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Recently, considerable attention has been devoted to distributed systems. It has 
become obvious that a high security level should be a fundamental prerequisite for 
organisations’ processes, both in the commercial and public sectors. A crucial 
foundation for securing a network is the ability to reliably authenticate 
communication parties. However, these systems face some critical security risks and 
challenges when they attempt to stabilise between security, efficiency and 
functionality.  
 
Developing a secure authentication protocol can be challenging; this thesis proposes 
an authentication scheme that employs two authentication factors involving 
something you know (password) and something you are (biometric) based on 
Identity-Based Cryptography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Two protocols have 
been chosen that provide mutual authentication and secure key exchange, which are 
the equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Due to a potential flaw in the 
protocols, guarding against attacks can be challenging. In order to alleviate some of 
the issues encountered with the new protocol, this thesis uses the encrypt-then-
authenticate method. 
 
Formal verification methods are used to evaluate the new protocol. First, finite-state 
machines are used to examine and predict the behaviour of the protocol. Modelling 
with this method shows that the new protocol can function correctly and behave 
correctly within the protocol description, even with invalid input or time delay. 
Second, Petri nets are used to model, simulate and analyse the new protocol. This 
thesis formulates several attack models via Petri nets in which the security of the 
proposed protocols is discussed precisely.  
 
Ultimately, this novel work ensures that the new protocol provides a coherent 
security concept and can be implemented over insecure channels while offering 
secure mutual authentication. 
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While the pervasive use of distributed systems facilitates end-to-end communication 
for organisations through effective use of information technology, it also poses 
serious risks and security threats. The main challenge organisations face is to 
develop a framework that promotes exchanging data for organisational entities. 
When most distributed systems were being designed, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
seemed to be the best solution for the scheme as far as security is concerned. PKI is 
presently deployed in most organisation implementations as it is perceived as a 
mature technology, which is widely supported and can be easily integrated with 
different systems. Examples of current initiatives that apply PKI on a large scale are 
the US eGov initiative (www.usa.gov), which is supported by Federal PKI 
(Caloyannides et al., 2003), and the Saudi Arabian e-Government Program 
1 
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(yesser.gov.sa) (Sahraoui, et al., 2006).  
One of the main issues concerning the security perspective in distributed systems is 
granting access to authorised users as well as the need to verify that the user is really 
who they claim to be. The most common solution to this problem is to deploy PKI 
(Evans and Yen, 2005) and digital signatures in large-scale systems. Even though 
PKI supports strong authentication and digital signatures, it has a few disadvantages. 
For example, users must be pre-enrolled, certificate directories can leak critical 
information, key recovery is difficult and costly, and boundary services (anti-spam, 
anti-virus, archiving) integration is very difficult (Voltage Security, 2006; Zhao et 
al., 2012). 
Thus, to take full advantages of the capabilities of distributed systems, end users 
need robust security solutions to achieve assurance when dealing with them. A 
variant of public key cryptography that derives public keys directly from unique 
identity information (such as an e-mail address) known by the user is called Identity-
Based Cryptography (IBC). This approach has recently received considerable 
attention from researchers (Lim and Paterson 2011; Yussoff et al. 2012; Mishra and 
Mukhopadyay, 2013; Nicanfar et al., 2014; Joonsang et al., 2015) as the 
development of ID-Based Cryptography offers great flexibility and obviates the 
requirement for user certificates since the identity of the user can be transformed into 
encryption keys and used for authentication. 
 
1.1	  PROBLEM	  STATEMENT	  
Without a secure and trusted infrastructure, organisations, such as governments, 
would leave data electronically unsecured and vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, 
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organisations constantly look for ways to deliver secure and reliable services. ID-
Based Cryptography introduces lightweight key management and offers encryption 
for data confidentiality and robust authentication, which are prerequisites for 
securing high-value transactions. The question this research addressing is, can 
biometric and ID-based security be successfully integrated into distributed systems 
and hence increase the usability and security of the authentication mechanism whilst 




The PKI approach uses asymmetric algorithms, where a pair of keys is used to 
encrypt and decrypt data. Usually, a public key is used for encryption and it is 
usually known to everybody and freely distributed while a private key is kept secret 
from one part and is used for decryption. 
In traditional PKI application, a user’s public key is certified with a certificate issued 
by a Certification Authority (CA) as shown in Figure 1.1. For example, Alice (the 
sender) must obtain Bob’s (the recipient) certificate in order to send him an 
encrypted message. However, both participants must first verify the corresponding 
certificates to check the validity of the public keys with a trusted authority.   
When many CAs are involved between two users, trust relationships among those 
CAs also have to be verified. PKI is an important infrastructure for managing the 
trust relationship among entities in a hierarchical manner. In certificate-based 
schemes key revocation is also an issue which requires a large amount of storage and 
computing. As a result, certificate-based public key cryptosystems require a large 
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amount of storage and computing time to store, verify and revoke certificates (Zhao 






In contrast to PKI, ID-based cryptography provides public keys for encryption, 
which are a combination of identity information known by users such as an e-mail 
address. For decryption, the corresponding private key is generated by a trusted third 
party called a Private Key Generator (PKG), which has been calculated from the user 
identity and the master secret as shown in Figure 1.2 and then given to the user 
through a secure channel (Shamir, 1985). The idea behind this scheme is to eliminate 
the public key distribution problem by making each user’s public key derivable from 


































Bob’s public key alice@a.com bob@b.com 
(5) Bob decrypts 
with private key 
Figure	  1.1:	  Public	  Key	  Infrastructure	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Since communications among organisations users are frequent, it is important to find 
a robust encryption and signature scheme to achieve a secure authentication. 
Identity-based cryptography is based on two popular approaches for the key 
management design: Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Bilinear Pairing Computation 





Also, what differentiates Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) from other infrastructures 
is the need for only a single connection and being able to operate offline, which is 
particularly useful in large distributed computing environments (Martin, 2008). 
 
1.3	  RESEARCH	  METHODOLOGY	  
Research methodology is the process of delivering an accurate explanation of the 
defined problem through a set of phases and steps. This step-by-step methodology 
































bob@b.com alice@a.com bob@b.com 
(4) Bob decrypts 
with private key 
Figure	  1.2:	  Identity	  Based	  Encryption	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weakness or vulnerability is overlooked and that all essential information is gathered 
before designing the protocol. Zelkowitz and Wallace (1998) categorised computer 
science approaches into four groups: scientific method, engineering method, 
empirical method, and analytical method.  
Freitas (2009) divided the computer science scientific research method into four 
classification: theoretical, experimental, and simulation. Whereas Elio et al. (2011) 
defined scientific research into five methodologies: formal, experimental, build, 
process and model. Given the nature of this research, it was challenging to find a 
suitable research methodology. As a result, a combination of the Freitas (2009) 
model approach and the Di et al. (2014) design security methodology were adopted 
to guide this research work. Di et al. (2014) methodology was chosen because it is 
based on a set of design principles to develop a step-by-step security protocol using a 
systemic approach. 
This thesis examines the application of ID-based cryptography infrastructure and 
how to integrate a biometric verification method into systems as an alternative 
solution to current PKI. The research methodology is developing an authentication 
protocol that enforces security properties. This thesis explicitly models and simulates 
the behaviour of the proposed protocol by using finite state machines and Petri nets.   
The research objectives and motivation stipulated that the best approach for the 
research is to be divided into two main parts (Figure 1.3). Each part consists of 
various phases to help develop and maintain a secure protocol. The first part of the 
research methodology consists of three cascading phases inspired by waterfall 
model: the first phase starts from gathering information and literature that are related 
to the research topic; the second phase defines protocol objectives and the security 
goals that the protocol must achieve in the end; the third phase highlights selection 
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and classification of the design principles. The second part of the methodology is 
regarded as an iterative process, which is very similar to spiral model (Boehm, 
1988). Typically, it tends to optimise the current design of the proposed protocol 
without changing its functionality and maintaining low-cost cryptographic 
techniques. The strong point of this methodology is that it can be used to benchmark 
research progress and assess the state and maturity of the proposed protocol. 
Phase 1 – Literature review 
This phase of the methodology was the initial phase of the research work. It started 
with a reviewing of current and related literature for the defined problem, then study 
and synthesise of information and literature relevant to the research area. The chief 
goal was to gain knowledge about the security issues related to the research area and 
to identify feasible solutions. Some of the research topics under investigations are: 
current trends and security issues in distributed systems, weaknesses in PKI, ID-
based encryption, biometric verification systems, and formal verification methods for 
evaluations. The information gathered mostly consisted of scientific papers, journals, 
conference proceedings, ISO standards and textbooks. 
Phase 2- Define protocol objectives and security goals 
After gathering and studying the literature, the objectives were formulated and linked 
to the fundamental aspects of security: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
Each protocol objective was achieved by reflecting the security aspects and protocol 
goals while underlining any potential threats. This was an important step because 
every aspect of the protocol is subject to an attack by a malicious entity and 
consistently reviewing the security goal keeps the protocol up-to-date.  
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Figure	  1.3:	  Research	  Methodology	  
 
Phase 3 - Select and classify design principles 
This phase concerned cryptographic primitives and authentication algorithms. The 
security of the protocol depends on using two-factor authentication: the biometric 
verification system, elliptic curve cryptography and ID-based Cryptography. It was 
necessary to select a method that allows key agreement protocol to be established 
without being exposed during the handshake procedure.  
Part II 
Phase 1- Literature Review 
Phase 2 – Define Protocol 
Objectives and Security Goals 
Phase 3 – Select and Classify 
Design Principles 
Phase 4- Design the Protocol 
Phase 5- Model the Protocol 
Behaviour and Functionalities 
Phase 6- Add Adversary 
Attack Model 
Phase 7- Verification and 
Analysis 
Part I 
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Phase 4 - Design the protocol 
In general, designing any protocol from scratch tends to be difficult. Therefore, the 
research focused on finding the most suitable lightweight protocol and improving its 
security characteristics. This was achieved by critically addressing each step of the 
protocol contexts and increasing the complexity of its security.  
Phase 5 - Model the protocol behaviour and functionalities (simulation) 
Behaviour modelling and simulation are usually easier and less expensive to run than 
in real environments. Simulation is a simple and safe practice to evaluate, and it 
tends to identify weaknesses and improve performance. Also, it defines the protocol 
steps and of what it is capable.  Modelling and simulation include description of state 
machines and Petri nets of the communication between the server and the client. Two 
tools have been chosen for the research. The first software is Visual Automata 
Simulator (1.2.1) designed by Jean Boret. This software was developed to draw and 
simulate different theoretical machines, including finite state automate and turning 
machines. The second software is TAPAAL 3.1.3 and it was developed by 
Department of Computer Science at AALborg University in Denmark. This tool is a 
graphical editor for modelling, simulation and verification of Timed-Acr Petri net 
model. Both tools are compatible for Linux, Windows and Mac OS X platforms.   
Phase 6- Add adversary attack model 
This phase of the methodology is vital. Adding an attacker model to the protocol 
helps to assess how the protocol would run with an intruder and what information 
can be intercepted during transition and how much information are exposed during 
transmission. This phase simulates attacks in order to assessing authentication 
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controls and whether the adversary can probe the system and obtain valuable 
information. 
Phase 7- Verification and analysis 
This phase helps to validate the protocol with various attacks and identify flaws to 
amend them. This phase formally ensures the new protocol satisfies its specification 
and functions soundly via simulation tools chosen for this research. Furthermore, it 
provides a deeper understanding of the protocol’s behaviour and simulate the 
progress of the protocol. 
 
1.4	  ORIGINAL	  CONTRIBUTIONS	  	  
The novel contribution of this research focuses on secure distributed systems and 
improving their authentication and communication. To guarantee the security of 
these systems, biometrics verification and ID-based cryptography are used. The new 
authentication protocol is based on a three-way handshake mechanism, which is the 
kernel of the protocol. This mechanism is applied to negotiate the secure components 
of a session between the client and the server, such as verifying the identity of the 
client using biometric data and password, agreeing on cryptographic algorithms, 
mutually authenticating each other, and using biometric and ID-based encryption 
techniques to generate session keys.  
The proposed protocol allows a client and a server to exchange encrypted messages 
with each other. Symmetric cryptography is used to ensure that the subsequent 
messages are protected during transition. Each enciphered message is appended with 
a MAC value to alert the recipient in case of message tampering.  The aim of the new 
protocol is to establish a shared session key between the server and the client with 
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mutual authentication using the encrypt-then-authenticate method. The protocol 
achieves cryptographic goals using bit-wise exclusive-OR (XOR) operations and 
collision-free one-way hash functions as the main cryptographic operation. 
Additionally, applying symmetric cryptography adds another layer of protection.  
The new protocol is evaluated via two formal verification methods: finite-state 
machine (FSM) and Petri nets (PN). The security analysis via PN showed that the 
protocol is secure against most known active and passive attacks. Furthermore, the 
new protocol generation does not require heavy computation, such as modular 
exponentiations and digital signatures and it can be implemented efficiently in 
devices with poor computing power such as smartcards, ATMs and smartphones. 
 
1.5	  THESIS	  ORGANISATION	  
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows, mostly in accordance with the research 
methodology. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter introduces background material on computer security and security 
metrics, which includes availability, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and 
authenticity. Furthermore it discusses the controls and the cryptographic 
considerations that are effective for each metric. Finally, the chapter provides a brief 
discussion on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the most recent application on 
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Chapter 3: Design Analysis  
This chapter introduces and explains some of the concepts that underpin the work in 
this thesis. It reviews the original steps of identity-based cryptography, briefly 
discusses biometric verification systems. Then, it analyses several attacks that 
authentication protocols may encounter. Finally, it examines two simulation tools. 
Chapter 4: The new Protocol Architecture 
This chapter draws a general idea of protocol architecture and the cryptographic 
techniques used to establish a secure key exchange. Additionally, it illustrates basic 
security properties to develop secure methodology. 
Chapter 5: Protocol Design 
This chapter describes the new protocol phases and the objectives the protocol 
should achieve.  The proposed scheme consists of four phases: system initialisation 
phase, registration phase, login phase, and authentication phase.  It identifies 
explicitly the process of each phase and discusses the defence mechanism used.  
Chapter 6: Performance and Behaviour Modelling 
This chapter elaborates the details of the finite-state verification of the new protocol 
and identifies the functionalities of each phase. Also, it studies the behaviour of each 
machine created for each phase and how they interrelate, even with invalid input or 
time delay. Modelling with a finite-state machine helps to understand the behaviour 
of cryptographic protocol. Additionally, it offers accurate results and provides a clear 
perception of the system’s characteristics. The analysis presented in this chapter 
covers the process of the three-way handshake used to negotiate the session key, and 
examines the behaviours of the protocol and enumerates all possible states it can 
reach. 
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Chapter 7: Security Evaluation 
This chapter presents a PN approach to modelling, simulating and analysing the new 
protocol. A formal approach like PNs allows one to formally represent 
communication protocols. For the sake of simplicity, a complex PN model will not 
be discussed until all attacks are demonstrated and the model has proved to be secure. 
This chapter shows how Petri nets are used to model and analyse the cryptographic 
protocol into two steps. First, the new protocol is modelled without an adversary, and 
then a generic adversary model is added to examine all possible adversary 
behaviours. The chapter presents an innovative idea to simulate different attacks such 
as man-in-the-middle attacks, parallel session attacks, and reflection attacks.  
Chapter 8: The Modified Protocol 
To give more perspective on the new protocol, this chapter is full of rich detail to 
finalise the new protocol. It discusses the enhancements to improve the new protocol 
and it presents a modified version of it. This includes another run of validation and 
evaluation via FSM and PN. Also, it briefly discusses various attacks against the 
modified proposed protocol. This chapter proves the benefit gained from Chapter 5 
and 6 by using formal methods of analysis. This suggests how the methodology is 
capable of detecting flaws. 
Chapter 9: Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Works 
This chapter presents a summary of the proposed protocol and the security criteria 
provided for organisations. It briefly discusses some of the limitations that occurred 
during the research and the approach. In addition, it discusses further work that needs 
to be undertaken in this field. 
 
















This chapter describes all aspects of computer security. By examining them, one 
will be aware of a computer’s major problem areas. This chapter introduces some 
background knowledge of computer security, further discusses the controls that are 
effective against them and how current research is addressing the open problems. 
Finally, the chapter provides a brief discussion on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
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2.1	  WHAT	  IS	  SECURITY?	  	  	  
“Uncertainty is the only certainty there is, and knowing how to live with insecurity is 
the only security” 
John Allen Paulos  	  
Information security is the art of protecting information and information systems and 
understanding how to identify risks and weakness, as well as how to defeat or 
eliminate them. For this reason, it is essential to assess the true security profile, and 
this can be accomplished by understanding the source of risk and weaknesses that 
exist in the system. The most common risk is embodied by the external attacker 
accessing an organisation information system via the Internet. Usually these 
attackers break into a system for various reasons, for example, to steal information, 
or disrupt business and create chaos, or simply just for personal gratification.. 
Nowadays organisations view the computers on the Internet as valuable potential 
sources of information. Therefore, organisations always seek to secure their system 
and create a balance between security and functionality. To protect themselves, 
organisations must understand the impact of attacks and what the attackers are 
capable of in order to stop and limit the damage. 
In essence, security must be assessed from multiple perspectives for the best result. 
These perspectives range from physical security of the machines to the configuration 
of the firewalls to the trustworthiness of employees. The security assessment of a 
system can be assessed by the CIA triad, sometimes called the security triad, 
comprising: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The CIA triad plays a 
significant role in information security. It forms a foundation aspect that comes to 
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protect information by recognising security into three major areas. The goal of CIA 
is to ensure that protective measures are properly implemented to prevent attacks and 
intrusion and to limit the damages, for example, eliminating unauthorised access. 
The security metrics of the CIA triad are: 
• Confidentiality: ensures that an asset/data is viewed only by authorised 
parties 
• Integrity: ensures that the data/asset is modified only by authorised parties 
• Availability: ensures that the systems can be used by any authorised parties  
These metrics are the basis of computer security. They help to define the objects of 
security threats and examine techniques to prevent security breaches or at least 
mitigate their effect. However, Sloan and Warner (2013) argue the CIA triad covers 
all information and it does not fully describe identity. Attacks can occur in the 
process of authentication by defeating online authentication. Any attacker who 
successfully impersonates a legitimate user would compromise both confidentiality 
and integrity by stealing protected information and altering data (Sloan and Warner, 
2013). 
In addition to the CIA, ISO 7498-2 added two more properties that are desirable, 
especially in communication networks (Pfleeger et al., 2015): 
• Authentication: verifies entity access to system resources, including data and 
applications. Authentication controls include authorisations and 
accountability (Stapleton, 2014; Pfleeger et al., 2015). 
• Non-repudiation or accountability: a combination of integrity and 
authentication (Pfleeger et al., 2015) 
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These two extra properties extend security notions with regard to identity and cover 
all the security aspects that were missing in the integrity and authenticity. There are 
many measures and controls available to provide security. To understand their 
impact it is necessary to review the types of attacks that can affect the security 
metrics. The Figure 1.2 is an enhanced version, which is adopted from Sloan and 
Warner (2013). It shows the different attacks that can be launched against the 
security metric if the vulnerability inherited with it were not covered. Be recognising 
the type of attacks against each metric, preventive and detection measures can be 
implemented to strengthen the security. 





Figure	  2.1	  Complete	  an	  overview	  of	  types	  of	  attacks	  and	  examples	  	  	  
It is often hard to separate attacks on authentication alone from attacks on 
confidentiality and integrity, as the goal of many attacks is to steal personal 
information  (by attacking confidentiality) and successfully impersonate someone 
Types	  of	  attacks	  
Integrity	  Authentication	  and	  repudiation	  Confidentiality	  Availability	  
DoS	   DDoS	   Packet	  sniffing	   Session	  hijacking	   Password	  	  cracking	  
Backdoor	   Software,	  hardware,	  and	  web	  server	  vulnerabilities	  
Social	  engineering	   Phishing	  and	  pharming	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legitimate (by attacking authentication) in order to alter or delete information (by 
attacking integrity). These attacks are related to each other because they may affect 




Availability can be applied to data and services provided. It must ensure that the 
information must be accessible to authorised users at all times. Failure to provide 
services to users is one of the issues effecting availability. For example, experience 
overload, slow computer response, or access to information is denied due to denial of 
service attacks. Availability can be defined as a combination of the following criteria: 
capacity, performance, fault tolerance, and usability.  
A typical example of attacking availability is the denial-of-service (DoS) attack, 
where the target is swamped with extremely large volumes of network traffic and 
becomes completely overwhelmed with requests. Another example is distributed 
denial-of service (DDoS) attack, where the requests appear to come from multiple 
sources. The target would have difficulty in distinguishing the attack traffic from 
legitimate ones. These attacks cause considerable disruption and force the 
organisation’s website to shut down (Sloan and Warner, 2013).   
Therefore, while availability is an important security metric, this research will not 
discuss availability in detail and how this metric affect the new protocol. It is beyond 
the scope of the thesis to engage in a detailed discussion. 
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2.1.2	  CONFIDENTIALITY	  
The aspect of confidentiality is straightforward. It refers to the secrecy to access 
protected data by authorised entities only. In other words, confidentiality identifies 
the security control requirements to protect the disclosure of information from 
unauthorised individuals or systems during the data life cycle (Stapleton, 2014).  
Data resides in many places, for example data stored in the database or data that is 
moving across the network. Ensuring confidentiality can be difficult because data 
classifications require different levels of control. For example, determining what 
level of control needed in protecting cryptographic keys is different to protecting 
passwords, and protecting passwords is different to protecting account numbers 
(Stapleton, 2014). It is important to emphasise the security controls and protect data 
from unauthorised access during transmission, or in storage. The adoption of data 
encryption provides mitigation against data breaches. Packet sniffing is one example 
that threatens confidentiality. To prevent sniffing of critical information encryption 
provides a good defence. Protecting confidentiality of data can be achieved through 
the combination of encryption and integrity protection techniques. The next section 
discusses the cryptographic consideration to guarantee confidentiality.  
	  
2.3.1	  CRYPTOGRAPHIC	  CONSIDERATIONS	  
Throughout the ages, cryptography was used as a method to protect information. 
Encryptions such as Caesar’s cipher and One-Time Pads were invented to protect 
sensitive data (Gregg, 2014). Cryptography is one way to protect computer security. 
It is considered one of the most powerful tools in delivering security by making it 
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harder or meaningless for the attacker to interpret the encoded data without knowing 
how the encryption was done.  
Cryptography can be found in almost every information security control and it can be 
used to improve confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation. For 
example, symmetric encryption provides confidentiality, hashing provides integrity, 
and digital signatures provides authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation (Gregg, 
2014). 
Cryptographic algorithms can be categorised into three groups: symmetric, 
asymmetric and hashing. Each algorithm possesses a unique role in the world of 
cryptography and can be applied to protect data while in transit or at rest. The next 
section will explain the difference between symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. 
Hashing will be discussed in section (2.4.1). Confidentiality can be achieved through 
the use of encryption, offering an easy solution to protect informational assets in case 
the equipment contained within them is stolen, accessed by unauthorised users, or 
lost. The next section will discuss the difference between symmetric and asymmetric 
algorithms.  
	  	  	  
2.3.1.1	  Symmetric	  Cryptography	  
Symmetric algorithm utilises a shared key and both the sender and recipient share the 
same secret key for the encryption and decryption process. Furthermore, it is well 
known to operate at extreme speeds -being one hundred times faster than asymmetric 
cryptography - and can encrypt and decrypt quickly (Murphy, 2015; Gregg, 2014; 
Gibson, 2012). Additionally, it is considered strong and hard to break if a large key is 
used (Gregg, 2014). 
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Symmetric cryptography can be used to encrypt data at rest and data in transit 
(Murphy, 2015). Symmetric encryption comprises two types of ciphers known as a 
block cipher and a steam cipher. The block cipher processes the message by dividing 
the input data into blocks while the stream cipher processes the message by dividing 
the input data into bits. Symmetric algorithms include (Gregg, 2014): 
§ Data Encryption Standard (DES): This is the most common symmetric 
algorithm used. DES functions as a block cipher and processes 64 bits of 
plain text at a time to output 64-bit blocks of cipher text using a 56-bit key. 
DES has four modes: electronic codebook mode (ECB), cipher block 
chaining mode (CBC), cipher feedback mode (CFB), and output feedback 
mode (OFB). To extend the usefulness of DES, 3DES was developed as a 
multiple encryption, which can use two or three keys to encrypt data. 
§ Advanced Encryption Standard (AES): also known as Rijndael, this is an 
iterated block cipher that supports variable key and block lengths of 128, 192, 
or 256 bits. In 2002, the U.S. government adopted AES to protect classified 
information because DES was vulnerable to brute-force attacks and meet-in-
the-middle attacks. AES is considered a fast, simple, and robust encryption 
mechanism. Each step is performed involving four stages during each round, 
as follows: SubByte, Shift Row, Mix Column, and Add Round Key.  
§ Rivest Cipher (RC): This includes RC2, RC4, RC5, and RC6. The ciphers of 
this family all designed by Ron Rivest. RC4 is a stream-based cipher and is 
faster than block mode ciphers and most commonly found in 128-bit key 
versions. RC5 is a block-based cipher and the number of rounds performed 
ranges from 0 to 255 and the key ranges from 0 bits to 2040 bits in size. 
Finally, RC6 features variable key sizes and rounds and includes two new 
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features - integer multiplication and four 4-bit working registers. 
Even though symmetric algorithm has a fast encryption and decryption process, it 
also has three disadvantages. The first problem is key distribution (Gregg, 2014). For 
example, a secure method must be applied during key transfer in order for this 
algorithm to be effective. The second challenge with symmetric encryption is 
privately sharing the key (Gibson, 2012). The shared key must only be known by the 
entities encrypting and decrypting the data. The dual use of keys causes weakness in 
the algorithm and the confidentially would be violated if the key was discovered by 
other entities who were able to decrypt the data.  
	  
2.3.1.2	  Asymmetric	  Cryptography	  
Asymmetric encryption is based on an asymmetric algorithm that utilises two keys 
for encryption and decryption. It differs from symmetric encryption because it uses a 
difficult mathematical problem, which is called a trapdoor function (Gregg, 2014). 
Trapdoor functions perform on the difficulty in factoring large prime numbers. These 
functions are useful because it can perform in both directions. For example, forward 
direction is used for encryption and signature verification, and the inverse direction 
is used for decryption and signature generation (Gregg, 2014). This algorithm, by 
design, is relatively slow when compared to symmetric algorithms (Murphy, 2015). 
Also, it requires a longer key length in order to achieve the same level of security 
that is achieved through symmetric cryptography (Chapple et al., 2013; Ballad et al., 
2011). The most widely used asymmetric cryptography solutions are as follows:	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Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman introduced the first asymmetric cryptography 
algorithm in 1976. It was originally used to distribute the symmetric keys and is 
based on the mathematics of discreet logarithms in a finite field and the use of one-
way functions (Gregg, 2014; Chapple et al., 2013; Ballad et al., 2011). The Diffe-
Hellman is used as a component in Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and IPesc (Gregg, 
2014) and it allows two entities to receive the symmetric key without any prior 
communication. The key exchange mechanism for Diffie-Hellman is constructed as 
follows (Konstantinou et al., 2013; Chapple et al., 2013; Ballad et al., 2011): 
Suppose two communicating parties, A and B, want to agree on a shared secret key, 
they may execute the following steps.  
1. A and B first agree on a finite cyclic group G as well as one of its generators 
g (it is not necessary to keep g secret).  
2. A initiates the protocol by generating a secret random positive integer a.  
3. B also generates a secret random positive integer b.  
4. Then A’s public value is computed as ga mod p while B’s public value is gb 
mod p.  
5. Next, A and B exchange their public values, A computes gab= (gb)a mod p, 
and B computes gba = (ga )b mod p. It is easy to check that gab= gba = k. 
6. A and B can now communicate using their secret shared key which they can, 
subsequently, use to communicate by means of a shared key block cipher. 
The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks because no 
authentication occurs when the public keys are sent (Kahate, 2013; Chapple et al., 
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2013; Ballad et al., 2011). To overcome this problem, the use of digital signature or 
the Password Authentication Key Exchange (PAKE) form of Diffie-Hellman can be 
effective (Gregg, 2014).  
Rivest, Shamir, and Aldeman (RSA) 
RSA is the popular asymmetric algorithm and it can be used for digital signature, key 
exchange, encryption, and decryption (Gregg, 2014; Chapple et al., 2013; Ballad et 
al., 2011). Although RSA is not as fast as a symmetric encryption, it is strong 
because it uses two large prime numbers. This algorithm derives both the public and 
private keys by multiplying two large prime numbers. While it is easy to multiply 
two numbers, it is extremely complex to factor the product of these two large prime 
numbers (Gregg, 2014; Gibson, 2012).  The RSA algorithm was developed to 
resolve man-in-the-middle attacks (Chapple et al., 2013).  For example, When the 
RSA is used in a PKI system, the cryptosystem generates a symmetric key using a 
symmetric algorithm such as AES. The cryptosystem encrypts the symmetric key 
with the receiver’s public key. Only the receiver will be able to decrypt the message 
via the use of his/her private key and be able to retrieve the symmetric key. RSA key 
sizes can increase up to 4096 bits in length and cracking a key of this size requires an 
extraordinary amount of computer processing power and time (Gregg, 2014). The 
RSA cryptosystem can be found in many products, such as Microsoft Internet 
Explorer and Mozilla Firefox (Gregg, 2014). 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has recently received a great deal of 
consideration due to the fact that not only does ECC require smaller key size and 
lesser bandwidth, but that also the computational cost and storage space is effectively 
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low (Hankerson et al., 2004). ECC is more efficient than typical asymmetric 
encryption methods such RSA because it takes less processing power, which is 
useful in hardware devices like cell phones and tablets (Gregg, 2014; Gibson, 2012) 
 
	  
Let	  p	  be	  a	  prime	  number,	  and	  let	  Fp	  denote	  the	  field	  of	  integers	  modulo	  p.	  An	  
elliptic	  curve	  E	  over	  Fp	  is	  defined	  by	  an	  equation	  of	  the	  form	  
E:	  y2	  =	  x3	  +	  ax	  +	  b	  
Where	  a	  and	  b	  are	   elements	  of	   a	   finite	   field	  with	  p
n	  
elements,	  where	  p	   is	   a	  
prime	  larger	  than	  3.	  A	  pair	  (x,y),	  where	  x,	  y	  ∈	  Fp,is	  a	  point	  on	  the	  curve	  if	  (x,	  y)	  
satisfies	  the	  equation	  above.	  The	  point	  at	  infinity,	  denoted	  by	  ∞,	  is	  also	  said	  to	  
be	  on	  the	  curve.	  The	  set	  of	  all	  the	  points	  on	  E	  is	  denoted	  by	  E(Fp).	  
	  
The key exchange mechanism for ECC is constructed as the following (Hankerson et 
al., 2004): 
A and B agree on an Elliptic Curve E (specified by the field F and parameters a, 
b) and a base point g on E. 
(1) A secretly selects an integer x, then computes X = xg and sends it to B. 
(2) B secretly selects an integer y, then computes Y = yg and sends it to A. 
(3) A computes:  xY = x(yg) =xyg. 
(4) B computes:  yX = y(xg) =yxg=xyg. 
Now, A and B both share the point xyg which they can use to create a secret key. 
ECC maintains the same security level of the RSA cryptosystem, but with small key 
sizes, bandwidth savings and faster computation These features are desirable in most 
security applications where computational power and circuit space is limited, such as 
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smart cards and wireless devices (Yokoyama, 2000; Koblitz et al., 2000; Ballad et 
al., 2011; Chapple et al., 2013). The French National Institute in Computer Science 
and Control tested the strength of ECC in early 2000. They used a distributed 
network of more than 9,500 computers and were able to brute force ECC and recover 
the 109-bit key that was used to encrypt a message. This only proves that it is hard to 
break ECC on a single machine and it would take almost 500 years to achieve 
(Gregg, 2014). However, if larger keys were used, it would take longer to crack it. 
Therefore, brute-force attacks are difficult to mount and they are extremely time-
consuming and computationally intensive.  
	  
2.4	  INTEGRITY	  	  
Integrity is another important pillar in information security, and can be recognised in 
different aspects. It can be thought as a way to detect errors and modifications and 
reflects the logical correctness (Andress, 2014; Gregg, 2014). For example, integrity 
ensures that information remains correct from the point it was created until it reaches 
the desired location. Integrity is significant for many organisations, especially during 
the exchange of sensitive or secret information that allows users to have confidence 
in its correctness. Therefore, integrity of information must be protected in storage 
and transit. Protecting integrity of information in storage can be accomplished by 
using access and audit controls as well as cryptography through hashing algorithms 
applications (Gregg, 2014).  As for integrity in transit, information can be protected 
by applying security controls to the protocols, such as hashing and cryptography 
(Andress, 2014; Gregg, 2014).  
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2.4.1	  CRYPTOGRAPHIC	  CONSIDERATIONS	  
To maintain integrity, using simple cryptographic techniques such as checksums help 
preventing unauthorised modification, forging or replaying messages. Integrity can 
be enforced by employing one or two of the integrity check methods. Session 
hijacking is one example of attack on the integrity. 
	  
2.4.1.1 Hash and Message Digest 
What makes hash algorithms plausible is the noticeable improvement of performance 
and efficiency. For example, the hash value used in such algorithms is smaller than 
the original message. The same hash value is used to verify the integrity of the 
message. 
The two most popular hashing algorithms are the Message-Digest algorithm family 
and Secure Hash Algorithm family. An example of each algorithm family is 
explained below: 
§ MD5: This produces a fixed 128-bit output and divides the data into blocks 
of 512 bits. MD5 digests are widely used for software verification and 
forensics to ensure that a downloaded file has been unchanged. 
§ SHA-1: This generates a 160-bit hash value and can be used as input to the 
digital signature algorithm for both generation and verification of message 
(Pachghar, 2015). However, SHA algorithms are considered less prone to 
collision due to the large message digest.  Other examples of SHA are SHA-2 
and the soon-to-arrive SHA-3 
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However, MD5 is considered faster when compared with SHA-1, but has been 
attacked and found to be less secure. MD5 is prone to collisions and it can be easy to 
generate. Being collision resistance is one of the main properties of hash function. 
The main properties of cryptographic hash functions defined as the following (Dong 
and Chen, 2012; Menezes et al., 2010): 
1. Pre-image resistance — for essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is 
computationally infeasible to find any input which hashes to that output, i.e. to 
find any preimage x’ such that h(x’) = y when given any y for which a 
corresponding input is not known. 
2. 2nd-pre-image resistance — it is computationally infeasible to find any second 
input which has the same output as any specified input, i.e. given x, to find a 2nd 
pre-image x’ = x such that h(x) = h(x’). 
3. Collision resistance — it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct 
inputs x, x’ which hash to the same output, i.e. such that h(x) = h(x’). (Note that 
here there is free choice of both inputs.) 
	  
2.4.1.2 Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
A message authentication code is a sophisticated type of keyed hash function that 
provides message authenticity by a symmetric technique. Menezes et al. (2010) and 
Stallings (2011) defined a message authentication code as an algorithm that takes 
two functionally distinct parameters - a message and a secret key - and produces a 
fixed-size output. The MAC helps to detect unauthorised changes in data transfer and 
provides integrity as well as verification of the message source. The MAC can be 
recognised as a cryptographic checksum that basically works as a hash function and 
	   29	  
condenses a variable length message with a secret key to a fixed-sized authenticator 
or code. The MAC computation is performed as follows (Smart, 2008; Stallings, 
2011): 
code = MACk(m) 
Where 
• MAC is the check function, 
•  k is the secret key,  
• m is the message. 	  
2.4.1.3 Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) 
Hashed message authentication code is a strong integrity method that employs a 
symmetric encryption with a hash algorithm. It detects any changes in the cleartext 
but it cannot stop attackers changing the contents of the original data. The HMAC 
computation is performed as follows (Ramkumar, 2014): 
code = MACK(m)= H ((K ⊕ Po) || H(( K ⊕ Pi ) || M) ) 
Where: 
H is a cryptographic hash function, 
K is the shared key by the sender and receiver  
Po is the standard outer pad and Po = 0x5c5c…5c5c 
Pi is the standard inner pad and Pi = 0x3636…3636 
M is the message to be authenticated, 
|| denotes concatenation, 
  denotes exclusive or (XOR), 
The two parties involved in the process must pre-share a secret key. First, the sender 
performs XOR twice to combine the secret key once with the outer pad and another 
inner pad, and then combines the result with plaintext and hashes the output using 
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algorithms like MD5 or SHA-1. Finally, the hash code is combined with the secret 
key again to create an HMAC. Once the receiver receives the HMAC, he performs 
the same process locally and compares the result of computed HMAC with the 
sender’s HAMC. If the two values match, the sender is authenticated and the 
message’s integrity is assured (Ramkumar, 2014; Conrad, 2012). An example 
protocol that employs HMAC for data integrity is the SSL protocol (Stapleton, 
2014). 
	  
2.4.1.4 Digital Signature 
Digital signature is an application of asymmetric encryption that provides 
authentication. It validates the integrity of the data and the sender. The following 
steps illustrate the mechanism of digital signature (Gregg, 2014; Stapleton, 2014): 
1. A produces a message digest by passing a message through a hash algorithm.  
2. The message digest is then encrypted using A’s private key. 
3. The message is forwarded, along with the encrypted message digest to the 
recipient B. 
4. B creates a message digest from the message with the same hashing 
algorithm that A used. B then decrypts A’s signature digest by using A’s 
public key. 
5. Finally, B compares the two message digests - the one originally created by A 
and the other that was created by it. If the two values match, B has proof that 
the message is unaltered and did come from A. 
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2.5	  NON-­‐REPUDIATION	  AND	  AUTHENTICITY	  
These two properties are used to ensure that a sender of data is provided with proof 
of delivery and the recipient is assured of the sender’s identity. Today, the Internet 
makes it difficult to trust others without knowing whom we are dealing with. That is 
why non-repudiation became very critical. Non-repudiation is a set of controls 
necessary to prevent repudiation. It is a method to ensure that individuals cannot later 
deny their own actions and it can be thought of as a combination of integrity and 
authentication controls that have to be verified by a third party. Non-repudiation is 
achieved through digital signatures, digital certificates, and message authentication 
codes (Gregg, 2014; Stapleton, 2014). Authentication is a method that enables one to 
verify the identity of individuals. Authentication includes proactive controls 
including methods for single, mutual, and multifactor authentication. It involves 
knowledge, possession, biometrics and cryptographic factors. Passwords, tokens, 
PINs and biometrics are common examples for person authentication. Authentication 
is related to integrity and the same cryptographic considerations of integrity applied 
to authentication. Authenticity can be achieved through MAC, HMAC, digital 
signature and trusted time stamps.  For example, MAC can be used for authenticity 
since the sender and the receiver share the same key. Authenticity is also necessary 
in asymmetric public keys to prevent adversarial modification.  
	  
2.6	  AUTHENTICATION	  PROTOCOLS	  
Authentication protocols often use cryptographic protocols and they are essential in 
real world applications. Various protocols have been proposed to provide mutual 
authentication and key establishment security (Dong and Chen, 2012). Moreover, 
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authentication protocols are prone to errors and flaws which make it difficult to 
detect sometimes. Many protocols have been proved to be flawed even after a period 
of time of their publication. Chapter 3 discusses various examples of flawed 
protocols. However, therein lies the problem and question of whether the security of 
an authentication protocol is adequate and has been extensively studied to meet all 
the fundamental security measures. This thesis will introduce a new security 
protocol, which was theoretically proved secure against attacks. Furthermore, it will 
uncover some flaws found in the new protocol and suggest how to amend them and 
achieve security. 
An authentication protocol is a protocol to provide one entity some degree of 
assurance about the identity of the entity with whom it is communicating. Both 
entities must follow a set of rules to achieve authentication. There are a number of 
different authentication mechanisms, but all serve this same purpose. 
	  
2.6.1	  PUBLIC	  KEY	  INFRASTRUCTURE	  (PKI)	  
PKI is a framework that consists of a set of security services that enable the user to 
manage, create, store, and distribute keys and digital certificates (Stapleton, 2014; 
Stalling, 2011; Graves, 2010). In reality, PKI is highly reliable with a relatively 
sophisticated user infrastructure. It was developed to overcome the problem of 
exchanging keys among big groups. The component of the PKI framework include 
the following (Gregg, 2014; Stapleton, 2014): 
§ Certificate authority (CA): a function managed by a third party to issue 
certificates to authorised users. Basically, CA creates, signs and verifies the 
authenticity of certificates.  
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§ Certificate revocation list (CRL): this list is maintained by CA to verify the 
accuracy and integrity of the digital certificates.  
§ Registration authority (RA): the RA cannot generate a certificate but it can 
accept requests, verify identities and passes these information to the CA for 
certificate generation. The purpose of RA is to reduce the load on the CA.  
§ Certificate server: this server keeps the database of stored certificates. 
§ X.509 standard: the accepted standard for digital certificates.  
The technology behind PKI provides a true robust example of non-repudiation 
through digital certificates. It also invokes the sender to use their private key to 
encrypt messages to achieve confidentiality. However, one major issue affecting PKI 
is a compromised CA. If the attackers could convince a CA that they are legitimate 
users, the CA would issue them a certificate. Certificate management can be 
challenging. Sometimes vulnerabilities can be found in the protocol that is using PKI 
for example, the BEAST (2011), CRIME (2012), and Lucky13 (2013) attacks on 
SSL/TLS. Another weakness found in PKI based on OpenSSL is the Heartbleed 
vulnerability (2014). The Heartbleed is a recent vulnerability that can expose the 
original private key. This means both keys and certificate are likely to be 
compromised undetectably. Unfortunately, this small bug does not require any attack 
on cryptographic algorithms. In fact, it is the result of a simple bound check in the 
code that handles TLS (Meyer and Schwenk, 2014; Ristic, 2014; Zhang et al., 2014). 
	  
2.6.2	  IDENTITY-­‐BASED	  CRYPTOGRAPHY	  
The idea of identity-based cryptography was originally proposed by Shamir in 1984 
but practical identity-based encryption schemes were not found until 2001 by Boneh 
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and Franklin. The idea behind identity-based cryptography is to eliminate the 
requirement of checking the validity of certificates in PKI. For example, using 
identities instead of digital certificates can save significant amounts of resources for 
computation and communications, and resolve scalability problems (Joonsang et al., 
2015). The attractive benefits gained from applying identity-based cryptography 
draws researchers’ attentions to test and implement this public key approach to 
different environments, such as in wireless sensors networks, grid computing, and 
digital rights management systems.  
Mishra and Mukhopadyay (2013) proposed a certificateless authenticated key 
agreement protocol for Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems by utilising 
identity-based encryption. The main motivation of their research is to protect 
authorised digital contents and prevent illegal distribution by utilising identity-based 
encryption. They show that their protocol ensures flawless mutual authentication and 
that it establishes a session key between the user and the server.  Their protocol 
eliminates the use of trust certificate authority, uses PKG-generated partial private 
key share, and self-generates secret values to solve key escrow problems (Mishra and 
Mukhopadyay, 2013).   
Yussoff et al. (2012) proposed IBE-Trust protocols to confirm the trustworthiness of 
nodes in wireless sensor networks (WSN). They aimed to design a trusted platform 
and an energy efficient authentication protocol. Their protocol proves that it can 
establish trust in WSN with less computation and communication, and most 
importantly, eliminates the need for neighbouring evaluation for trust management 
systems (TMS)  (Lopez et al., 2010), or relying on external security chips.  
Recent research on gird computing has focused on implementing identity-based 
cryptography into gird security architectures since the majority of current grid 
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systems use PKI to securely authenticate grid users. Lim and Paterson (2011) 
proposed a customised identity-based key agreement protocol that is compatible with 
the Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI). Their new protocol provides a more 
lightweight secure job submission environment for grid users. The analysis shows 
that the computational costs in Lim and Paterson’s proposal are approximately less 
costly when compared with PKI. In terms of communication costs, their scheme 
appears to be significantly more lightweight and less bandwidth-consuming than PKI 
because of its certificate-free nature and small key sizes (Lim and Paterson, 2011). 
Nicanfar et al. (2014) propose an efficient scheme that provides mutual 
authentication based on identity-based cryptography for secure smart grid 
communication. Their protocol is capable of preventing various attacks such as an 
unknown key-share attack and insider attacks, while reducing the management 
overhead. Their scheme shows an improvement in key management by periodically 
refreshing public and private key pairs as well as utilising smaller key sizes and 
reducing resource consumption in the system (Nicanfar et al., 2014). 
Joonsang et al. (2015) proposed a secure cloud computing-based framework for big 
data information management called “Smart-Frame”. The main idea behind this 
framework is to develop a hierarchical structure of cloud computing centres at three 
levels to provide different types of computing services for information management 
and big data analysis. Furthermore, the security of this framework is based on 
identity-based encryption, signature and proxy re-encryption. The scheme achieved 
scalability, flexibility and data confidentiality (Joonsang et al., 2015). 
In light of that, previous research showed that replacing PKI with identity-based 
infrastructure could offer an alternative security infrastructure with lightweight 
computation.  
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2.7	  SUMMARY	  
Computer security revolves around the protection, prevention and detection of any 
unauthorised use of all data as well as computer systems.  Information security is 
achieved through a process that is a combination of three aspects. It seeks to prevent 
unauthorised access (confidentiality) or modification (integrity) of data while 
maintaining access to resources (availability). Moreover, this chapter presents an 
overview of the controls available to protect information and examining some of the 
controls in detail. Table (2.1) maps the security method to achieve certain security 
aspects.  
 
Table	  2.1	  Cryptography	  services	  summary	  
Confidentiality Integrity Authentication Non-repudiation 
Encryption    
 MAC MAC  
 HMAC HMAC  
 Digital signature Digital signature Digital Signature 	  
Table 2.2 provides a comparison summary of symmetric algorithms and asymmetric 
algorithms attributes. Even though encryption is an important tool in computer 
security, encryption does not solve all computer problems. Protection of data can be 
achieved through the combination of encryption and integrity protection techniques. 
Thus, it is important to implement a combination of the controls to secure valuable 
information and resources.  Furthermore, this chapter presents the most recent 
application of identity-based cryptography and research suggests it can be a good 
authentication infrastructure in term on fast communication and low cost.  
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Table	  2.2	  Symmetric	  versus	  Asymmetric	  attributes	  
Attribute Symmetric Algorithms Asymmetric Algorithms 
Keys 
One key is shared between 
two or more entities 
Public key is available to all. 
Private key is kept secret to 
the owner and never shared 
Example 
algorithms 
Des, 3DES, AES RSA, ECC, Diffie-Hellman 
Key exchange 
Requires sharing keys in 
advance through another 
secure mechanism 









































One cannot appreciate the technical details underlying security protocol without 
understanding the services it provides. This chapter reviews the original concept of 
identity-based cryptography, discusses biometric verification systems briefly, and 
highlights various attacks that communication protocols may encounter. Finally, it 
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3.1	  IDENTITY-­‐BASED	  ENCRYPTION	  	  
In order to introduce ID-Based Encryption to distributed systems, an initial review of 
the current literature is required to provide an overview of the related topics. The 
idea of identity-based cryptography was originally proposed by Shamir in 1984 but 
practical identity-based encryption schemes were not found until recently. Several 
proposals have been made to tackle these problems and to improve the IBE scheme.   
In 2001, Boneh & Franklin developed a fully functional ID-based encryption 
scheme, which can be constructed efficiently by using Weil pairing on elliptic 
curves. The PKG in this scheme can be distributed so that the master key is never 
available in a single location. This scheme based its security under the bilinear 
Diffie-Hellman assumption:  
“Let G1; G2  be two groups of prime order q. Let ê:  G1  X  G1  àG2 be an admissible 
bilinear map and let P be a generator of G1. The BDH problem in <G1,  G2,  ê> is as 
follows:  
Given <P,  aP,  bP,  cP>for some a,  b,  c  ∈  Z*q compute W  =  ê  (P;  P)abc  ∈  G2.” 
According to Boneh & Franklin (2001), there are four algorithms: Setup, Extract, 
Encrypt, and Decrypt called “BasicIdent”. These algorithms are defined as the 
following: 
v Setup 
Given a security parameter k  ∈  Z+ and letting g be some parameter generator, the 
algorithm works as follows: 
(1) Run g on input k to generate two groups G1,  G2 of some prime order q and 
an admissible bilinear map ê:  G1  X  G1  à  G2 
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(2) Select a random s   ∈   Z+ and set Ppub   =   sP, where s is the master key 
picked at random and its public key computed. 
(3) Choose a cryptography hash function: H1:  {0,  1}*  à  G1                              (extract point from ID) H2:  G2  à  {0,  1}n  for some n,        (where n is the length of a plaintext 
message)  
The message space is M =  {0,  1}n  and the ciphertext space is C  =  G1  X  {0,  1}n . The 
system parameters are prams= <q,  G1,  G2,  ê,  n,  P,  Ppub,  H1,  H2  >.  
v Extract 
For a given string ID  ∈  {0,  1}*, the algorithm does: 
(1) Computes QID  =  H1(ID)  ∈  G1 
(2) Sets the private key dID  =  sQID, where s is the master-key 
v Encryption 
To encrypt M  ∈  M under the public key ID: (1) Compute QID  =  H1(ID)  ∈  G1  
(2) Choose a random r  ∈  Zq 
(3) Set the ciphertext to be  C  =  <  rP,  M  ⊕  H2(gID)r  >,  where  gID  =  ê  (QID,  Ppub)  ∈  G2  
v Decryption 
Let C  =  <   U,   V   >   ∈   C   be   a   ciphertext   encrypted   using   the   public   key   ID.   To  decrypt  C  using  the  private  key  dID  ∈  G1, compute: V  ⊕  H2(ê(dId  ,  U)  )  =  M  
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In ID-Based cryptosystems, there is a trusted third party called the Private Key 
Generator (PKG), which is responsible for generating the secret keys for all users. As 
a result, a PKG holds the users’ private keys. If a PKG is malicious, it can 
impersonate any user and therefore decrypt any cipher text or forge a signature on 
any message. This fact can lead to a problem known as the key escrow (Liao et al., 
2005; Yuen et al., 2010). 
The concept of Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) was first introduced 
by Horwitz and Lynn (2002) and a fully practical HIBE system was proposed by 
Gentry and Silverberg (2002). The latter scheme was an extension of the Boneh-
Franklin IBE scheme and its security is based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman 
assumption in the random oracle model (Boneh and Franklin, 2001). Gentry and 
Silverberg demonstrated how a root PKG in HIBE could distribute the workload by 
delegating private key generation and identity authentication to lower-level PKGs, 
which, in turn, are responsible for generating the private keys for users in their 
domains on the next level. In an HIBE scheme, the identities are organised in a 
hierarchy tree as shown in Figure 3.1. Later, Boneh and Boyen (2004) constructed an 
efficient HIBE with a weaker notion of security without the random oracle model. 
Boyen and Waters (2006) presented an anonymous HIBE without random oracles. 
The system, which works with small ciphertext, is efficient and practical and it is 
proved to be secure by using a standard model based on the linear assumption in 











	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  3.1:	  Hierarchical	  architecture	  for	  ID-­‐Based	  Encryption	  
Another approach to address the key escrow problem is a Certificateless Public-Key 
Cryptosystem (CL-PKC). This paradigm is a strong security model and was 
established by Al-Riyami and Paterson in 2003. The concept of the CL-PKC scheme 
is that the user’s private key is not only generated by the Key Generation Centre 
(KGC), it is also a combination of some contribution of KGC (called partial-private-
key) and some user-chosen secret. Zhang et al. (2006) proposed a security model for 
certificateless public-key signatures based on n-bilinear pairings and showed that the 
scheme is equivalent to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the random 
oracle model (Boneh and Franklin, 2001). 
 
3.1.1	  REVIEW	  OF	  HE	  ET	  AL.’S	  SCHEME	  
He et al. (2012) proposed an ID-based remote mutual authentication with a key 
agreement scheme on ECC. This proposal attempts to cope with many of the well-
known security problems such as know session key security and perfect forward 
secrecy. 
	    Upper-Level (Root PKG) 	  
Nodes (Users) 
    Lower-Level 
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The security of He et al.’s scheme is based on the intractability of two mathematical 
problems on elliptic curves: the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption (CDHA) 
and collision attack assumption 1 (k-CAA1). The protocol is divided into three 
phases: system initialisation phase, client registration phase and mutual 
authentication with key agreement phase. 
System Initialisation Phase  S  generates parameter of the system. First, S selects an elliptic curve equation E,   a 
base point P with the order n over E, the master key x and computes public 
key Ps  =  xP. Next, the server chooses three secure one-way hash 
functions H1(·),  H2(·),  H3(·) and a message authentication code MACk(m). Finally, 
the server publishes (Fp,  E,  n,  P,  Ps,  H1,  H2,  H3,  MACk(m)) but keeps x private. 
Client Registration Phase 
First, Ci submits his/her identity IDCi to S. Next, S  computes hCi=H1(IDCi)  and the 
client’s private key/public key DCi    =  (x+  hCi))-­‐1.P and  PCi  =  (hCi+x).P  =  hCiP+PS 
and returns the private key along IDCi  to Ci  via secure channel. Finally, Ci validates 
the private/public key pair (DCi,   PCi) by checking whether the equation PCi   =  (hCi+x).P  =  hCiP+PS  holds.  
 
Mutual Authentication with Key Agreement Phase: 
(1) The client Ci chooses a random number rCi ∈ Zn*, and computes M = rCi ·P, M′ = 
rCi ·DCi. Then Ci computes k = H2(IDCi, TCi , M, M′), where TCi  is a timestamp. 
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Finally, Ci sends a service request message M1={IDCi, TCi, M, MACk(IDCi, 
TCi ,M)} to the server. 
(2) After receiving M1, S  checks the validity of IDCi  and the freshness of TCi  and 
computes hCi=H1(IDCi),   M’=(x+   hCi)-­‐1.M  and k=H2(IDCi,   TCi,   M,   M′). 
Then, S  checks the integrity of MACk(IDCi   ,  TCi  ,  M)  with the key k.  S  chooses a 
random number rS   ∈  Zn*, and computes W  =  rS  ·  P,  KS  =  rS  · M  and the session 
key sk=  H3(IDCi,  TCi  ,  TS,  M,  W,  KS). Then S  sends M2={IDCi,  TS,  W,  MACk(IDCi  ,  TS,  W)} to Ci   , where TS is a timestamp. 
(3)  Ci checks the integrity of MACk(IDCi,   TS,   W)  with the key k  
and computes KCi=rCi·W  and the session key sk=H3(IDCi  ,  TCi  ,  TS,  M,  W,  KCi). 











Protocol	  3.1:	  The	  He et al.’s authentication protocol	  
 
            Client 
  
            Server rCi  ∈  Zn*  M  =  rCi  ·P  M′=  rCi  ·DCi  k  =H2(IDCi,  TCi,    M,  M′) 
 
 
 M1={IDCi,  TCi  ,M,  MACk(IDCi,  TCi  ,M)}  
        hCi=H1(IDCi),  M’=(x+  hCi)-­‐1.M    k=H2(IDCi,  TCi,  M,  M′)  




 Ci  checks the integrity 
of MACk(IDCi,  TS,  W)    KCi=rCi·W    sk=H3(IDCi,   TCi,   TS,  M,  W,  KCi) 
 
 
 M2={IDCi,  TS,  W,  MACk(IDCi  ,  TS,  W)}  
rS  ∈  Zn*  W  =  rS  ·  P,    KS  =  rS  ·  M    sk=  H3(IDCi,   TCi,  TS,  M,  W,  KS)  
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Cryptanalysis of He et al.’s Scheme 
He et al. claimed that their scheme provides resilience against many cryptographic 
attacks. However, researchers Wang et al. (2013) and Islam et al. (2012) proved that 
their scheme fails to protect a user’s anonymity, known session-specific temporary 
attacks, privileged-insider attacks, and many logged-in users’ attacks and has no 
provision for leaked key revocation phase. 
This protocol attempts to cope with many of the well-known security and efficiency 
problems. However, the scheme has a potential flaw that may lead to man-in-the-
middle attacks and impersonation attacks (Wang et al., 2013; Islam et al., 2012). It 
can be seen that if an attacker E eavesdrops and listens to the communication 
between S  and Ci, then, E can intercept a valid login request M1={IDC,   TC,   M,  MACk(IDC,  TC  ,M)} or h(ID  ||  Xs) and masquerade as a legal user.  
 
3.2	  BIOMETRIC	  VERIFICATION	  SYSTEMS	  
Biometric technology and verification systems offer a number of benefits to 
distributed systems and their users (Jain et al., 2015). Biometrics are automated 
methods and are used to recognise a person based on a physiological or behavioural 
characteristic. Biometric technologies are becoming a fundamental element to ensure 
highly secure identification and personal verification solutions (Jain et al., 2015). 
Biometric keys can be extracted from keystroke patterns (Monrose et al., 1999), 
fingerprints (Seto, 2002; Clancy et al., 2003), handwritten signatures (Hao et al., 
2002), the human voice (Monrose et al., 2001), and facial characteristics (Goh and 
Ngo, 2003); each method being unique to a greater or lesser extent.  
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An accurate and reliable authentication is needed in distributed systems as the level 
of security breaches increases. Biometric technologies are able to provide a highly 
secure identification and verification system through something that you possess 
individually, such as fingerprints. That is why it is considered to be a unique feature 
of individuals. The probability of two people sharing the same biometric data is 
virtually nil. As a result, they cannot be shared or cannot be lost unless in the case of 
a serious accident. Moreover, adopting and utilising biometrics for personal 
authentication is becoming more convenient for both public and private sectors, 
because it can help to combat credit card and transaction fraud, prevent identity theft, 
restore identity, enhanced security, data verification and authentication (Abidin et al., 
2014; Jain et al., 2015). 
Combining ID based cryptography with biometric techniques can effectively 
improve the security in authentication systems, which provides a reliable identity 
with a high degree of assurance. The biometric technology is regarded as a powerful 
solution due to its unique link to identify individuals, which is somehow impossible 
to fake. Thus, a biometric identity is an inherent trait, which will always remain with 
the person all the time. In another words, using biometric techniques in IBE will 
mean that the person will always have their identification handy.  
However, irrevocability is the most severe concerns in security engineering aspects. 
Biometric features are inherent in individuals, therefore, they cannot be changed 
easily once they are exposed or compromised Abidin et al., 2014; Jain et al., 2015). 
A related problem is “key diversity”, for example, an individual prefers to have 
separate keys for their bank account and for access to their workplace computer, so 
that they can revoke one without affecting the other (Hao et al., 2005).  
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On the other hand, one of main obstacles to this powerful technique is that biometric 
measurements are proved to be noisy by nature while cryptography demands 
correctness in keys otherwise the protocols would fail. In light of that, deploying 
biometric measurements in the existing IBE systems directly can be difficult because 
most attempts have suffered from an excessive False Rejection Rate (FRR), usually 
over 20%, which is unacceptable for practical applications (Hao et al., 2005; 
Bissessar et al., 2016). 
Moreover, biometric data suffers from a low level of secrecy or not being very 
secretive. For instance, people leave fingerprints everywhere and iris images can be 
captured by hidden camera. Overall, the more a biometric is used, the less secret it 
will be. It would be unwise to depend on a biometric alone, especially if that 
biometric becomes used on a global scale. Social acceptance is necessary to 
biometric technology and it tends to be a primary measure of success. The fear of 
potential misuse of biometric data may make the public hesitant to use systems that 
rely on it. Also, compromised biometric templates pose serious security and privacy 
issues (Abidin et al., 2014; Jain et al., 2015; Bissessar et al., 2016).  
 
3.2.1	  REVIEW	  OF	  LI-­‐HWANG’S	  SCHEME	  
Li and Hwang (2010) proposed an efficient biometrics-based remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards. The security of their scheme is based on a 
one-way hash function, biometrics verification, smart card and nonce. The scheme is 
very efficient in computation of costs, which have been proved to be relatively low 
compared with other related schemes, such as Lin-Lai scheme (2002), Lee-Chiu 
scheme (2005), Chang et al.’s scheme (2006). 
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Li-Hwang’s scheme is composed of four phases, namely the registration phase, the 
login phase, the authentication phase and the password change phase. In their 
scheme, there are three participants, the registration centre (R), the server (Si) and 
the user (Ci), where R  is assumed to be a trusted party. R  chooses the master secret 
key Xs and distributes it to Si via a secure channel. 
Registration Phase  
First, the client Ci submits personal biometrics Bi and the password PWi, identity IDi  
to the registration centre Ri. Then, Ri computes ri  =  h  (PWi  ||  h(Bi))  and ei  =  h  (IDi  ||  Xs)  ⊕   h(PWi   ||   fi) where Xs is secret information generated by the server. After 
storing {IDi,  h  (.),  fi  ,  ei} on the user’s smart card,  Ri sends it to the user via a secure 
channel.  
Login Phase 
When the user Ci  wants to logon to a remote server, he inserts his smart card into the 
card reader and submits the personal biometrics, Bi, if h(Bi)  =   fi. The Smart card 
requires Ci to input the PWi and computes r  ì  =  h(PWi  ||  fi),  M1  =  ei  ⊕  r  ì    =    h(IDi  ||  Xs),  M2  =    M1  ⊕  Rc  , where Rc is a random number generated by the user. Finally Ci 
sends the message (IDCi,  M2) to the server Si. 
Authentication Phase 
After receiving the request login message, Si checks the format of IDCi, and then 
sends M5  =  h(IDi  ||   Xs)  ⊕  Rs and M6  =  h(M2   ||   (M2  ⊕  h(IDi  ||   Xs)) back to Ci, 
where Rs is a random number generated by Si. Ci  verifies the validity M6  ?  =  H4(M2  ||  Rc), and sends back  M8  =  h(M5  ||  (M5  ⊕  M1)) to Si. If M8  =  h(M5  ||  Rs). Ci  and Si  
authenticate each other successfully.  
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Password Changing Phase 
First, Ci inserts the smart card and inputs Bi. After passing the biometric verification 
(i.e., h(Bi)  =  fi), Ci  is required to enter the old password PWi, and the new password, 
new PWni. Next, the smart card will compute: r'i  =  h(PWi  ||  fi), e'i  =  ei⊕  r'i    =  h(IDi    ||  Xs),  e''i  =  e'i⊕  h  (PWn  i   ||  fi). Finally, the ei  is replaced with e''i on the smart card.  










Protocol	  3.2:	  The	  Li-Hwang authentication protocol 
 
Cryptanalysis of Li-Hwang’s scheme 
Researchers Li et al. (2011) and Jeon et al. (2011) showed that Li and Hwang’s 
scheme is vulnerable to various attacks such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle 
attacks. And it showed weakness to the password-changing scheme. Also, it fails to 
provide proper authentication. One of the key characteristics of the cryptographic 
hash function is that the outputs are very sensitive to small perturbations in their 





Server r  ̀i  =  h(PWi  ||  fi)    M1  =  ei  ⊕  r  ̀i      M2  =    M1  ⊕  Rc  
           (IDCi,  M2)  
    
  M5  =  h(IDi  ||  Xs)⊕Rs       M6  ?  =  h(M2  ||  Rc),                     (M5,  M6)   M6  =  h(M2  ||  (M2⊕h(IDi  ||  Xs))  M8  =  h(M5  ||  (M5  ⊕  M1))       (M8)     M8  ?  =    h(M5  ||  Rs).    
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such as biometrics (Vacca, 2007; Bissessar et al., 2016). Therefore, a secure one-way 
hash function cannot be used for biometric verification.   
In the login phase of Li-Hwang’s scheme, the user computes h(Bi) based on the 
personal biometric template Bi. Then, the biometric authentication process relies on 
comparing the hash value h(Bi) with fi. However, the scheme does not seem to be 
able to handle natural variations in the biometrics. For example, when the user logs 
in, his fresh biometric sample has to match exactly the template recorded during the 
registration phase, which never happens in practice. Thus, the protocol is 
fundamentally flawed and does not fulfil the basic objectives of a biometric 
authentication protocol. As a result, this may prevent a legal user to pass biometric 
verification at the login phase. So, Li-Hwang’s scheme is vulnerable to denial-of-
service attacks.   
In addition, Li-Hwang’s scheme is prone to man-in-the-middle attacks. In the login 
phase, when the user Ci sends the login request (IDi,  M2) to the server Si, an attacker A  may eavesdrop the login message and then start another session with Si and send 
both messages (IDi,  MA2),  (IDi,  M2) to Si. Upon receiving (IDi,  MA2) and (IDi,  M2),  S i 
generates two random numbers RS and RAS and computes the following (Jeon et al., 
2011): M3  =  h  (IDi  ||  Xs),  M4  =  M2  ⊕  M3,  M5  =  M3  ⊕  RS,  M6  =  h  (M2  ||  M4)  and  MA3  =  h  (IDi  ||  Xs),  MA4  =  MA2  ⊕  MA3,  MA5  =  MA3  ⊕  RAS,  MA6  =  h  (MA2  ||  MA4). Then, Si 
sends the message (M5,  M6) and (MA5,  MA6) for the two sessions respectively. It is 
worth noting that MA3  =  M3,  MA4  =  M4,  MA5  =  M3  ⊕  RAS, MA6  =  h  (M2  ||  M4)  =  h  (MA2   ||  MA4). In the meantime, A  captures (M5,  M6) and (MA5,  MA6) and sends the 
fabricated message (M’5,   M’6)   =   (MA5,   MA6) to Ci. After receiving (M’5,   M’6), Ci 
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verifies M’6    =  H4(M2  ||  Rc), which in this case is M’6  =  MA6  =    h  (M2  ||  M4)  =  h  (M2  ||  RC). So Si is successfully authenticated by Ci. Then Ci computes M7  =  M’5  ⊕  M1  =  RAS, M8  =  h  (M’5  ||  M7)  =  h  (MA2  ||  RAS) and sends M8 to Si. A intercepts M8 and 
sends the message MA8   =   M8 to Si. After receiving MA8, Si verifies the equation h(MA5   ||  RAS)  =  M8. Thus, A  is successfully authenticated by Si masquerading Ci.  
From this description, Li-Hwang’s scheme is vulnerable to man-in-middle-attacks 
and impersonation attacks. The attacker can cheat the server by impersonating the 
user or can impersonate the server to cheat the user without knowing any secret 
information (Li et al., 2011). 
 
3.3	  SECURITY	  ATTACKS	  
Security attacks can be achieved in different ways but they all lead to the goal of 
obtaining disclosed private information or exhausting the resources to deny 
legitimate users to gain access and use them.  Security attacks may be conveniently 
classified into three categories. These are physical attacks, passive attacks, and 
active attacks as illustrated in Figure 3.2.   
In a physical attack, an attacker can gain physical entry to organisation premises by 
pretending to be an employee or valid user and, in this way, gets inside the facility. 
This mischievous act allows the attacker to steal equipment or gather information 
from trashcans, desktops, or computer systems, or steal confidential documents that 
are not stored in a secure location. Moreover, the attacker can plug in any hardware 
keylogger to a PC or plant viruses or Trojans directly on the target system. That is 
why organisations need to enforce security policies and restriction access (Graves, 
2010).  
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In a passive attacks, the attacker sniffs or monitors transmitted traffic. The attacker’s 
main purpose is to obtain valuable information about the entities involved in the 
process. This attack is difficult to detect because the attacker does not affect the 
normal execution of protocols (Jahankhani, 2010; Stallings, 2011) but breaches 
confidentiality. Examples of this attack include: preforming network analysis, 
eavesdropping, traffic analysis, port scanning, and monitoring of unprotected 
communications. Passive attacks can be formed in two types. The first type is 
monitoring and reading the release of message contents. An attacker can acquire 
sensitive or confidential information by listening to a telephone conversation, reading 



























Passive Attacks Active Attacks Physical Attacks 
§ Network Analysis 
§ Eavesdropping 
§ Traffic Analysis 
§ Port Scanning 
§ Physical Entry 
§ Stolen Equipment 
§ Social Engineering, 
such as shoulder 
surfing and dumpster 
diving 
§ Port Scanning 
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In active attacks, the attacker may modify the intercepted data, delay, delete or create 
a false message. This type of attack affects the availability, integrity, and authenticity 
of data (Graves, 2010), and takes many forms. For example, impersonation attacks, 
replay attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, reflection attacks, parallel session attacks 
and denial-of-service attacks. To understand these possible attacks, this section 
includes, but is not limited to, the most relevant attacks on authentication protocols.  
 
3.3.1	  REPLAY	  ATTACKS	  
A replay attack occurs when the attacker intercepts a valid message and replays it 
again in a fraudulent way to sabotage a communication channel (Boyed and 
Mathurua, 2006; Gurtov, 2008). A very clear example of this attack can be found in 
the Needham-Schroeder secret key authentication protocol (Needham and Schroeder, 
1978). The protocol achieves mutual authentication between two principals, A   and B , 
through a trusted third part server. First, A  requests a session key from the server to 
communicate with B.  Then, the server generates the key and sends it to A . Finally, A  
and B  perform entity authentication and key confirmation (Clark and Jacob, 1997). 

















Protocol	  3.3:	  The	  Needham-­‐Schroeder	  secret	  key	  authentication	  protocol	  
 
Denning and Sacco (1981) identified that the protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack 
and demonstrated the attack as shown in Attack 3.1. An intruder I  intercepts a 
successful run of the protocol that consists of the compromised session key K. Thus I 
knows K and {KAB,  A}KB. I  masquerades as A  to B  and makes B  accept this old and 
compromised session key K . The flaw with this protocol is that there is no proof to 
guarantee the freshness of the message. According to Denning and Sacco (1981), the 







Attack	  3.1:	  Attack	  on	  The	  Needham-­‐Schroeder	  secret	  key	  authentication	  protocol	  








 A,  B,  NA                      {NA,  B,  KAB,  {KAB,  A}KBS  }KAS     
 {KAB,  A}KBS    
 {NB}KAB    
 {NB-­‐1}KAB    
 
  








      {KAB,  A}K’BS    
                                            {NB}K’AB    
  {NB-­‐1}K’AB    
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3.3.2	  MAN-­‐IN-­‐THE-­‐MIDDLE	  ATTACKS	  
A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is a special form of impersonation attack 
(Gurtov, 2008). As implied by the name, the attacker imposes himself between 
two entities during the communication. MITM can be a passive attack if the 
attacker only forwards the packets between entities. However, if the attacker 
modifies, delays, or drops the packets it becomes an active attack. To illustrate 
this attack, consider the Diffie-Hellman protocol as shown in Protocol 3.4 (Boyed 






Protocol	  3.4:	  The	  Diffie-­‐Hellman	  key	  agreement	  
 
The absence of authentication of the message sent can lead to a MITM attack. 
Where the attacker C  masquerades as B  to A  and masquerades as A  to B . Attack 
3.1 shows how both A  and B  complete a normal run without knowing they both 
share keys with C  (Boyed and Mathurua, 2006). 
 
 






rA  ∈  R    Zq  tA  =  GrA             tA       rB  ∈  R    Zq  tB  =  GrB  ZAB  =    trAB           tB   ZAB  =    trBA  
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Attack	  3.2:	  Attack	  on	  basic	  Diffie-­‐Hellman	  key	  agreement	  
 
3.3.3	  REFLECTION	  ATTACKS	  
This type of attack is a special case of replay attack, as the name implies. A 
malicious attacker reflects the message back at an honest agent. The idea of a 
reflection attack is to fool the challenge originator into providing the correct response 
to her\his message (Ryan and Schneider, 2001; Boyd and Mathuria, 2003). In order 
to demonstrate the execution of the attack, the basic protocol example first is 
described in Protocol 3.5, which is adopted from Boyd and Mathuria (2003). 
Suppose A  and B  are honest agents and share a secret K. NA, NB are nonces generated 
by A  and B   respectively for use in the protocol. This protocol is intended to achieve 










B rA  ∈  R    Zq  tA  =  grA          tA  
 
  rC  ∈  R    Zq  tC  =  grC      
   
 
    tC  
    rB  ∈  R    Zq  tB  =  grB  
ZAB  =    trAC     tC   ZAC  =    trCA  ZCB  =    trCB             tB   ZAB  =    trBC  







Protocol	  3.5:	  A	  protocol	  vulnerable	  to	  reflection	  attack	  
 
An adversary I    can successfully complete two runs of the protocol as shown in 
Attack 3.3. I(B) is an intruder who masquerades as B . I  intercepts the message {NA1}K  and reflects it back to A . Then, A   starts another run of the protocol with I  and 
sends a response to I . The reply allows I to deceive A  by responding to the first 
message with A’s reply and so on. As a result, the same challenge-response is used 










Attack	  3.3:	  Reflection	  attack	  on	  Protocol	  2.5	  	  
     A               B     {  NA  }K    {  NB  }A,  NA    
  
   NB     
  A           I         B              {  NA1  }K              {  NA1}K              {  NA2  }K  ,NA1              {  NA2  }K  ,NA1              NA2           
   NA2                     
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3.4.1	  PARALLEL	  SESSION	  ATTACKS	  
A parallel session attack is an example of interleaving attacks. It is conducted by 
subsequent interleaving replays among contemporaneous protocol sessions 
(Basagiannis et al., 2007), where the attacker undertakes a passive role while 
manipulating protocol participants. In other words, the attack occurs when two or 
more protocol runs are executed concurrently and messages from one are used to 
form messages in another (Clark and Jacob, 1997). The ISO two-way authentication 
protocol is vulnerable to parallel session attack. Protocol 3.6 describes the ISO two-








Protocol	  3.6:	  The	  ISO	  two-­‐authentication	  protocol	  
 
Attack 3.2 depicts how the parallel session attack performs on the ISO two-
authentication protocol. Suppose that A  and B  are honest principles and A wishes to 
communicate with B . A  generates a random number R1 and sends it to B . An intruder I  intercepts the challenge R1, and starts a second session with A , in which he 
impersonates B  by sending the intercepted challenge to A  as if he generated it 
himself. Meanwhile, A  assumes that the random number is from B  and encrypts it 




       
User A      B     R1        {R1}k  ,{R2}k          R2     
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R2 encrypted with k, and sends both encrypted number to B . I  intercepts the 
encrypted random numbers: {R1}k  {R2}k and replies to A  as a part of the first session. 
In this case, A  believes he is receiving the encrypted random numbers from B  and 
decrypts them with k. The received random number R1  is the same as the one A  has 
generated for the first session, so A  believes that he is actually communicating with B . Consequently, I  has now authenticated himself to A  as B . In order to complete the 
first session, A  sends R2 to B . I  intercepts the message and replies back to A  as part 
of the parallel session. A   receives R2 and assumes he is communicating with B . As a 



















 I     B  
 R1      
 R1      
 {R1}k  ,{R2}k      
 {R1}k  ,{R2}k      
 R2      
 
 
R2      
	   60	  
3.3.5	  ATTACKS	  ON	  ENCRYPTION	  SCHEMES	  
The obvious main objective to mounting attacks on ciphertext is to systematically 
recover plaintext or to deduce the decryption key (Menezes et al., 2010). This attack 
can take different forms, such as ciphertext-only attacks (COA), known-plaintext 
attacks (KPA), chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA), chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA-1) 
and adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA-2). This is a very threatening attack 
because the attacker may be able to recover the hidden secret key used for 
decryption. For example, in a chosen-ciphertext attack, the attack is conducted by 
choosing a ciphertext and obtaining its decryption under an unknown key. The 
attacker has a chance to enter one or more known ciphertexts into the system in an 
attempt to obtain the resulting plaintext. This attack model is used by cryptanalysts to 
gather information in order to perform cryptanalysis (Menezes et al., 2010). 
 
3.4	  EVALUATION	  AND	  SIMULATION	  TOOLS	  
Security protocols are rising in prominence in communication systems, and verifying 
them has gained significant attention by researchers and developers. Formal 
verification methods of cryptographic protocols aim to formally guarantee these 
protocols to satisfy their specifications, and they can function soundly. These 
methods can be employed to identify errors and they provide a deeper understanding 
of the protocols’ behaviour. Security evaluation is a fundamental step in the 
development of security protocols. The methods used to analyse security protocols 
can be categorised into two groups: methods based on analytical approach and 
methods based on simulation. The analytical approach offers accurate results and 
provides a clear perception of the system characteristics. This approach can be 
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classified into two groups based on the analysis methods according to Meadows 
(1995): 
1) Methods based on logic, for example, BAN logic (Burrows et al., 1990). 
2) Methods based on algebra such as CSP algebra (Ryan and Schneider, 2001). 
However, the analytical approach becomes unreliable when dealing with a high 
complex system (Genter et al., 2007). Therefore, the latter approach, which is the 
simulation approach, has become more popular in system analysis. Simulation tools, 
such as finite-state machines and Petri nets, expose progress in two directions: one 
related to the development of faster methods during execution of mathematical 
algorithms (Chiola and Ferscha, 1993), and the other associated with the 
effectiveness of simulation presentations and results (Genter et al., 2007). 
 
3.4.1	  FINITE-­‐STATE	  MACHINES	  
Verification is a crucial step in designing security protocols. Finite-state machines 
(FSM), also called finite-state automata, are a mathematical model of behaviour and 
they are considered a powerful tool to simulate software architecture and 
communication protocols. FSM can only model the control part of a system and 
consists of a finite number of states, a finite number of events, and a finite number of 
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An	  FSM	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  five-­‐tuple	  (Q,	  ∑,	  ∆,	  σ,	  ԛ0),	  where:	  
Q:	  finite	  set	  of	  symbols	  denoting	  states	  
∑:	  set	  of	  symbols	  denoting	  the	  possible	  inputs	  
∆:	  set	  of	  symbols	  denoting	  the	  possible	  outputs	  
σ:	  transition	  function	  mapping	  to	  Qx∑	  to	  Qx∆	  




An FSM is a graphical representation and it can be described as a state transition 
diagram (Gajski, 1997; Luba, 2001; Adamski and Barkalov, 2006). A state diagram 
is a direct graph that consists of the following components (De Micheli, 1994; 
Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979): 
§ States are represented by a finite set of vertices, drawn as circles labelled 
with a state name. 
§ Transitions are represented by direct edges, drawn as an arrow from a 
current state to the next state. 
§ Output symbols are represented by labels.  





Figure	  3.3:	  A	  finite-­‐state	  machine	  modelling	  an	  off/on	  switch	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A simple example of FSM is an on/off switch.  This device remembers what state 
it is in. It allows the user to press a button and change to a different state 
depending on the previous one. For example, if the switch is in the off state, then 
pressing the button changes it to the on state. As shown in Figure 3.3, this finite-
automaton model consists of two states: namely, the states on and off. The arcs 
between the states represent external influences on the system. In this example, 
both arcs are labelled by the input Push, which represents a user pushing the 
button. The state off is chosen to be the start state, the state in which the system is 
placed initially. The initial state is mostly indicated by an arrow and the word 
Start. Also, it is often necessary to indicate one or more state as a “final” or 
“accepting” state (Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979). 
 
3.4.2	  PETRI	  NETS	  
Historically speaking, the concept of the Petri nets was introduced in 1962 by Carl 
Adam Petri. Petri nets are graphical diagrammatic tools based on strong 
mathematical foundation. They are used as a visual communication aid to model 
concurrency, synchronisation, limited resources, sequentially mutual exclusion and 
behaviour in distributed systems (Peterson, 1981; Murata, 1989; Bobbio, 1990). 
 
Basic Notation 
A Petri net is defined as a bipartite directed, weighted graph with two types of nodes 
called places and transitions, linked by directed arcs. In other words, a Petri net must 
consist of the following components (Peterson, 1981; Murata, 1989; Bobbio, 1990): 
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§ A set of places (drawn as circles), representing conditions and possible 
states of the system.  
§ A set of transitions (drawn as rectangles or thick bars), representing a 
change of state, which is caused by events or actions. 
§ A set of arcs (drawn as arrows) connecting a place to transition and vice 
versa. 
§ Tokens (drawn as black dots), occupying places to represent the truth of the 
associated condition. 
Murata (1989) defined a formal definition of a Petri net as follows: 
 
	  
A	  Petri	  net	  is	  5-­‐tuple,	  PN=(P,T,F,W,M0)	  where:	  
P={p1,	  p2,…,pm}	  is	  a	  finite	  set	  of	  places,	  
T={t1,t2,…,tn}	  is	  a	  finite	  set	  of	  transitions,	  
F	  ⊆	  (P	  X	  T)	  U	  (T	  X	  P)	  is	  a	  set	  of	  arcs	  (flow	  relations),	  
W:F	  à	  {1,	  2,	  3,…}	  is	  a	  weight	  function,	  
M0:P	  à	  {0,	  1,	  2,	  3,….}	  is	  the	  initial	  marking,	  
P	  ∩	  T=	  ø	  and	  P	  U	  T	  ≠	  ø.	  	  	  
	  
A	  Petri	  net	  structure	  N=(P,	  T,	  F,	  W)	  without	  any	  specific	  initial	  marking	  is	  denoted	  
by	  N.	  
A	  Petri	  net	  with	  the	  given	  initial	  marking	  is	  denoted	  by	  (N,M0).	  	  
	  
 
 Furthermore, he distinguishes the dynamic behaviour of many systems according to 
their states or changes. To simulate the behaviour, a state or marking in a Petri net is 
changed according to the following transition (firing) rules (Murata, 1989): 
1) A transition t is said to be enabled if each input place P of t is marked with at 
least w(p,  t) tokens where w(p,  t) is the weight of the arc from p to t. 
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2) An enabled transition may or may not fire (depending on whether or not the 
event is actually takes place). 
3) A firing of enabled transition t  removes w(p,  t) tokens from each input place p of t, and adds w(t,  p) tokens to each output place p of t, where w(t,  p) is 
the weight of arc from  t top. 
Definition 1. A transition without any input place is called a source transition, 
and one without any output place is called a sink transition. Note that a source 
transition is unconditionally enabled, and the firing of a sink transition consumes 
tokens, but does not produce any. 
Definition 2. A pair of a place p and transition t called self-loop if p is both an 
input and output place of t. A Petri net is said to be pure if it has no self- loops. A 
Petri net is said to be ordinary if all of its arc weights are 1's. 
Murata (1989) illustrated a transition (firing) rule using a simple example of the 
well-known chemical reaction: 2H2 + O2 à  2H2O. 
Figure 3.4 (a) shows two tokens in each input place are available, and a transition t is 
enabled and can fire when at least two units of H2 and one unit of O2 contain the 
input places. After firing, a new even has occurred resulting in a change in the 
reaction state 2H2O. Also, the marking has changed to zero unit in H2 and one unit in 

























Petri nets behaviour properties 
A well-known major strength of Petri nets is the ability to analyse properties and 
complications associated with concurrent systems. The basic behavioural properties 
of Petri nets can be summarised in the following (Murata, 1989): 
Figure	  3.4:	  An	  illustration	  of	  transition	  (firing)	  rules:	  
(a) The	  marking	  before	  firing	  the	  enabled	  transition	  t.	  
(b) The	  marking	  after	  firing	  t,	  where	  t	  disabled.	  	  
(b)	  
(a)	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1. Reachability is a foundation for examining the dynamic properties of any 
system. The firing of an enabled transition will change the token distribution 
(marking) in a net, according to the transition rules. 
2. Boundedness is achieved when the number of tokens in each place does not 
exceed a finite number k for any marking reachable from M0. Thus, a Petri 
net is k-bounded. A Petri net is said to be safe if it is 1-bounded. 
3. Liveness is associated to the complete absence of deadlock in the system. A 
Petri net is said to be live, if no matter what marking has been reached from 
M0, it is possible to ultimately have some further firing sequence. 
 
3.5	  SUMMARY	  
This chapter examines the original concept of the identity based encryption and its 
basic algorithms for encryption and decryption. The He et al. scheme was examined 
thoroughly. Even though the protocol overcame many of the security problems, 
unfortunately it is vulnerable to reflection attack and parallel session attack. Next, a 
detailed description of Li-Hwang scheme was presented as a biometric authentication 
protocol, which also suffers from security issues such as man-in-the middle attack.  
Understanding the security flaws in previous cryptographic protocols is the leading 
key to fix the existing protocols and avoid to making the same flaws again. The 
chapter analyses the most common security flaws in authentication protocol and 
demonstrates each attack against them. Finally, the chapter discusses the most 
common simulation tools that are used in the research and reviews their structures 
and properties.  
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This chapter investigates the basic security properties that must be kept in mind when 
designing protocols. Also, it introduces the new scheme and some of the cryptographic 
techniques used to establish a secure key-exchange. Then, UML modelling is discussed 
briefly to represent all sequences of messages in the login phase.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4 
The New Protocol 
Architecture	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Today concerns about security breaches are constantly increasing in all areas and 
affecting organisations such as governments, military agencies, banks, the healthcare 
industry, and educational institutions. There are several issues contributing to 
security concerns and some of them are related to authentication mechanisms. One 
common example can be found in passwords being the weakest link in modern 
security. Unfortunately most users prefer to pick easy-to-remember passwords, 
which make them vulnerable to easy guessing, sniffing, and brute force attacks. As a 
result, they might allow malicious users to get easy access to computers or online 
accounts and further compromise the entire network. Most systems nowadays 
depend on inherently weak password mechanisms to authenticate and verify their 
users’ identities. Other authentication methods that can increase security are smart 
card authentication and biometric authentication. Biometrics can be used in many 
scenarios but for the purpose of this thesis it is used (1) as an authentication method 
to confirm user’s identity, (2) as a way to salt the password in order to defend against 
dictionary attacks and rainbow table attacks, i.e. the biometric and the password are 
concatenated and processed with a cryptographic hash function. Having two 
authentication factors to identify a person definitely enhances security.  In addition, 
this combination can limit any potential for fraud as well as provide a degree of 
distinctiveness and secrecy.  
 
4.1	  DEVELOPING	  SECURE	  METHODOLOGY	  
One of the main goals the organisation seeks is to promote secure authentication and 
data exchange electronically in distributed systems. Thus, developing an effective 
methodology is essential and it is the key factor for success. In terms of information 
security management and biometric security frameworks, both ISO/IEC 27001:2005 
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and ISO 19092:2008 have been carefully studied to produce the proposed conceptual 
method, as shown in Figure 4.1.  There are various techniques used in the proposed 
methodology in order to achieve the objectives of the security requirements. The 
purpose of the conceptual methodology is to investigate the requirements and 
mechanisms associated with building a secure protocol. Moreover, it attempts to 
identify factors to achieve functionalities and security in complex systems.    
 
	   	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 









o Data	  integrity	  
o Confidentiality	  
o Non-­‐Repudiation	  
o Risk	  Assessment	  
o Audit	  	  
• Biometric	  Information	  
Management:	  
o Data	  Storage	  
o Enrolment	  Process	  
o Search	  Process	  
o Verification	  process	  
• Security	  Mechanisms:	  
o Electronic	  Access	  
o Electronic	  Authentication	  
o Unique	  ID	  
o Electronic	  Information	  Exchange.	  
Develop	  
Methodology	  
How?	  What?	   Outcome?	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When designing security protocols, it is crucial to consider all the security properties 
and to carefully implement them in the right place. Those properties essentially 
become required security functions and are summarised as follows (Boyd and 
Mathuria, 2003; Stallings, 2011; Stapleton, 2014): 
• Authentication: is the ability to determine the origin of the received message 
and ensure no malicious user should be able to send a forged message. 
• Authorisation: restricts access to the resource for only authorised and 
legitimate users in the network. 
• Privacy: guarantees that the identity of a user should not be exposed to 
unauthorised entities and should remain anonymous.    
• Data integrity: assures that the recipient of a message should be able to verify 
that the contents of the message are authentic and have not been modified in 
transmission.  
• Confidentiality: provides protection against eavesdropping and unauthorised 
access while data in transit or set. Also, ensure that only those are authorised 
can access the data. 
• Non-repudiation: ensures that entities cannot later deny sending or receiving 
messages that they have committed to. 
• Risk assessment: includes vulnerability assessment by identifying weakness 
and threats. Also, it helps to understand exposures and limit any potential 
threats.  
• Audit logs: need to be collected and analysed to maintain proper controls in 
case of potential security breaches. They contain sufficient information to 
detect attacks and valuable information for forensic analysis. 
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The baseline of this methodology is treating the security requirements as a 
foundation of the authentication protocols. For example, in authorisation and 
authentication, a combination of biometric information and ID-Based Encryption 
((IBE) are applied to ensure that only authorised persons are allowed to gain access 
to the network after their credentials have been verified. Also, encryption is 
implemented to guarantee data confidentiality and privacy.  
	  
4.2	  THE	  NEW	  PROTOCOL	  ARCHITECTURE	  
Authentication is considered a significant pillar of a standard security model. It is the 
process to validate and confirm the identification of a client who is attempting to 
gain accesses in remote systems and using resources. The new scheme supports 
secure authentication by implementing biometric verification with IBE. Using IBE as 
an infrastructure will certainly simplify the encryption-decryption process. For 
example, a sender can encrypt a message by using the recipient’s identity (such as e-
mail address) and public parameters that have been generated by the server. Then, 
the server generates a private key for the recipient in order to decrypt messages.  
Before secure communication occurs, each individual user needs to be registered 
with the system first. This process is called enrolment. In this process, reference 
features for each user are stored in the system and associated with the identity of the 
subject (Figure 4.2). The process starts with the acquisition of physiological traits. 
The digital information representation after this step is denoted as enrolment 
samples. As shown in Figure 4.2 copies of enrolment samples may be stored in some 
evaluation environment in order to allow later reproduction of the original writing 
processes. From these original enrolments, features are then extracted after pre-
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processing. These extracted features are stored as references in a storage location of 
the authentication systems (Jain et al., 2015). As for authentication, the system 
performs a comparison of the data from the actually presented traits to stored 
references (Figure 4.3). The steps are identical to those in the enrolment mode until 
reaching the completion of the feature extraction process. Here, the features derived 
from the actual sample presented for authentication are compared to stored 
references from the references storage. Based on the result of the comparison, the 












Figure	  4.2:	  Enrolment	  mode	  of	  a	  biometric	  authentication	  system	  adopted	  	  
from	  Vielhauer	  (2005)	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Figure	  4.3:	  Authentication	  Mode	  of	  a	  Biometric	  Authentication	  System	  adopted	  from	  
Vielhauer	  (2005)	  
	  
The new scheme consists of three phases: registration phase, login phase, and 
authentication phase. It is based on a three-way handshake that promotes secure key 
establishment. Peers involved in the scheme must share the same security context. 
The protocol diagram shown in Figure 4.4 is a collaboration diagram that defines the 
necessity element to establish a secure interaction between the client and the server. 
This diagram formulates the ideas to help design the protocol. The aim of the 
proposed protocol is to establish a new secret session key between any trusted client 
and server, which they can use for subsequent secure communication. Additionally, 
both the client and the server should be able to calculate the session key at the end of 
the protocol process but it must be difficult for other parties to learn the true value of 
the session key. The session key should be generated within every new session to 






















Figure	  4.4:	  The	  new	  scheme	  architecture	  
	   Submits	  	  
ID	  +	  PW	  +	  BIO	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ü Computes	  Hash	  ID,	  PW	  
ü Submit	  multiple	  copies	  of	  BIO	  











	   Client	   Registration Centre	  
	  
Decrypts,	  checks:	  	  
ü ID	  validation	  
ü 	  Freshness	  of	  timestamp	  
ü
	  
Integrity	  of	  the	  request	  
Enters	  	  
ID	  +	  PW	  +	  BIO	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Encrypts:	  login	  request	  =	  ID,	  T,	  
MAC,	  SYN	  
	  	  
ü Verifies	  (ID,	  PW)	  








Ø Generates	  a	  random	  
number	  	  
Ø Performs	  several	  
calculations	  to	  establish	  
the	  key	  agreement	  
protocol	  	  
Client 
	   Encrypts:	  SYN/ACK	  	  
Decrypts	  and	  checks:	  




Decrypts	  and	  checks:	  

















Ø Generates	  a	  random	  
number	  
Ø Performs	  calculations	  for	  
the	  key	  agreement	  
protocol	  
Server	  is	  authenticated	  
Ø Computes	  the	  session	  key	  
	   76	  
In the registration phase, the client must submit his/her ID, password and biometric 
data for identification purposes. As for the login phase, the client needs to provide 
his/her credentials to confirm his/her identity. The negotiation of the session key 
begins once the client passes the identity check. Basically, the proposed 
authentication process implies that messages exchanged between entities must 
convey identities, freshness, and authenticity.  
The mechanism in the diagram in Figure 4.4 corresponds to the TCP handshake 
where the client establishes a connection with the server using a three-way 
handshake or SYN - SYN/ACK - ACK. First, the client creates a login request based 
on the generated random number, timestamp, and other computational values to 
disguise the random number. This part of the procedure resembles the SYN part in 
the three-way handshake. When the server receives the SYN, it checks the 
authenticity and integrity of the request. This can be achieved by checking the 
freshness of the timestamp and the MAC value. Once the verification is valid, the 
server generates random a number and a timestamp to create the SYN/ACK. At this 
stage, the server should have all the data needed to calculate the session key for the 
client. The client then computes the shared session key and sends an ACK message 
to the server. The server then uses the shared knowledge to verify that the message 
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4.3	  THE	  NEW	  PROTOCOL	  PROCESS	  MODEL	  
Developing a secure model for organisations tends to be difficult due to finding the 
right balance between security and functionality. For this reason, the research will 
focus on secure distributed systems and improve their authentication and 
communication. To guarantee the security of these distributed systems, biometric 
techniques and ID-based cryptography are adopted. Since it is very hard to design 
such a model correctly and without errors, a Unified Modelling Language (UML) 
(Larman, 2002; Stevens, 2006) is used to represent the abstraction level between the 
client and the server. This process is the initial phase to understand the functionality 
of the proposed protocol. It consists of:  
1. Using a case model to capture the functional requirements of the system 
2. Using an activity and sequence diagram to capture the dynamic behaviour of the 
system and articulates a sequence of messages exchanged in the protocol. 
 
System Requirements: 
The main goal is to design a secure computer system that fully supports biometric 
verification and IBE in any distributed system. The organisation employees and users 
could connect to the systems (server-side) from any place (client-side) through the 
Internet. 
The proposed system functions as the following: 
• The system provides users with a reliable authentication mechanism. 
• Data interchange in transaction should be secure. 
• Data storage should be secure and reliable.  
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The following activity diagram in Figure 4.5 shows the actions that occur during the 
login process for registered users. The primary actors in this activity diagram are the 
users and the system administrator. The diagram illustrates the steps taken as an 
authorised employee logs on to the computer system. Access to the system is only 
granted if the user’s ID/ password/ biometrics are all entered correctly within the first 
three attempts. Otherwise, the user ID will be locked out after the third attempt and 
the system administrator will need to issue a new password. Once access is granted 
the user can use the system according to their level of authorisation. The rational 
reason behind implementing limited entry attempts and lockout policy is to prevent 
brute force attack and unauthorised access. 
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The next diagram shown in Figure 4.6 below is the sequence diagram. It is used to 














































Figure	  4.6:	  Detailed	  system	  behaviour	  for	  user	  activities	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4.4	  SUMMARY	  
Designing a new authentication protocol can be challenging because authentication 
protocols are schemes based on cryptographic algorithms, which provide secure 
communication for authenticating peers. This chapter aims to present a methodology 
to formulate the basic notation to build a new scheme and helps to set the protocol 
rules and security context for the next chapter. The new scheme comprises a 
sequence of interactions between a client and a server designed to achieve mutual 
authentication and establish session keys between entities. The exchange of 
messages between entities uses various cryptographic mechanisms such as 
symmetric encryption, hash function, message authentication code, random numbers, 
and timestamps. These mechanisms will be discussed explicitly in Chapter 5.  
Moreover, this chapter discussed the concept of the new scheme and its architecture 
and shows the importance to consider all security requirements. The internal 
behaviour of the login phase is modelled with UML modelling to understand and 

































This chapter concentrates on designing an authentication protocol. First, it describes 
the objectives of the new protocol and scheme preliminaries. Then, it elaborates the 
details of the proposed protocol and identifies explicitly the process of each phase. The 
proposed scheme consists of four phases: system initialisation phase, registration 
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Authentication protocols can be thought of as schemes to authenticate the identity of 
entities, which are based on cryptographic algorithms (Stallings, 2011). It is essential 
to design a robust authentication scheme with well-built security measures. The main 
method used for devising the proposed protocol was to reengineer the He et al. 
scheme (2012) and Li-Hwang scheme (2010) and combine them together to produce 
a new protocol with the best features of both and without their flaws. To achieve the 
confidentiality goal of the new protocol, symmetric encryption is applied between 
the client and server during the mutual authentication to prevent passive attacks such 
as eavesdropping or active attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks. Additionally, 
to guarantee the integrity of the protocol, a message authentication code (MAC) is 
employed in every message transmitted to detect any modification or tampering. 
 
5.1	  PROTOCOL	  DESCRIPTION	  AND	  OBJECTIVES	  
The protocol objectives describe the environment within which the information 
transmission will be carried out between the client and server. It provides hybrid 
cryptography by utilising both ID-based encryption and biometric. The protocol 
objectives can be summarised as follows: 
1. The protocol can operate in insecure channels, such as the Internet, except in 
the registration phase where SSL is used. 
2. The protocol is an authentication protocol that provides mutual authentication 
through a three-way handshake between two participants: a server and a 
client. 
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3. To protect subsequent communication between the server and client within 
the organisation network, a short-term session key is established during the 
authentication process. 
 
5.2	  PROTOCOL	  PRELIMINARIES	  	  
The novel contribution of this submission is focused on secure distributed systems 
such as e-Government and improves their authentication and communication. To 
guarantee the security of these distributed systems, biometric verification and ID-
based cryptography are used. The proposed protocol is based on the following 
assumptions: 
• The shared secrets in the registration phase will never be disclosed.  
• The cryptographic algorithms are secure. For example, it is impossible to 
cryptanalyse a ciphertext without prior knowledge of the secret key. 
• Both the client and server are able to generate a random number securely. 
The security of the proposed scheme is based on the intractability of the following 
two mathematical problems on elliptic curves (Boneh and Franklin, 2001; He et al., 
2012) 
(i) Computational Diffie–Hellman Assumption (CDHA): Given P,  xP,  yP  ∈  G, it 
is hard to compute xyP  ∈  G. 
(ii) Collision Attack Assumption 1 (k-CAA1): For an integer k, and x∈  Zn*, P  ∈  G, given (P,   xP,   h0,   (h1,   (h1+x)-­‐1P),….,(hk,   (hk+x)-­‐1P)), where hi  ∈  Zn*,  and distinct for 0  ≤    i  ≤    k, it is hard to compute (h0+x)-­‐1P. 
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The proposed scheme consists of four phases: system initialisation phase, registration 
phase, login phase and authentication and key agreement phase. The notations used 
throughout this chapter are summarised in the list of notation section. 
 
5.3	  SYSTEM	  INITIALISATION	  PHASE	  	  
System initialisation is executed by the server to setup the security domain for 
protocol message exchange. This process is obtained by generating security 
parameters and publishing public parameters. The initialising steps in this phase are 
very similar to He et al.’s scheme where the server Si generates parameters of the 
system. 
Step 1: Si chooses an elliptic curve equation EP(a,  b). 
Step 2: Si selects a base point P with the order n over EP(a,  b). 
Step 3: Si randomly selects its master key x and secret information y and 
computes public key Pub_Ks  =  xP. 
Step 4: The server chooses four secure one-way hash function H1(.), H2(.), H3(.), H4(.), where H(.) is a known hash function that takes a string and 
assigns it to a point on the elliptic curve, i.e. H(A)  =  QA on E, where: 
• H1(.): a secure one-way hash function, where H1:  {0,  1}*  →  Z*n  
• H2(.): a secure one-way hash function, where H2:  {0,  1}*  →    Z*p 
• H3(.): a secure one-way hash function, where H3:  {0,  1}*  →    Z*p 
• H4(.):a secure one-way hash function, where H4:  {0,  1}*  →    Z*p 
Where: {0,  1}* denotes the set of all finite binary strings, Z*n is the multiplicative group of positive integers less than n, 
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Z*p is the multiplicative group Z*p  ={1,2,…,p-­‐1} of order p, where p is a 
prime.  
Also, the server keeps x private and publishes {Fp,  E,   n,  P,  Pub_Ks,  H1,  H2,  H3,  H4,  MACk(m)}. 
 
5.4	  REGISTRATION	  PHASE	  	  
A client Ci with identifier IDCi should be registered first with Ri before using the 
services provided. Clients may use a unique ID, for example, the employee number 
as an identity, when contacting Ri for authorisation and authenticity. In this phase, Ci 
needs to perform the following steps: 
Step 1: User Ci inputs their IDCi and personal biometrics BioCi on a specific 
biometric device, and provides the password PWCi to Ri via a secure channel 
(or to the registration centre in person). 
 Step 2: Ri computes the following: fi  =  H4  (BioCi  )    zi  =  H4  (PWCi  ||  fi)  ei  =  H4  (IDCi  ||  y)  ⊕  zi  
Step 3: Ri computes Ci’s private key using the system private key x and Ci’s 
public key. Pr_KCi  =  (x+  H4  (IDCi))-­‐1  P  ∈  G      Pub_KCi  =  H4  ((IDCi)  +  x)  P  =    H4  ((IDCi)P  +  Pub_Ks)    
Step 4: Ri stores {IDCi,  H4   (.),  Enc{   }a/Dec{   }a,   fi,   ei,   τ,  Pr_KCi} on a secure 
database and sends it to the user via a secure channel, where Enc{  }a/Dec{  }a 
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is a symmetric encryption with secret key a and τ is a predetermined 
threshold for biometric verification (Inuma et al., 2009). 
 
5.5	  LOGIN	  PHASE	  
The user Ci  sends a login request to the server Si and performs the following steps:  
Step 1: Ci  enters the IDCi and PWCi, then Si verifies the authenticity of client’s 
identity and password.  
Step 2: Ci  submits the BioCi on a specific biometric device, then Si verifies the 
following: 
    Accept if d(BioCi,  Bio*Ci)    <  τ 
     Reject if d(BioCi,  Bio*Ci)    ≥  τ 
Step 3: if the above does not hold, it means the biometric information does 
not match the template stored in the system. Thus Ci does not pass the 
biometric verification process and the authentication scheme is terminated. 
Otherwise, Ci passes the biometric verification and computes the following:  fi  =  H4  (BioCi  )    z  ì  =  H4  (PWCi  ||  fi)  M1  =  ei  ⊕  z  ì    =    H4  (IDCi  ||  y)  W1  =    rCi  .  P  M2  =    rCi  .  Pr_KCi  M3  =    M1  ⊕  rCi  
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Where rCi∈  Z*n is a random number generated by the client. For this step, the 
random value rCi is introduced to mask the hash of the secret value H4(IDCi||y). 
Step 4: Ci  computes the secret key for MAC,  k  =  H2  (IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M2), where TCi is a timestamp denoting the current time and calculates the MAC value 
for (IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M3). 
Step 5: Finally, Ci  encrypts the message {IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M3,  MACk  (IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M3)}a and sends it to the server Si. This login request contains the initial 
components of the negotiated session key: IDCi,  TCi,  W1 as contribution of the 
session key. 
The encrypted message includes Ci’s timestamps to provide freshness 
guarantees; the value of W1 is a multiplication of the Ci’s random number 
with P point on elliptic curve E with order n.  
 
5.6	  AUTHENTICATION	  AND	  KEY	  AGREEMENT	  PHASE	  
After receiving the request login message, Si and Ci will perform the 
following steps for mutual authentication: 
Step 1: Si  decrypts the message {IDCi,  T  Ci,  W1,  M3,  MACk(IDCi,  T  Ci,  W1,  M3)}a, 
then checks the validity of IDCi and the freshness of TCi. The freshness of TCi 
is checked by performing T ̀ –  TCi  ≤  ∆T, where T ̀  is the time when Si receives 
the above message and ∆T is a valid time interval. In the case where IDCi   is 
not valid or TCi is not fresh, then Si  aborts the current session. This means the 
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system stops processing the request due to invalid parameters and the client 
has to login again.  
Step 2: If Step 1 holds, Si  computes the following to create the secret key for 
MAC:  M2  =    (x  +  H1(IDCi)-­‐1.  W1    
            =  Pr_KCi  .  rCi      k    =  H2  (IDCi,  T  Ci,  W1,  M2)  Si  checks the integrity of MACk  (IDCi,  T  Ci,  W1,  M3)  with the key k. Si 
will quit the current session if the check produces a negative result. 
Step 3: If Step 2 holds, Si  chooses a random number RSi  ∈  Z*n and computes 
the following: M4  =  H4  (IDCi  ||  y)  W2  =    rSi  .  P  KSi  =    rSi  .  W1  
Now Si is able to complete the protocol and compute the absolute 
value of the session key sk  =  H3  (IDCi,  TCi,  TSi,  W1,  W2,  KSi), where TSi 
is a timestamp denoting the current time. M5  =  M3  ⊕  M4  =  rCi  M6  =  M4  ⊕  rSi  M7  =  H4(M3  ||  M5)  
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Where M5   is the random value rCi   of the user Ci and only Si can 
unmask the value because it can compute H4  (IDCi    ||  y). 
Step 4: Si  computes the MAC value for (IDCi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7), then encrypts 
the message {IDCi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7,  MACk(IDCi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7)}a and sends it 
to Ci .  
Step 5: Upon receiving the Si’s message, Ci first decrypts {IDCi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7,   MACk(IDCi,   TSi,   W2,   M6,   M7)}a , and checks the freshness of TSi by 
performing T’–   TSi  ≤  ∆T, where T ̀  is the time when Ci receives the above 
message and ∆T is the expected time interval for the transmission delay. 
Step 6: Ci verifies whether the received message M7 matches the computation 
of H4  (M3  ||  rCi) and checks the integrity of MACk  (IDCi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7) with 
the key k. Ci will quit the current session if the check produces a negative 
result.  
Step 7: If it holds, Ci believes that Si is authenticated and then computes the 
following: KCi  =  rCi  .  W2  
The session key sk  =  H3  (IDCi,  TCi,  TSi,  W1,  W2,  KCi)  M8  =  M6  ⊕  M1  =  rSi  M9  =  H4(M6  ||  M8)  
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Where M9 is the random value rSi  of the server Si and only the client Ci, which know M1  =  H4  (IDCi||  y), can send back the correct hashed 
value of M9  =  H4  (H4  (IDCi||  y)  ⊕  rSi)  ||  rSi). 
Step 8: Ci compute the MAC value for M9, then sends the encrypted message {M9,  MACk(M9)  }a to Si. 
Step 9: After receiving Ci’s message, Si decrypts Enc{M9}a and checks the 
integrity of MACk(M9). Then, Si verifies whether M9  =  H4  (M6  ||  rSi) or not. 
Step 10: If the above-mentioned holds, Si accepts Ci’s login request or 
otherwise rejects it. 
 
5.7	  PROTOCOL	  DEFENCE	  MECHANISMS	  	  
Securing authentication protocols plays a crucial role in the area of protocol design. 
The security of algorithms and techniques are equally important as efficiency and 
functionality. Carefully choosing adequate cryptographic algorithms can remove real 
threats that most protocols face. For example, encrypt the traffic to ensure 
confidentiality and apply message authentication code for integrity check. It is 
fundamental to consider if every component in the protocol represents 
complementary building blocks. Sometimes it is necessary to combine several 
mechanisms to achieve certain benefits on security features. This strategy often helps 
to focus on the small details of the protocol design and treat vulnerabilities and flaws 
as a visible opponent. 
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5.7.1 One-way cryptographic hash functions (OWCHF) 
Hash functions in general were introduced in modern cryptography to provide data 
integrity and message authentication, and digital signatures (Menezes et al., 2010). 
Hash functions have many practical applications in computer science and 
information security. For example, cryptographic hash functions are used as a way to 
detect data corruption. In case the data is corrupted, a re-computation of the hash 
value will certainly change and eventually it will not match the stored value (Ryan 
and Schneider, 2001). However, the key purpose of using hash functions is to 
maintain integrity, protect sensitive data and computation values from security 
breach and determine if the data is authentic. However, there is a crucial difference 
between a standard hash function and a cryptographic hash function. A cryptographic 
hash function must at least have the property of being one-way. To clarify, given any 
string  y from the range of h, it should be computationally infeasible to find any value x in the domain of h such that (Smart, 2008): 
h(x)  =  y.  
 One-way cryptographic hash functions are mathematical computations that take in a 
relatively arbitrary amount of data as input and produce a fixed size output. They are 
easy to compute once the input is known but it should be difficult to calculate the 
hashed value without a prior knowledge of the original input (Stallings, 2011). The 
one-way hash function can be defined as a transformation mechanism that takes an 
arbitrarily large data field as its argument and maps it to a fixed output with the 
additional properties of preimage resistance and 2nd pre-image resistance. It is mostly 
used for authentication schemes (Menezes et al., 2010).  
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The one-way cryptographic hash function in the proposed protocol satisfied the 
following properties: pre-image resistance, 2nd-pre-image resistance, collision 
resistance. A formal detailed security proof in the random oracle model has been 
conducted by He et al. (2012) based on the intractability of the following two 
mathematical problems assumptions: Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption 
(CDHA) and Collision Attack Assumption 1 (k-CAA1). Note that, the reason for 
emphasis on that H2,   H3,   H4:{0,   1}*  →   Z*p is because it is known that half of the 
elements in Z*p are quadratic non-residues modulo p. The hash value of any binary 
message is thus some element of the group Z*p, which is easily computable and 
difficult to invert (Menezes et al., 2010). 
In principle, storing the hash value of an applied one-way function can relatively 
prevent possible attacks for the following reasons. First, It should be computationally 
difficult for an attacker to find different inputs that produce the same hash value. 
Second, it should be computationally difficult for an attacker to find from one 
message a modified image of this message that both have the same hash values. 
Hence, if a hash function is resistant to a second pre-image attack it means that the 
one-way function will continue being one-way and it will always produce the same 
specific hash value for a specific message. Based on that, the password is 
concatenated with f, which is the biometric hashed value of the client. Thus, 
legitimate clients must provide something they know (password) and something they 
are (biometric) in order to be authenticated. This combined hashed value creates a 
tricky situation for an attacker to mount a brute force attack. It is crucial that the 
password is concatenated with the biometric template f  to prevent the rainbow table 
attack. The technique prevents knowing the common inputs and produces long hash 
value, which makes it hard for the attacker to generate a rainbow table. 
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5.7.2 Message Authentication code (MAC) 
In the new protocol, a MAC-based method is applied instead of using a signature-
based method.  This method provides a guarantee that messages arriving at a 
destination are indeed in their original form as sent by the sender and they are 
coming from an authentic source. Moreover, the MAC detects if the content or 
timing of the message is modified. Also, it ensures non-repudiation by verifying the 
source that originated the message. The recipient can do the checksum with the 
shared key and compare the received checksum. This way the recipient only has to 
verify the integrity of messages using the same MAC algorithm. 
Some attacks simply seek to corrupt particular fields in a packet’s internal data by 
replacing some bytes of the transmitted data with random inputs to change the 
original plaintext for sabotage purposes. The proposed protocol relies on using 
MACs to authenticate the messages exchange between the client and server. The 
main goal that the proposed protocol seeks to achieve with the MAC is the ability to 
detect any attempt to corrupt or modify the transmitted data by attackers. The 
proposed protocol is designed to limit the attacker’s ability to produce feasible 
messages the client will deem authentic. That is, the attacker will not be able to 
create a feasible message: {IDCi,   TCi,  W1,  M3} without recovering the secret key to 
compute the MAC code. This type of forgery might be useless to mount against the 
new protocol because a message should have a certain format to pass the validation 
check, which is matching the MAC codes and comparing them. Therefore, it is 
necessary to consider a message authentication code to design a good protocol as 
well as providing data origin authentication. 
 
 
	   95	  
5.7.3 Symmetric Key Cryptography 
Cryptography is the art of disguising information during data transmission and it 
adequately addresses information security in a way that prevents malicious activities. 
Encryption algorithms are divided into two groups based on the key type: symmetric 
or secret key, and asymmetric or public key encryption. In symmetric key encryption 
both the sender and recipient use the same secret key to encrypt and decrypt, whereas 
in asymmetric key encryption, the sender and the receiver each have distinct private 
and public keys. Symmetric encryption should be thought of as a method that can 
handle the problem of privacy and secrecy. Encryption alone does not protect data 
from alteration by another party, but the advantages of symmetric encryption should 
be obvious in that it conceals the contents of the messages exchanged such as 
password, hash values and other sensitive data. 
In contrast to asymmetric encryption, which is considered very computationally 
intensive, symmetric encryption is computationally light. The sender and receiver 
use a shared key to encode and decode the messages, thus privacy can be enforced 
even if a third party listens to the conversation. In summary, symmetric encryption 
provides secrecy and confidentiality. The purpose of using symmetric encryption 
over other algorithms is because it is designed to be computationally fast and simple. 
Also, it can accommodate high rates of data throughput (Menezes et al., 2010). The 
main goal of using symmetric key cryptography is to maintain an efficient way of 
achieving confidentiality and prevent any act of eavesdropping, thus attaining a 
secure channel between the client and server during negotiation and mutual 
authentication. 
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5.8	  DISCUSSION	  
Enhancing the result of merging the two protocols is significantly essential. Without 
the adjustments, both protocols do not apply any encryption mechanisms and this 
increases the likelihood of exploit. Insecure protocols can be threatening because an 
eavesdropper gets to observe any sensitive data exchanged between a client and a 
server.  
The merits of both protocols after merging still exist in the new protocol. The 
security of the new protocol is equivalent to the security of Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange, which provide perfect forward secrecy.  The client and the server agree on 
the key session during the handshake based on prior information without allowing an 
eavesdropper to obtain a copy of the session key. The handshake in the new protocol 
is based on ECC, both the client and the server’s random numbers are disclosed and 
it is hard for an attacker to reverse engineer random numbers. In the system 
initialisation phase, the server selects an elliptic curve equation EP(a,  b) and a base 
point P with the order  n  over EP(a,  b) and shares these values with the client. The 
key exchange mechanism in the new protocol follows the same step on ECC key 
exchange: 
(1) The client generates a random number rC, then computes W1  =   rC   .   P and 
sends it to the server. 
(2) The server generates a random number rS, then computes W2  =   rS   .P and 
sends it to the client. 
(3) The client computes rC  .  W2 , which equals to rC.  rS  .  P. 
(4) The server computes rS  .  W1  , which equals to rS  .  rC  .P. 
At this stage, the client and the server now share the point rS   .   rC   .P to create the 
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session key.  
However, the security of key exchange does not prevent other attacks like man-in-
the-middle attack, parallel session attack and reflection attack as demonstrated in 
Chapter 7. To protect the messages from passive attacks such as eavesdropping, it is 
necessary to send the messages in encrypted form. For this reason, the new protocol 
uses a secret key cipher to encode the messages using the mutually agreed secret key a.  
In the new protocol, the contents of the message exchange are not exposed to 
spoofing attacks. The method of authenticate-then-encrypt is used where every 
message is concatenated with MAC code for an integrity check and then encrypted 
via symmetric encryption. However, this method may raise other security concerns 
and make the new protocol vulnerable to a chosen cipher-text attack. This flaw will 
be discussed explicitly in Chapter 7.   
 
5.9	  SUMMARY	  	  
The proposed authentication protocol is based on a three-way handshake mechanism, 
which is the kernel of the protocol. This mechanism is applied to negotiate the secure 
components of a session between the client and server, such as verifying the identity 
of the client using biometric and password information, agreeing on cryptographic 
algorithms, mutually authenticating each other and using biometric and ID-based 
encryption over ECC to generate session keys. The proposed protocol allows the 
client and the server to exchange encrypted messages between each other. The 
symmetric cryptography is used to ensure that the subsequent messages are protected 
during transmission. Since encryption does not automatically protect data against 
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modification, each message contains a MAC to alert the receiver in case the message 
has been tampered with.  Figure 5.1 summarises the phases of the new protocol. 
 
 







	   Client	  Ci	   	   Registration	  Centre	  Ri	  (1)  IDci,  PWci,  Bioci,        
    (3)  IDCi,  H4(.),  Enc{}a/Dec{  }a,  fi,  ei,  τ,  Pr_K  Ci  
(2)  Computes:    
• fi  =  H4(Bioci)  
• ei  =  H4(IDci||y)⊕H4(PWCi||fi)  




Client	  Ci	   	   Server	  Si	  (1) Enters    ID’  Ci    and  PW’Ci      (3)  Inputs  Bio’Ci      (5)  Computes:  
• z’i  =  H4(PWCi  ||fi)  
• M1=ei⊕z’i  
• W1=r  Ci  .  P  
• M2=  r  Ci  .  Pr_K  Ci  
• M3=  M1⊕rci  
• k=H2(IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M2)            
                 (6)  C1=Enc{IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M3,  MACk(IDCi,  TCi,  W1  ,M3)}a    
  (2)Verifies  the  authenticity  of  ID’Ci  and  PW’Ci  (4)  Verifies      Accept  if  d(BioCi,  Bio*Ci)  <  τ      Reject  if  d(BioCi,  Bio*Ci)    ≥  τ    









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (5)  Decrypts  C2  and  verifies  M7  ?=  H4(M4||rCi)and  the  integrity  of  MACk(IDCi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,M7)  Server  S i   is   authenticated   (6)  Computes:  
• KCi  =rCi  .  W2  
• Sk  =  H3(IDCi,  TCi,  TSi,  W1,  W2,  KCi)    
• M8=M6⊕M1  =rSi  
• M9=  H4(M6||M8)	  
                        
   (4)  C2=Enc{IDCi,  TSi,W2,  M6,  M7,  MACk(IDCi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7)}a             (7)  C3=  Enc{M9,  MACk(M9)}a    
(1)  Decrypts  C1,  then  checks  validity  of  IDci  and  freshness  of  Tci  (2)  Computes:  
• M2=(x+H1(IDCi))-­‐1.W1  
• k=H2(IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M2)  
• Checks  the  integrity  of  MACk(IDCi,  TCi,W1,  M3)  (3)  Computes:  
• M4=H4(IDCi||y)  
• W2=rSi  .P  
• KSi=rSi.W1  
• Sk=H3(IDCi,  TCi,  TSi  W1,  W2,  KSi)    
• M5=M3⊕M4  =  rCi  
• M6=M4  ⊕  rSi  
• M7  =  H4(M3||M5)                      (8)  Decrypts  C3  and  verifies  M9?=  H4(M6⊕rSi)  Client  Ci   is   authenticated    

















This chapter starts by giving a brief definition of extended finite state machines 
(EFSM). Then it elaborates the details of the finite-state verification of the proposed 
protocol and identifies the functionality of each phase. Also, it studies the behaviour of 
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6.1	  PROTOCOL	  MODEL	  AND	  STATE	  MACHINE	  
Protocol modelling is a crucial step in designing security protocols. It contributes to 
diminishing ambiguity and misinterpretation of protocol specifications. For example, 
modelling a protocol using a finite-state machine (FSM) can help to understand how 
it will interact with changes and how it will behave with invalid inputs. A finite-state 
machine is a powerful tool to simulate software architecture and communication 
protocols. FSM can only model the control part of a system and consists of a finite 
number of states, a finite number of events and a finite number of transitions.  
In order to model the complex behaviour of the proposed protocol, an extended 
model of FSM is considered. According to Alagar and Periyasamy (2011), EFSM 
helps to comprehend the state space complexity of a system when the number of 
states and transitions increases. They also emphasise the importance of introducing 
state variables into FSM models. State variables play a key role in modelling 
because they can define a range of arithmetic and logical operators to manipulate 
state variables and trigger transitions based on logical primitives (Alagar et al., 
2011). Moreover, EFSM with variables can transfer variable values from one model 
to another. Consequently, the produced output value from one machine can be 
consumed by other machines. With the introduction of variables, EFSM allows one 
to model a system with conditions. Transitions may have guards and predicates, 
which consist of operations or Boolean-valued expressions that can depend on input 
variables (Alagar and Periyasamy, 2011). A formal definition of an EFSM is as 
follows (Androutsopoulos et al., 2009; Alagar and Periyasamy, 2011): 
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An	  Extended	  Finite	  State	  Machine	   (EFSM)	   is	  defined	  by	   the	   tuple	  M	  =	   (S,	  T,	  E,	  V),	  
where:	  
S	  is	  a	  set	  of	  states,	  	  
T	  is	  a	  set	  of	  transitions,	  	  
E	  is	  a	  set	  of	  events,	  and	  	  
V	  is	  a	  store	  represented	  by	  a	  set	  of	  variables.	  	  
Transitions	  have	  a	  source	  state	  source(t)	  ∈	  S,	  a	  target	  state	  target(t)	  ∈	  S	  and	  a	  
label	  lbl(t).	  Transition	  labels	  are	  of	  the	  form	  e1[c]/a	  where	  e1	  ∈	  E,	  c	  is	  a	  condition	  
and	  a	  is	  a	  sequence	  of	  actions.	  	  
	  
 
The EFSM is used to model the communication channel of the new protocol between 
the Client Ci  and the Server Si. Since the exchange of packets follows a pattern 
defined by a finite set of rules, each principal in the protocol has a corresponding 
state machine: EFSMserver, EFSMregister and EFSMclient. 
 
6.2	  SERVER	  EFSM	  
The EFSM at the server side represents the various on-going communications with 
the client at any point in time. It is modelled using 10 states and 22 transitions as 
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Transition Transition	  Direction Guards/Condition 
Waiting for clients S0 à S0 - 
Request to enrol S0 à R0 ClientEnrol  ==  True  
Client is registered  S0 à S1 R0àS0 ClientReg  ==  True  
Enter ID S0 à S1 ID  Valid  
Enter Password S1 à S2 Password  Valid  
Submit Biometric S2 à S3 Biometric  Valid  
Request client login  

















ID_attempt  ==  3  PW_attempt  ==  3  Bio_Attempt  ==  3  
Send SYN/ACK and C2 S5àS6 
T  ̀–  TCi  ≤  ∆T  Server_MACk  ==  Client_MAC  
Client ACK and C3 
received S6àS7   
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Figure	  6.1:	  The	  server	  machine	  modelled	  by	  EFSM	  
	  
1) The EFSMserver will loop itself as the server is waiting for clients. The 
machine advances to the next state once it is triggered by a login/enrol 
transition accordingly. 
2) When the EFSMserver is in the state S1, it checks the validity of the 
received ID. If ID is proved to be incorrect, Si will request Ci  to enter the 
valid ID for three times and EFSMserver will loop until Ci enters the valid 
ID or if the attempts exceed three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s 
account will be blocked and EFSMserver will change to state S4 from state 
S1. Generally, three attempts are made through our protocol steps to 
allow common errors. 
 
	   104	  
3) When the EFSMserver is in the state S2, it is triggered by valid ID and it is 
now waiting for a valid PW. Once Si  receives PW, it verifies the validity 
of PW. If PW is proved to be wrong, Si  will request Ci to enter the valid 
PW for three times and EFSMserver will loop until Ci enters the valid PW 
or if the attempts exceed three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s account 
will be blocked and EFSMserver changes state to S4 from state S2.  
4) When the EFSMserver is in the state S3, it is triggered by valid PW and it is 
now waiting for a valid Bio. Once Si receives Bio, it verifies the validity 
of Bio by comparing the imprinted Bio with the template stored. If Bio 
does not match the stored template, Si will request Ci to enter the valid 
Bio up to three times and the EFSMserver will loop until Ci enters the valid 
PW or if the attempts exceed three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s 
account will be blocked and the EFSMserver changes state to S4 from state 
S3. 
5) In state S5, the EFSMserver waits until it receives the login request SYN  =  {IDCi,   TCi,   W1,   M3,   MACk(IDCi,   TCi,   W1,   M3)}a from the FSMclient to 
establish a connection by performing  the three-way handshake.  
6) While in state S5, the EFSMserver checks the validity of ID, freshness of T  
and the integrity of MACk. Then Si generates a random number and 
timestamp in order to calculate the session key sk  =  H3(IDCi,  TCi,  TSi,  W1,  W2,  KSi). After that, Si replies with the SYN/ACK  =  {IDCi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7,  MACk(IDCi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7)}a to the EFSMclient. 
7) In state S6, EFSMserver waits until it receives the ACK from the 
EFSMclient. Once the EFSMclient sends ACK  =  {M9}a, EFSMserver verifies 
	   105	  
M9≟H4   (M6   ||   rSi). In this instance, Si   authenticates Ci as a legitimate 
user.  
8) At state S5 and state S6, EFSMserver terminates the current session if any 
of the following situations occurs: 
§ The client ID is invalid 
§ The freshness of T ̀ –  TCi  ≥  ∆T 
§ Negative result when checking the integrity of MACk(IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M3)    
§ M9  !=  H4  (M6  ||  rSi)    
At any stage of EFSMserver, EFSMserver aborts the current session and changes to state 
S9 if the timeout exceeds the defined TIME_WAIT while waiting for packets. This 
feature helps to prevent an infinite from waiting when the EFSMclient fails to respond.  
 
6.3	  CLIENT	  EFSM	  
The EFSM at the client side represents the various on-going transmissions with the 
server at any point in time. It is modelled using 9 states and 21 transitions as detailed 
in Table 6.2 below. Figure 6.2 shows the transitions diagram for the EFSMclient. 
1) First, the EFSMclient is in the initial state C0. That is when the request for 
register/login is initiated by itself. While in state C0, the EFSMserver checks 
whether Ci is enrolled or not. The next state will be decided according to 
the condition ClientReg  ==  True. 
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Transition	   Transition	  Direction	   Guards/Condition	  
Request to enrol C0 à R0 ClientEnrol  ==  True  
Client is registered / Enter 
ID C0 à C1 ClientReg  ==  True  
Enter Password C1 à C2 ID valid 
Submit Biometric C2 à C3 Password valid 
Send login request SYN 
(C1) 

















ID_attempt  ==  3  PW_attempt  ==  3  Bio_Attempt  ==  3 
Client receives SYN/ACK 
(C2)  C5àC6  
Client sends ACK (C3) C6àC7 
M8  ==  H4  (M4  ||  rCi)    Client_MACk  ==  Server_MAC 
Authenticated by server C7àC8  
















Figure	  6.2:	  The	  client	  machine	  modelled	  by	  EFSM	  
2) In state C1, C2, C3, the FSMclient is waiting for validating ID, PW, and Bio. 
Once the client credentials are validated, the EFSMclient triggers itself and 
changes to state C5. 
3) In states C1, C2, C3, the client may be required to re-enter ID, PW, Bio in 
case they were incorrect. However, the client’s account will be blocked if the 
number of attempts exceeds three, which changes the above states to state C4.  
§ ID_attempt  <  3,  ID_attempt  =  ID_attempt  +1  
§ PW_attempt  <  3,  PW_attempt  =  PW_attempt  +1  
§ Bio_Attempt    <  3,  Bio_attempt  =  Bio_attempt  +1  
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4) In state C5, The EFSMclient generates a random number and timestamp to 
calculate the encrypted login request {IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M3,  MACk(IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M3)}a and sends it to the EFSMserver. This request represents the SYN part in 
the three-way handshake procedure.  
5) While in state C5, the FSMclient is waiting for the EFSMserver to respond after 
sending the login request in order to establish the connection. 
6) In state C6, the EFSMclient is validating the EFSMserver response by checking 
the integrity of MACk, ∆T and M7  ≟  H4  (M4  ||  rCi). If Si proves legitimate, Ci 
authenticates Si at this stage. 
7) While in state C6, the EFSMclient computes the shared session key sk   =  H3(IDCi,   TCi,   TSi,   W1,   W2,   KCi) and finalises the handshake procedure by 
sending the ACK  =  {M9}a to Si. 
8) In state C7, the EFSMclient is waiting to be authenticated by   server.  
9) In state C8, the client terminates the current session if one of the following 
occurs: 
§ Negative result when checking the integrity of MACk  
§ T ̀ –  TSi  ≥  ∆T  
§   M7  ≟  H4  (M4  ||  rCi)  
At any stage of EFSMclient, EFSMclient aborts the current session and changes to state 
C9 if the timeout exceeds the defined TIME_WAIT while waiting for packets. This 
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6.4	  REGISTER	  EFSM	  
The EFSM at the registration side represents the various on-going transmissions with 
the server and the client at any point in time. It is modelled using EFSM with 4 states 











Figure	  6.3:	  The	  register	  machine	  modelled	  by	  EFSM	  
 
1)  First, the EFSMregister is triggered if the client is not enrolled at state R0. That 
is when the request for registration is initiated by EFSMclient. While in state C0, 
the EFSMserver checks whether Ci  is enrolled or not. 
2) Once Ci enters ID, EFSMregister changes to state R1 and validates the format of 
ID. Then EFSMregister triggers itself asking Ci to enter PW and changes to state 
R2. 
3) In state R2, on receiving PW for the first time, EFSMregister requires Ci to re-
enter PW for confirmation. Then it triggers itself and changes to the state R3. 
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4) In state R3, Ci   is required to submit multiple scans of the biometric data to 
increase accuracy. Once the acquisition process is complete, EFSMregister 
triggers itself and sends a message to EFSMregister, which indicates that the 
enrolment is successful. 
6.2	  BEHAVIOUR	  EVALUATION	  
The capability to detect errors and vulnerabilities is essential in protocol design 
implementation. Since communication protocols are partially specified, the finite 
state approach provides a flexible way to detect invalid inputs and ambiguous 
specifications, which are usually unspecified or vague in protocol design. Testing the 
new protocol with FSM helps to verify whether the protocol complies with its 
specification or not. Modelling with FSM shows that the new protocol can function 
correctly and behave properly even with invalid input or time delay.  
The state machine in Figure 6.4 represents the result of combining the three 
machines together. The composite model executes according to the protocol 
description and handles error in a safe manner and it performs certain action in case 
of unreliable state. Each valid and reachable state generates a valid protocol state and 
the transitions can be triggered by either events or guards.  
Predicating and considering all possible combinations of both desirable and 
undesirable states are one way to fully understand the complexity of the proposed 
protocol. Based on the equivalent behaviour, each machine may follow 
nondeterministic behaviour and produce different outputs according to the original 
input. For example, if EFSMclient generates an illogical input for the authentication 
process then EFSMclient rejects the session and goes to the terminate state.  
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Figure	  6.4:	  The	  new	  protocol	  modelled	  by	  EFSM	  
 
Note that the following states S9 and C9 are defined in terms of a timeout being 
reached with an inability to complete mutual authentication. The states S4 and C4 are 
defined in terms of an invalid input being injected due to an invalid ID, wrong 
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password, or unmatched biometric. The states S8 and C8 are defined in the case of 
unreliable actions being performed for example, if the integrity or validity check 
failed. Furthermore, a state machine hierarchy or hierarchical FSM is used to provide 
a more concrete level of refinement; FSMregister can be refined by introducing an 
“Enrol” feature. This state determines if the client is pre-enrolled or not. The state R0 
becomes a new EFSM with three states R1, R2, R3 as described in section 6.4. 
 
6.3	  PERFORMANCE	  EVALUATION	  
Theoretically, the computation cost for the proposed protocol is relatively low and 
efficient since lightweight algorithms are applied, such as symmetric encryption, 
hash operations and XOR operations. On one hand, symmetric encryption provides 
secrecy and prevents active attack. On the other hand, MAC provides integrity and 
authenticity. Another important point to stress is that the symmetric key computation 
for encryption and decryption is similar to hash function operations (Feldhofer and 
Rechberger, 2006)  
The handshake in the new protocol based on ECC tends to be faster than the 
handshake based on RSA. Lauter (2004) and Gupta et al.(2002) showed that an ECC 
is roughly 5 to 15 times as fast as RSA  at the 163-bit ECC/1024-bit RSA security 
level and the ratio increases between 20 and 60 at the 256-bit ECC/3072-bit RSA 
security level. This analysis shows the advantage of ECC over RSA. Moreover, ECC 
has significant advantages over other public-key cryptography because ECC 
provides the same security level of RSA cryptosystem, but with a shorter key length 
and faster computation (Yokoyama, 2000) 
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Even though the number of operations is greater than those of other schemes, the 
scheme holds some other security properties. The proposed protocol is based on a 
two-factor user authentication mechanism and it is obvious that it takes a few more 
hash operations and XOR operations for the server and client. Due to the security 
weaknesses in related schemes, the authenticate-then-encrypt method is applied to 
ensure the confidentiality and the integrity of transmitted packets. This feature makes 
the new scheme more efficient in terms of performance and security.  
	  
6.4	  SUMMARY	  
This chapter started by giving a brief definition of extended finite state machines 
(EFSM). Then it discussed the details of the finite-state verification of the new 
protocol and identifies the functionality of each phase. Also, it studied the behaviour 
of each machine created for each phase and how they interrelate together. 
 The composite model executes efficiently and handles error in a safe manner 
according to their types. The new protocol connection progresses from one state to 
another based on the data pertained from the message exchanged. EFSM helps to 
understand the behaviour of the protocol and detects any unwanted behaviours.   	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The first step of analysis is modelling the protocol. This chapter presents a Petri net 
(PN) approach to model, simulate and analyse the new protocol. A formal approach 
like Petri nets allows one to represent communication protocols. For the sake of 
simplicity, a complex PN model will not be discussed until all attacks are 
demonstrated and the model is proved to be secure. This chapter shows how Petri nets 
are used to model and analyse the cryptographic protocol. First, the proposed 
protocol is modelled without an adversary, and then a generic adversary model is 









Security Evaluation	  	  
	   115	  
7.1	  CRYPTOGRAPHIC	  PROTOCOL	  AND	  PETRI	  NETS	  	  	  
Due to the unique characteristics possessed by cryptographic protocols, analysis and 
evaluation tend to be more difficult than network protocols, which send data in 
unencrypted form such as the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Telnet. 
Typically cryptographic protocols, also known as security protocols, tend to inhabit a 
complex environment by utilising various cryptographic mechanisms, such as 
symmetric and asymmetric encryption, hash functions, timestamps and digital 
signature (Ryan and Schneider, 2001).  
For this reason, Petri Nets offer the opportunity to conduct an in-depth analysis and 
overcome security vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Moreover, they simplify the 
modelling of exchange messages between nodes and describe the behaviour of 
authentication and key agreement procedure. A number of researchers have used 
Petri nets to model and analyse cryptographic protocols such as Nieh and Taveres 
(1993), Al-Azzoni et al. (2005), Dresp (2005), Permpoontanalarp and Sornkhom 
(2009) and Xu et al. (2001) and there are more examples besides these.  
Petri nets are a finite-state analysis approach that explicitly provides a graphical 
description for cryptographic protocols. They pay attention to specific properties 
such as liveness, deadlock, livelock, and boundedness.   
Outline of the technique: 
The following steps explain the methodology to model the proposed protocol with 
Petri Nets (PN): 
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1) Build a PN trust model using TAPAAL simulation and verification software. 
The following steps are necessary for the process of modelling: 
(a) Define the places and transitions and declare their functionalities.  
(b)  Implement a token passing scheme once the initial marking is set. 
(c) Assess the model’s behaviour by examining reachability, 
boundedness, and liveness. 
(d) Validate the model using simulation. 
2) Add an adversary entity. This step involves the following: 
(a)  Extend the original model and define places and transitions for the 
adversary entities. 
(b) Implement the token-passing scheme with the adversary. 
(c) Model different attacks and identify any insecure behaviour. 
 
7.2	  CLIENT-­‐SERVER	  TRUST	  MODEL	  
The trust model is a notation for determining the organisations should trust with its 
assets. For example, organisations usually verify the applicants’ resumes and 
references to conduct background and history checks before trusting their employees. 
Once they are employed, they will be issued photo ID badges and parking permits. In 
contrast to the real world, it is challenging in the virtual world to identify individuals 
who are trusted and those who are not. A trust relationship between a client and a 
server can be obtained in different practices. Some systems use the traditional way 
that relies on usernames, passwords and digital certificates. Sometimes it may 
involve a trusted third party to operate the authentication and validation, such as the 
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Kerberos login protocol and Shibboleth authentication, while other systems deploy 
biometric automated verification systems to recognise trusted users. 
In the proposed trust model, the client-server trust relationship is initiated during the 
registration phase. First, the client submits his/her ID, password (PWCi), and 
biometric data (BioCi). Then the server will issue in return a corresponding private 
key (Pr_KCi), secret key (a) for the symmetric encryption, and τ   the predetermined 
threshold for biometric verification. The assumption for this model is that the client 
and server are trustable entities, and they never cheat.	  Timed-arc Petri nets are used 
to model the new protocol. The trust model consists of two entities: one for the 
client, C , and the other for the server, S . The protocol entities are derived from the 
protocol description in Chapter 5. The assumption made for this model is that each	  legitimate	  participant	  is	  honest,	  i.e.	  behaves	  according	  to	  the	  protocol	  rules. The 
Petri net model in Figure 7.1 represents the trust model for the new protocol. The 
definitions of the places and transitions used in this model are illustrated in Table 7.1 

























P={P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P17, P18, P19, P20, 
P21, P22, P23, P24, P25} 
 
T = {T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7, T8, T9, T10, T11, T12, T13, T14, T15, T16, T17, T18} 
 
M0: {2, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,0} 
 
I(T1)={P1,P2,P3} I(T10)={P15} O(T1)={P4} O(T10)={P16} 
I(T2)={P4} I(T11)={P16} O(T2)={P5} O(T11)={P17} 
I(T3)={P5} I(T12)={P16} O(T3)={P6} O(T12)={P18} 
I(T4)={P6} I(T13)={P1,P2,P18} O(T4)={P7} O(T13)={P19,P20} 
I(T5)={P7} I(T14)={P20} O(T5)={P8} O(T14)={P21} 
I(T6)={P7} I(T15)={ P21} O(T6)={P9} O(T15)={ P22} 
I(T7)={P9,P10,P11} I(T16)={ P22} O(T7)={P12,P13} O(T16)={ P23} 
I(T8)={P13} I(T17)={P23} O(T8)={P14} O(T17)={P24} 
I(T9)={P14} I(T18)={P23} O(T9)={P15} O(T18)={P25} 
     
(b) 
Figure	  7.1.	  (a)	  The	  client-­‐server	  trust	  model	  	  (b)	  Descriptions	  of	  trust	  model	  
Client	   Server	  
(a)	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Table	  7.1.	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  PLACES	  -­‐	  THE	  TRUST	  MODEL	  
Place	   Definition	   Place	   Definition	  
P1	   Client	  random	  number	   P14	   Encrypted	  SYN/ACK	  
P2	   Client	  timestamp	   P15	   Decrypted	  SYN/ACK	  
P3	   SYN	  request	   P16	   Verification	  message	  
P4	   Login	  request	   P17	   Rejected	  request	  
P5	   Encrypted	  login	  request	  	   P18	   Accept	  request	  –	  Server	  is	  authenticated	  
P6	   Decrypted	  login	  req.	   P19	   Session	  key	  
P7	   Verification	  message	   P20	   ACK	  
P8	   Rejected	  request	   P21	   Encrypted	  ACK	  
P9	   Accepted	  request	   P22	   Decrypted	  ACK	  
P10	   Server	  random	  number	   P23	   Verification	  message	  
P11	   Server	  timestamp	   P24	   Rejected	  request	  
P12	   Session	  Key	   P25	   Accept	  request	  –	  Client	  	  
P13	   SYN/ACK	   	   is	  authenticated	  
	  
	  
Table	  7.2.	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  TRANSITIONS	  FOR	  TRUST	  MODEL	  
Trans.	   Definition	   Trans.	   Definition	  
T1	   Compute	  login	  request	  +	  SYN	   T10	   Split	  the	  packet	  and	  verify	  
T2	   Encrypt	   T11	   Drop	  the	  packet	  
T3	   Decrypt	   T12	   Accept	  
T4	   Split	  the	  packet	  and	  verify	   T13	   Compute	  ACK	  and	  session	  key	  
T5	   Drop	  the	  request	   T14	   Encrypt	  ACK	  
T6	   Accept	   T15	   Decrypt	  ACK	  
T7	   Compute	  SYN/ACK	  and	  session	  key	   T16	   Split	  the	  packet	  and	  verify	  
T8	   Encrypt	  SYN/ACK	   T17	   Drop	  the	  packet	  
T9	   Decrypt	  SYN/ACK	   T18	   Accept	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
The PN trust model represents a three-way handshake procedure between C  and S . It 
allows both C   and S  to agree on a shared session key over an insecure channel. The 
steps of protocol analysis for the PN trust model are described as follows: 
• At first, the protocol is initiated by a client. The client entity of the PN trust 
model generates a random value (P1), a timestamp (P2), SYN request (P3) to 
compute the login request (P4) within a specific time limit. C  sends the 
encrypted request (P5) to S . 
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• Upon receiving the request, S  will check the age of the token. Note that 
computing and sending the request to S  takes some units of time. S   will drop 
the request if the time processing exceeds the deadline. This is guaranteed by 
the use of transport arcs that preserve the age of the tokens and the 
corresponding invariants. Figure (6.3) shows the PN behaviour with time 
delay. In the second message of the handshake, the server entity generates a 
random value (P10), and a timestamp (P11) to compute the session key (P12), 
and a SYN/ACK request (P13). Then S  sends the encrypted SYN/ACK (P14) to 
C. 
• Upon receiving the SYN/ACK, C  checks the token age and computes the 
session key (P19). At this stage, C  authenticates S  and sends an enciphered 
ACK (P21) to S . 





Figure	  7.2.	  The	  trust	  model	  in	  simulation	  state	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Figure	  7.3:	  Trust	  model	  with	  time	  delay	  (a)	  Server	  in	  rejection	  state.	  (b)	  Client	  in	  rejection	  state	  
(a)	  
(b)	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After modelling the proposed protocol, it is essential to examine the behavioural 
properties of the model. Detailed behavioural properties for Petri nets can be found 
in Murata (1989). Generating a reachability graph (Figure 7.4) allows one to identify 
the presence and absence behaviours of the modelled protocol. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
A. Reachability:  
A reachability or coverability assessment can be conducted by enumerating all states, 
in other words, deriving all the possible marking the protocol can reach in the model.  
This method can clearly identify all the enabled transitions starting from the initial 
state and generating new states after firing transitions. The model shown in Figure 
7.1 is bounded. This is evident from the reachability graph (Figure 7.4). The whole 
set of reachable markings Mi, where i={0,1,2,…,19} are said to be reachable, that is 
to say there exists a sequence of transition firings which transform one marking state 
to another.  
R=	  Rejection	  State	  	  
M0	  	   P1	  P2	  P3	  P10P11	  is	  authenticat	  1	  
P4	  P10	  P11	  is	  
P5	  P10	  P11	  is	  authenticat
P6	  P10	  P11	  is	  





P9	  P10	  P11	  is	  P8	  P10	  P11	  	  
T5 T6
T7







P17is	  authen P18	  P1	  P2	  	  
T12T11













Figure	  7.4:	  Reachability	  graph	  for	  the	  trust	  model	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B. Boundedness and safeness:  
Boundedness helps to detect overflows in the modelled system. This property is an 
indication of the stability behaviour of the model. It is evident that the proposed 
model is structurally bounded, since each place in the net holds at most two tokens 
given an initial marking m0. That is to say, there are a finite number of states in the 
modelled protocol. Thus, the model has no self-loop and satisfies the condition 
(Murata, 1989): 
 
A Petri net is k-bounded if all its places are k-bounded. 
A Petri net is structurally bounded if it is bounded in any initial marking.   
 
Hence, it can be said that the net is structurally 2-bounded. However, the net is not 
safe because there are two nodes (P1, P2), which contain more than one token. It does 
not fulfil the safeness condition, which is 1-bounded. 
 
C. Liveness 
The PN has a finite number of dead markings1. The transitions (T5, T11, T17) 
connected to places (P8, P17, P24) respectively would not be live if the protocol runs 
without rejections. Apart from that, the rest of the places and their corresponding 
firing transitions are live. The occurrence of deadlocks2 (rejection state), as shown in 
Figure 7.3, would be a reason for aborting the current session between the client and 
the server as eventually the token age would exceed the deadline.   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A	  dead	  marking	  is	  a	  marking	  where	  no	  transition	  is	  enabled	  (Diaz,	  2013).	  2	  A	  PN	  is	  called	  deadlock	  when	  no	  transition	  can	  fire	  (Diaz,	  2013).	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7.3	  TRUST	  MODEL	  WITH	  ADVERSARY	  	  
The purpose of this analysis is to find weaknesses and flaws in the protocol. It is 
essential to examine the behaviour of the protocol with the presence of a malicious 
adversary. An adversary entity can be a hacker, a malicious insider, a disgruntled 
employee, a terrorist, organised crime, or competitors.  
The worst-case scenario would be if attackers obtained illegitimate access to the 
target system. They could install malicious software, such as a rootkit, to remove or 
modify data. This act of unauthorised access could lead to privilege escalation and 
allow the attacker to gain elevated entry to resources that are meant to be protected 
from other application users. Moreover, faulty protocols may allow an attacker to 
compromise other machines in the network to act as zombie computers to launch 
Denial-of-Service attacks.  
PN Modelling is capable to the message flow throughout the protocol with an 











Server	  Adversary	  Client	  
Figure	  7.5:	  High-­‐level	  view	  of	  the	  adversary	  entity	  attacking	  the	  protocol	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The adversary entity is composed of processes, each designed for a specific function 
in the protocol. Each process models the adversary’s possible actions to capture 
tokens. It can intercept messages from the channel, alter them, and pass them to the 
target source. Figure 7.6 below shows an example of a low-level view of an 










Conceptually, the adversary entity is non-deterministic, in that it may perform 
possible actions under different client identities at a given time to ultimately 
compromise the target system. The following assumptions are considered for the 
adversary model: 
1) The adversary can eavesdrop, intercept, and store a message. It may block or 
pass any of these messages. Additionally, it may construct forged messages 
and inject them into the channel. 
2) The adversary has zero knowledge such that it does not possess any elements 
of messages transmitted between the legitimate nodes but it can learn by 
observing the traffic. 
3) The traffic between client and server is not encrypted.  
Figure	  7.6:	  Low-­‐level	  view	  of	  adversary	  process	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The main goal of the adversary model is to examine the protocol behaviour with the 
presence of an adversary while modelling attacks. In the adversary model (attack 
model), the description of the client and the server entities is similar to the trust 
model as described in section 7.2. For the adversary entity, places represent the 
adversary database, which store control and knowledge and accumulate all the 
intercepted messages. Transitions represent a set of input events and commands the 
adversary may perform to launch an attack. The input token in the adversary entity 
indicates that the message has been captured. The token movement from place to 
place through the directed arcs indicates the progress of an attack. To distinguish 
genuine traffic from forged traffic, the grave symbol ` is used to indicate that the 
variable could be modified. For example, if the adversary intercepted the message [A,  B,  C], the output message would be [A`,  B`,  C`], which means the message has been 
manipulated by the adversary. A malicious adversary can attempt to abuse an 
authentication protocol by hijacking a specific session request to gain legitimate 
access to the target system.  
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7.4	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  MAN-­‐IN-­‐THE-­‐MIDDLE	  ATTACK	  
After adding an adversary entity to the model, it can be noticed that there is the 
possibility of a man-in-the-middle between the two entities C  and S . An active 
adversary A  can intercept the communication line between a legitimate client and a 
trusted server as well as manipulate the protocol by using some means to 
successfully masquerade either as server or client. The attack model in Figure 7.7 
represents the man-in-the-middle attack for the proposed protocol. The definitions of 




Server	  Adversary	  Client	  
Figure	  7.7:	  Modelling	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  attack	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Table	  7.3:	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  PLACES	  –	  THE-­‐MAN-­‐IN-­‐THE-­‐MIDDEL	  ATTACKS	  MODEL	  
	  	  
	  
Table	  7.4:	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  TRANSITIONS	  –	  THE-­‐MAN-­‐IN-­‐THE-­‐MIDDEL-­‐ATTACK	  MODEL	  
Trans.	   Definition	   Trans.	   Definition	  
T1	   Compute	  login	  request	  +	  SYN	   T14	   Receive	  forge	  SYN/ACK	  
T2	   Send	  MSG	   T15	   Split	  the	  packet	  and	  verify	  
T3	   Intercept	  MSG	   T16	   Drop	  the	  request	  
T4	   Duplicate	  MSG	   T17	   Accept	  
T5	   Send	  forge	  MSG	   T18	   Compute	  ACK	  and	  session	  key	  
T6	   Received	  Forge	  MSG	   T19	   Send	  ACK	  
T7	   Split	  the	  packet	  and	  verify	   T20	   Intercept	  MSG	  
T8	   Drop	  the	  request	   T21	   Send	  forge	  ACK	  
T9	   Accept	   T22	   Receive	  forge	  ACK	  
T10	   Compute	  SYN/ACK	  and	  session	  key	   T23	   Split	  the	  packet	  and	  verify	  
T11	   Send	  SYN/ACK	   T24	   Drop	  the	  request	  
T12	   Intercept	  MSG	   T25	   Accept	  
T13	   Send	  forge	  SYN/ACK	   	   	  
 
 
Place	   Definition	   Place	   Definition	  
P1	   Client	  random	  number	   P21	   SYN/ACK	  for	  C	  
P2	   Client	  timestamp	   P22	   Sent	  SYN/ACK	  for	  A	  
P3	   SYN	  request	   P23	   Sent	  SYN/ACK	  for	  C	  
P4	   Login	  request	   P24	   Received	  SYN/ACK	  for	  C	  
P5	   Sent	  request	  	   P25	   Received	  SYN/ACK	  for	  A	  
P6	   Intercepted	  MSG	   P26	   Sent	  forge	  SYN/ACK	  to	  C	  
P7	   Forge	  MSG	  A	   P27	   Received	  forge	  SYN/ACK	  
P8	   Forge	  MSG	  C	   P28	   Verification	  message	  
P9	   Sent	  forge	  MSG	  A	   P29	   Rejected	  request	  
P10	   Sent	  forge	  MSG	  C	   P30	   Accept	  request	  –	  A	  is	  authenticated	  
P11	   Received	  forge	  MSG	  A	   P31	   Session	  key	  
P12	   Received	  forge	  MSG	  A	   P32	   ACK	  
P13	   Verification	  message	   P33	   Sent	  ACK	  
P14	   Rejected	  request	   P34	   Intercepted	  ACK	  
P15	   Accepted	  request	   P35	   Forge	  ACK	  
P16	   Server	  random	  number	   P36	   Received	  forge	  ACK	  
P17	   Server	  timestamp	   P37	   Verification	  message	  
P18	   A	  Session	  Key	   P38	   Rejected	  request	  
P19	   C	  Session	  key	   P39	   Accept	  request	  –	  A	  is	  authenticated	  
P20	   SYN/ACK	  for	  A	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According to Figure 7.7, the man-in-the-middle attack proceeds as follows: 
• In the login phase, when the client C   initiates and sends the login request P4 
to the server S , an adversary A  may intercept the login message. Transition T3 
represents the initial phase of the attack. A  can duplicate the login message 
and then start two sessions with S   by sending two copies of request: P7 = P8 
= [ID`C,  T`C,  W`1,  M`3,  MAC`k(IDC,  TC,  W1  ,M3)]  to S  as shown in Figure 7.8.  
 
 
• Upon receiving P11 and P12, S  generates two random numbers from (P16)  and 
two timestamps from (P17) and computes the following:  
o Two session keys (P18, P19) for A  and C , respectively 
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Adversary	   Server	  Client	  
Figure	  7.8:	  	  The	  adversary	  is	  sending	  forged	  messages	  to	  server	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o Two SYN/ACK messages (P20, P21) for A  and C , respectively  
Then, S  sends the messages (P22, P23) for the two sessions respectively.  
• In the meantime, A  captures (P22, P23) and sends a forged message (P25) to C  
as shown in Figure 7.9.  
  
 
• After receiving the (P27), C  verifies it, which in this case is a genuine request [IDC,   TS,   W2,   M6,   M7,   MACk(IDC,   TS,   W2,   M6,   M7)]. Consequently, C  
authenticates A masquerading as S. Then C computes the shared session key 
(P31) and sends ACK (P32) to S .  
• A  intercepts (P33) and forwards it to S .  
Figure	  7.9:	  The	  adversary	  masquerading	  as	  server	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• After receiving (P36), S  verifies ACK=  H4(M6⊕rS). Thus, A  is successfully 




By analysing the protocol, without encrypting the traffic, the proposed protocol is 
prone to man-in-the-middle attack. The adversary has the ability to control the 
negotiation between the client and the server. In fact, the adversary can clearly 
modify, substitute or delete all subsequent messages. It is obvious that both the client 
and the server have established a bogus session with the adversary.  
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Client	   Server	  Adversary	  
Figure	  7.10:	  The	  adversary	  masquerading	  as	  client	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7.5	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  REFLECTION	  ATTACK	  
The Reflection Attack consists of two parties. The Adversary in this model is 
masquerading as the server. In this PN model, places represent either input or output 
of the protocol run. Transitions are used to illustrate the client and adversary actions. 
Tokens indicate the progress of the attack. Figure 7.11 describes the execution of a 
reflection attack for the new protocol with the presence of the client and the 
adversary. The definitions of the places and the transitions used in this model are 
illustrated in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6, respectively. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Client	   Adversary	  
Figure	  7.11:	  Modelling	  the	  reflection	  attack	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Table	  7.5:	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  PLACES	  –	  THE	  REFLECTION	  ATTACK	  MODEL	  
	  	  
Table	  7.7:	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  TRANSITIONS	  –	  THE	  REFLECTION	  ATTACK	  MODEL	  
Trans.	   Definition	   Trans.	   Definition	  
T1	   Compute	  login	  request	  +	  SYN	   T7	   Split	  the	  packet	  and	  verify	  
T2	   Send	  MSG	   T8	   Drop	  the	  request	  
T3	   Intercept	  MSG	   T9	   Accept	  the	  request	  
T4	   Fabricate	  SYN/ACK	   T10	   Compute	  ACK	  and	  session	  key	  
T5	   Send	  fake	  SYN/ACK	   T11	   Send	  ACK	  
T6	   Received	  fake	  SYN/ACK	   T12	   Receive	  ACK	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
Since client C’s login request  [IDC,   TC,   W1,   M3,   MACk(IDC,   TC,   W1   ,M3)] is 
symmetrical to server S  response [IDC,  TS,  W2,  M6,  M7,  MACk(IDC,  TS,  W2,  M6,  M7)] 
but the differences between them can only be found in the timestamps and hash 
values, this symmetry flaw (Wang and Ma, 2013) leads to a reflection attack. To 
exploit the reflection attack, the adversary A  intercepts the login request while 
listening to the electronic conversation between client C  and server S . Then, the 
adversary sends the same login request [ID`C,  T`C,  W`1,  M`3,  MAC`k(IDC,  TC,  W1  ,  M3)] 




Place	   Definition	   Place	   Definition	  
P1	   Client	  random	  number	   P9	   Received	  forge	  SYN/ACK	  
P2	   Client	  timestamp	   P10	   Verification	  message	  
P3	   SYN	  request	   P11	   Rejected	  request	  
P4	   Login	  request	   P12	   Accepted	  request	  
P5	   Sent	  request	  	   P13	   Session	  key	  
P6	   Intercepted	  MSG	   P14	   ACK	  
P7	   Sent	  forge	  SYN/ACK	   P15	   Sent	  ACK	  
P8	   Received	  forge	  SYN/ACK	   P16	   Received	  ACK	  













It is obvious that, upon receiving the forged server’s response (which is in fact the 
adversary’s reply request), C   will automatically acknowledge the response since the 
computation is accomplished with the correct key, so the MAC integrity check will 
succeed. Consequently, A  successfully masquerades as S  and the protocol fails to 
provide mutual authentication. 
Although A  can cheat C  into believing he is communicating with S , A  cannot obtain 
the corresponding session key sk. Still this type of attack is deemed to represent a 
breach of the basic obligation of mutual authentication with limited damage. A  
performed the exploit without the knowledge of key k, merely by intercepting the 
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Server−Side
Client−SideClient	   Adversary	  
Figure	  7.12:	  	  The	  adversary	  masquerading	  as	  server	  (SYN/ACK)	  





7.6	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  PARALLEL	  SESSION	  ATTACK	  
Another attack, which is effective against the new model without encrypted traffic, is 
a parallel session attack. This attack uses deception to compromise authentication 
protocols. It involves selecting a valid combination of information from ongoing 
protocol executions. Figure 7.14 explains the exploitation of a parallel session attack 
on the proposed protocol with the presence of an adversary. The message exchange 
in this attack is mainly between the server and the adversary, leaving the client 
completely out of the picture. The definitions of the places and transitions for this 
model are given in Table 7.7 and Table 7.8, respectively. 
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Server−Side
Client−Side Adversary	  Client	  
Figure	  7.13:	  	  The	  adversary	  masquerading	  as	  server	  (ACK)	  




Table	  7.7:	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  PLACES	  -­‐	  THE	  PARALLEL	  SESSION	  ATTACK	  MODEL	  
	  	  
Place	   Definition	   Place	   Definition	  
P1	   Client	  random	  number	   P16	   Sent	  SYN/ACK	  	  
P2	   Client	  timestamp	   P17	   Received	  SYN/ACK	  
P3	   SYN	  request	   P18	   Fabricated	  Fake	  SYN	  
P4	   Login	  request	   P19	   Sent	  fake	  SYN	  
P5	   Sent	  request	  	   P20	   Received	  fake	  SYN	  
P6	   Intercepted	  MSG	   P21	   Verification	  message	  
P7	   Forge	  MSG	  	   P22	   Rejected	  request	  
P8	   Sent	  Forge	  MSG	  	   P23	   Accepted	  request	  
P9	   Verification	  message	   P24	   Server	  random	  number	  
P10	   Rejected	  request	   P25	   Server	  timestamp	  
P11	   Accepted	  request	   P26	   Session	  Key	  
P12	   Server	  random	  number	   P27	   SYN/ACK	  
P13	   Server	  timestamp	   P28	   Sent	  SYN/ACK	  
P14	   Session	  Key	   P29	   Received	  SYN/ACK	  
P15	   SYN/ACK	   	   	  
Adversary	   Server	  Client	  
Figure	  7.14:	  Modelling	  the	  parallel	  session	  attack	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Table	  7.8:	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  TRANSITIONS	  -­‐	  THE	  PARALLEL	  SESSION	  ATTACK	  MODEL	  
Trans.	   Definition	   Trans.	   Definition	  
T1	   Compute	  login	  request	  +	  SYN	   T11	   Intercept	  MSG	  
T2	   Send	  MSG	   T12	   Fabricate	  SYN	  
T3	   Intercept	  MSG	   T13	   Send	  fake	  SYN	  
T4	   Send	  forge	  MSG	   T14	   Receive	  forge	  SYN	  
T5	   Received	  Forge	  MSG	   T15	   Split	  the	  packet	  and	  verify	  
T6	   Split	  the	  packet	  and	  verify	   T16	   Drop	  the	  request	  
T7	   Drop	  the	  request	   T17	   Accept	  
T8	   Accept	   T18	   Compute	  SYN/ACK	  and	  session	  key	  
T9	   Compute	  SYN/ACK	  and	  session	  key	   T19	   Send	  SYN/ACK	  
T10	   Send	  SYN/ACK	   T20	   Receive	  SYN/ACK	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
In the authentication phase of the new protocol, the adversary A  can masquerade as 
an authorised client without prior knowledge of the password. The exploit starts 
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          Intruder Server−SideClient−Side Adversary	   Server	  Client	  
Figure	  7.15:	  	  The	  adversary	  eavesdrops	  on	  the	  communication	  between	  C	  and	  S	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A  intercepts and blocks the S  response message: P16 = [IDCi,   TSi,   W2,   M6,   M7,  MACk(IDCi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7)]. Then, A  instantly impersonates C  and initiates a new 
session with S  by sending a fabricated login request: P19 = [IDA  =ID`C  ,   TA  =  T`S,  W1=W`2,  M3  =  M`6,  M7,  MAC`k(IDC,  TS,  W2,  M6,  M7)], which is the original reply of S  to  C  (Figure 7.16). 
 
 
Assume that, if the fabricated message arrives at S on time T, it will pass the 
verification check for the following reasons: 
(1) The likelihood of correlation associated with T –̀ TC ≤ ∆T will be high 
considering the time-delay in wide-area networks is unpredictable and varies 
most of the time. Thus, ∆T is often set higher than the timespan of a complete 
round-trip (Mills, 1991; Giridhar and Kumar, 2006; Han and Jeong, 2010). 
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          Intruder Server−SideClient−Side Adversary	   Server	  Client	  
Figure	  7.16:	  	  The	  adversary	  intercepts	  the	  server	  response	  (SYN/ACK)	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(2) The MAC integrity check will give a positive result since MAC`k(IDC,  TS,  W2,  M6,  M7)  is actually computed with the correct key k by S . 
Based on the above assumptions, S  generates random number P24 and timestamp P25 
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          Intruder Server−SideClient−Side Adversary	   Server	  Client	  
Figure	  7.17:	  The	  adversary	  intercepts	  the	  server	  response	  (ACK)	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7.7	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  IMPERSONATION	  ATTACK	  
One possible attack against the proposed model is impersonation attack. Based on 
the simulation of man-in-the-middle attack, reflection attack, and parallel session 
attack, the model reveals a potential risk and weakness that leads to an impersonation 
attack. The adversary A  can mount an impersonation attack without knowing any 
other secret information or credentials by intercepting the login request [IDC,  TC,  W1,  M3,  MACk(IDC,  TC,  W1   ,M3)]. Hence, A  can exploit the proposed protocol by using 
any of the methods explained previously and hijacking sessions transmitted between C   and S . Eventually, A  succeeds in impersonating either the client or the server by 
pretending to be either the client or the server. 
 
 
7.8	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  REPLAY	  ATTACK	  
The security feature in the new protocol can withstand replay attack due to the use of 
the freshness property. This is guaranteed by applying timestamps and random 
numbers for each authentication session. To validate the authenticity of messages 
exchanged between C  and S , the freshness of timestamps is constantly checked. For 
example, the verification request will fail if T ̀ –  TC  >  ∆T. This will cause the session 
to be terminated. Moreover, a new session key is constructed in every authentication 
cycle. The adversary cannot compromise the old session key because it has never 
been transmitted in the protocol execution between the client and the server. One of 
the new protocol merits is that each entity computes the correct session key based on 
the information exchanged between them.   
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7.9	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  FORGERY	  ATTACK	  
The adversary cannot create a valid login from scratch without knowing the secret 
value and the private key of the client. Thus, the adversary cannot act as a legal 
client, so the attack is not feasible.   
 
7.10	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  CIPHERTEXT	  ATTACK	  
Ciphertext attack is one of the realistically possible attacks that can subvert the 
protocol. The PN model for this attack is demonstrated in Figure 7.18, which shows 
the attack takes place in the first part of the three-way handshake. The definitions of 
the places and the transitions for this model are defined in Table 7.9 and Table 7.10, 
respectively. The analysis for this attack is based on the following assumptions: 
1. MAC functions are secure against chosen-message attacks. 
2. Symmetric encryption functions are secure against chosen-plaintext attacks. 
 
  
Adversary	  	   Server	  Client	  	  
Figure	  7.18:	  Modelling	  the	  ciphertext	  attack	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Table	  7.9:	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  PLACES	  -­‐	  THE	  CIPHERTEXT	  ATTACK	  MODEL	  
	  
	  	   Table	  7.10:	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  TRANSITIONS	  -­‐	  THE	  CIPHERTEXT	  ATTACK	  MODEL	  
Trans.	   Definition	   Trans.	   Definition	  
T1	   Compute	  login	  request	  +	  SYN	   T12	   Accept	  
T2	   Compute	  MAC	  value	  and	  append	  it	  to	  the	  MSG	   T13	   Compute	  SYN/ACK	  and	  session	  key	  
T3	   Encrypt	  MSG	   T14	   Compute	  MAC	  value	  and	  append	  	  
T4	   Send	  ciphertext	   	   it	  to	  the	  MSG	  
T5	   Intercept	  ciphertext	   T15	   Encrypt	  MSG	  
T6	   Alter	   T16	   Send	  ciphertext	  
T7	   Send	  modified	  ciphertext	   T17	   Receive	  ciphertext	  
T8	   Receive	  modified	  ciphertext	   T18	   Decrypt	  ciphertext	  
T9	   Decrypt	  ciphertext	   T19	   Split	  the	  packet	  and	  verify	  
T10	   Split	  the	  packet	  and	  verify	   T20	   Drop	  the	  request	  
T11	   Drop	  the	  request	   T21	   Accept	  
 
 
Suppose that C   and S  are exchanging messages in encrypted form using symmetric 
key cryptography. Typically, C  creates a login request via T1 and then authenticates 
the login request P4 by calculating the MAC value using the computed key k, via T2. 
Next C  appends the result of the MAC calculation and produces an authenticated 
Place	   Definition	   Place	   Definition	  
P1	   Client	  random	  number	   P17	   Rejected	  request	  
P2	   Client	  timestamp	   P18	   Accepted	  request	  
P3	   SYN	  request	   P19	   Server	  random	  number	  
P4	   Login	  request	   P20	   Server	  timestamp	  
P5	   MAC	  secret	  key	  	   P21	  	   Session	  Key	  
P6	   Authenticated	  MSG	   P22	   SYN/ACK	  for	  C	  
P7	   Symmetric	  key	   P23	   MAC	  secret	  key	  
P8	   Ciphertext	   P24	   Authenticated	  MSG	  
P9	   Sent	  ciphertext	   P25	   Ciphertext	  
P10	   Intercepted	  ciphertext	   P26	   Sent	  ciphertext	  
P11	   Modified	  ciphertext	   P27	   Received	  ciphertext	  
P12	   Sent	  modified	  ciphertext	   P28	   Decrypted	  ciphertext	  
P13	   Received	  modified	  	   P29	   Verification	  message	  
	   ciphertext	   P30	   Rejected	  request	  
P14	   Symmetric	  key	   P31	   Accept	  request	  –	  S	  is	  	  
P15	   Decrypted	  ciphertext	   	   authenticated	  
P16	   Verification	  message	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message P6 = IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M3,  MACk(IDCi,  TCi,  W1  ,M3). At this stage, C  encrypts the 
authenticated message with the key a via T3 and sends the ciphertext P8 = {IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M3,  MACk(IDCi,  TCi,  W1  ,  M3)}a  to S . Now, assume there is an active adversary A  
listening to the conversation between C   and S . A  can basically perform a man-in-the-
middle attack even if it cannot decrypt or re-encrypt the packets as they pass through. 
In this scenario, A  can intercept the messages interchanged between C  and S , trim 
them, alter them, and pass on the modified versions. The session between C and S 
breaks every time A  interferes. During the exchange in Figure 7.14, A  can intercept 
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Adversary	   Server	  Client	  	  
Figure	  7.19:	  	  The	  adversary	  intercepts	  the	  client’s	  request	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This attack relies on the fact that the MAC value is encrypted along with the raw 
data. When S  receives the encrypted message, it needs to validate as follows: 
1. Decrypt the received data (Figure 7.20). 
2. Compute the MAC value and validate the checksum (Figure 7.21). 
It is true that S  will terminate the session once it decrypts because when S  computes 
the MAC value for the modified message it will not match the received MAC value. 
Also, it is worth considering the wasted time the process S  takes to realise the 
message is invalid and terminates the session due to a technical error from the point 
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Adversary	  	   Server	  Client	  
Figure	  7.20:	  	  The	  server	  decrypts	  the	  forged	  request	  





The analysis determines that the attack can be successful in subverting the main goal 
of the protocol. To make the point clearer, S    believed the message came from C  
because the decryption process was a success. However, it was up to S  to validate the 
integrity of the message by verifying the integrity checksum based on the MAC. 
Another attack is effective against the new protocol is the attack illustrated by 
Krawczyk (2001). He exposed a vulnerability in the authenticate-then-encrypt 
method. This attack can be applied to the new protocol and it works as long as the 
adversary can learn if a given ciphertext is valid, even if it cannot obtain full 
decryption. The following encryption scheme is used in the attack scenario (Katz and 
Lindell, 2007): 
• Let Transform(m) be as follows: any 0 in m is transformed to 00, and any 1 in m is 
transformed arbitrarily to 01 or 10. The decoding of a message works by mapping 
00 back to 0, and 01 and 10 back to 1. However, a pair of bits 11 will result in 
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Adversary	  	   Server	  Client	  
Figure	  7.21:	  	  The	  server	  verifies	  the	  decrypted	  request	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• Define Enc’k (m) = Enck(Transform(m)), where Enc is a stream cipher that works 
by generating a new pseudorandom stream for each message to encrypt, and then 
XORs the stream with the input message. For example, this can be obtained by using 
a pseudorandom function (secure block cipher) in CTR mode, with a new random IV 
for each encryption. Note that both the encryption schemes Enc and Enc’ are CPA 
secure. 
 
An adversary A  can willingly observe a transmitted ciphertext P10: C={IDCi,  TCi,  W1,  M3,  MACk(IDCi,   TCi,  W1   ,  M3)}a and it can learn the first bit while intercepting the 
ciphertext C. A  can simply flip the first two bits (c1,  c2) of C and send the modified 
ciphertext C` to its destination. A  can find out that the resulting ciphertext is valid if 
the original bit is equals to 1. The bit change in ciphertext will result in the same 
decrypted plaintext and then the MAC check will succeed. This is because if the first 
bit of the original message equals 1, then the first two bits of Transform(m) can be 
01 or 10. Thus, the match of these two bits still maps to the same initial bit 1. On the 
other hand, if the original bit is equal to 0, the decrypted plaintext will have a 1 
instead, then MAC will fail. This is because 0 is mapped to 00 and so flipping these 
bits results in 11, which is an incorrect encoding. Thus, the plaintext is ⊥≠ m but the 
MAC is still computed over m. All A   needs is to obtain the information whether the 
MAC succeeded or not (Krawczyk, 2001; Katz and Lindell, 2007). 
The above analysis unfortunately exhibits the fragility of the security of the 
authenticate-then-encrypt method and it shows that the combination is not secure 
against chosen-ciphertext attacks. Thus, the new protocol shows weaknesses and 
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7.10	  SECURITY	  ANALYSIS	  AND	  DISCUSSION	  
Security analysis is a crucial process in evaluating communication and cryptographic 
protocols. Also, it aids in identifying flaws and weaknesses existing in protocols. The 
analysis shows that there are few flaws in the proposed protocol. These flaws can be 
quickly removed by considering three techniques. The first amendment is to include 
the IDS of the server. The absence of server identity allows an adversary to simply 
masquerade as a trusted server. It is possible to optimise the protocol with a simple 
technique, such as adding the server IDS, which can address the problem. As for the 
second amendment, encrypting the traffic between client and server creates a private 
channel to transmit a confidential conversation and calculate the session key. 
Variations of these attacks were modelled in all phases of mutual authentication and 
key agreement of the cycle. Modelling and simulation revealed that the unencrypted 
traffic does not provide a full secure transmission and allows a sensitive credential 
information travel in clear forms. However, a major issue to be highlighted here is 
that encryption provides only secrecy and it does not guarantee integrity. In 
conjunction, the authenticate-then-encrypt method does not quite accomplish the 
integrity of the ciphertext, even if these mechanisms are secure as standalone 
functions. This leads to the third amendment, which encourages employing the 
encrypt-then-authenticate method instead of the authenticate-then-encrypt. The 
reasonable reaction to overcome this flaw is to validate the ciphertext integrity by 
calculating the MAC value of the ciphertext and appending the value to it. This way, 
both S  and C  will be able to validate the integrity of the incoming message and 
authenticate the cipher messages before decryption. By applying this technique, the 
proposed protocol will be effective in circumventing attacks on ciphertexts such as 
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known-plaintext attack (KPA), chosen ciphertext attack (CCA1), and adopted chosen 
ciphertext attack (CCA2).  
 
7.12	  SUMMARY	  
Security analysis is an essential process in evaluating communication and 
cryptographic protocols. This chapter presents a formal approach for enumerating the 
vulnerabilities and flaws in proposed protocols and determining suitable 
countermeasures to fix them. First, PNs are used to model the client-server trust 
model. Then, an adversary entity is added to the trust model to analyse various 
attacks and understand the possible behaviours of the adversary. Each attack scenario 
has been simulated using PNs to exploit vulnerabilities in both cases without the 
symmetric encryption applied and with it. 
It is evident that the most viable countermeasure to defend authentication attacks is 
to encrypt then authenticate the message exchange between the client and server. 
Since the traffic is encrypted between the client and server, this proves that the 
proposed protocol is resistant to man-in-the-middle attack, reflection attack, parallel 
session attack, and impersonation attack but not a ciphertext attack. Also, this 
chapter shows that replay attack and forgery attack are not effective because of the 
freshness property and the difficulty of creating a login request without learning any 
prior credentials.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
















This chapter presents the modified protocol that can overcome the security flaws of the 
original proposed protocol. Before conducting the security evaluation of the proposed 
protocol, there was no safe way to avoid security flaws during the protocol design. 
Security issues were not properly addressed even though security measures were taken 
into account during the protocol design.  
To solve the flaws found in Chapter 6 and provide further improvements on the 
proposed protocol, this chapter presents an enhanced version of the proposed 
protocol, which can defeat attacks. It employs the same concept of the proposed 
protocol but adds another valuable element to it. The concept of maintaining 







The Modified Protocol	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8.1	  MODIFIED	  PROPOSED	  PROTOCOL	  
The modified version of the proposed protocol should improve security and provide 
users with better authentication and data confidentiality. To address and correct the 
perceived security weakness in the proposed protocol, authenticating the ciphertext 
by applying the encrypt-then-authenticate method is considered to be one of the most 
secure methods for security protocols (Krawczyk, 2001). The previous message 
exchange in the proposed protocol was constructed like this: Encrypt  (Message  ||  MAC)  
The new modification for the message exchange will be constructed as this: Encrypt  (Message)  ||  MAC  
This way the MAC is covering the entire ciphertext to preserve the integrity of the 
cipher message. The MAC value is then appended to the encrypted message.	  When 
the recipient receives the authenticated encrypted message, the MAC should be 
evaluated before attempting to decrypt the ciphertext. If the MAC verification fails, 
the recipient will terminate the session immediately. This process will be more 
efficient by eliminating the time spent to going through the manipulated data.	  
The enhancements for the proposed protocol will only affect part of the registration 
phase and the authentication and key agreement phase. Additionally, enclosing the 
identity of the server along with the client’s identity can mitigate the impact of 
masquerading attack. The ID’s of entities must be unique in the network. Thus, the 
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8.1.1	  REGISTRATION	  PHASE	  
The registration process will remain the same except for one change in the last step 
of the process. The secret key for MAC will no longer be computed during the 
handshake. Instead, the key will be agreed on previously and will be sent via a secure 
channel during registration. The modification that will apply to Step 4 is: 
Step 4: Ri stores {IDCi,  H4  (.),  MACK(  ),  Enc{  }a/Dec{  }a,  fi,  ei,  τ,  Pr_KCi} on a 
secure database and sends it to the user via a secure channel, where: 
• MACK(  ) is a message authentication code with secret key k 
• Enc{  }a/Dec{  }a is a symmetric encryption with secret key a   
• f is the biometric template  
• ei  =  H4  (IDCi  ||  y)  ⊕  H4  (PWCi  ||  fi)  
• τ  is a predetermined threshold for biometric verification. 
• Pr_KCi client’s private key. 
 
	  8.1.2	  LOGIN	  PHASE	  
After the client Ci   successfully logs in, the client begins the authentication process 
and negotiates the session key. The client generates a random number and a 
timestamp, then computes the following:  fi  =  H4  (BioCi  )    z  ì  =  H4  (PWCi  ||  fi)  M1  =  ei  ⊕  z  ì    =    H4  (IDCi  ||  y)  W1  =    rCi  .  P  M2  =    rCi  .  Pr_KCi  
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M3  =    M1  ⊕  rCi  
Where rCi∈  Z*n is a random number generated by the user. For this step, the 
random value rCi is introduced to mask the hash of the secret value H4(IDCi||y). 
Step 4: Ci encrypts the login request contains the initial components of the 
negotiated session key: IDCi,  TCi,  W1 as contribution of the session key. C1  =  Enc{IDCi,  IDSi,  TCi,  W1,  M2,  M3} with the secret key a 
Step 5: Ci authenticates the ciphertext by calculating the MAC value and 
appends it to encrypted message.  mac1  =  MACk  (IDCi,  IDSi,  TCi,  W1,  M2,  M3)    A1  =  C1  ||  mac1  Ci sends the authenticated ciphertext to the server Si.  
The authenticated encrypted message includes Ci’s timestamps to provide freshness 
guarantees; the value of W1 is a multiplication of the Ci’s random number with P 
point on elliptic curve E with order n.  
 
7.1.3	  AUTHENTICATION	  AND	  KEY	  AGREEMENT	  PHASE	  
After receiving the request login message, Si and Ci will perform the following steps 
for mutual authentication: 
Step 1: Si  checks the authenticity of the ciphertext and ensures the encrypted 
message has not been altered. This can be accomplished by recalculating the 
hash value of the received ciphertext and comparing it with the appended 
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hash value that was attached with the ciphertext. If the MAC values are 
identical, then the ciphertext is authenticated and the integrity is checked. 
Step 2: If Step 1 holds true, Si decrypts the message {IDCi,  IDSi,  TCi,  W1,  M2,  M3}a, then checks the validity of IDCi  and the freshness of TCi. The freshness 
of TCi is checked by performing T ̀ –  TCi  ≤  ∆T, where T ̀  is the time when Si 
receives the above message and ∆T is a valid time interval. In the case where IDCi is not valid or TCi is not fresh, then Si  aborts the current session.  
Step 3: If Step 2 holds true, Si  computes the following:  M  2̀  =    (x  +  H1(IDCi)-­‐1.  W1    
            =  Pr_KCi  .  rCi              =  M2  Si will quit the current session if the values of M  2̀ and M2 are not equal. 
Step 4: If Step 3 holds true, Si   chooses a random number RSi   ∈   Z*n and 
computes the following: M4  =  H4  (IDCi  ||  y)  W2  =    rSi  .  P  KSi  =    rSi  .  W1  
Now Si is able to complete the protocol and compute the absolute value of 
the session key sk   =   H3   (IDCi,   IDSi,   TCi,   TSi,   W1,   W2,   KSi), where TSi is a 
timestamp denoting the current time M5  =  M3  ⊕  M4  =  rCi  
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M6  =  M4  ⊕  rSi  M7  =  H4(M3  ||  M5)  
Where M5 is the random value rCi of the user Ci and only Si can unmask the 
value because it can compute H4  (IDCi  ||  y). 
Step 4: Then, Si  encrypts the message with shared secret key a. C2  =  Enc  {IDCi,  IDSi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7}a  
Step 5: Si  authenticates the encrypted message by calculating the MAC value 
of the ciphertext and appends it along with the ciphertext. Then Si sends the 
authenticated ciphertext to the client Ci. Mac2  =  MACk  (IDCi,  IDSi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7)    A2  =  C2  ||  mac2 
Step 6: Upon receiving Si’s encrypted message, Ci first checks the 
authenticity of the ciphertext and ensures the encrypted message has not been 
altered. This can be accomplished by recalculating the hash value of the 
received ciphertext and comparing it with the appended hash value that was 
attached to the ciphertext. If the MAC values are identical, then the ciphertext 
is authenticated and the integrity is checked. 
Step 7: Ci decrypts {IDCi,  IDSi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7}a, and checks the freshness of TSi by performing T’–   TSi  ≤   ∆T, where T’ is the time when Ci receives the 
above message and ∆T is the expected time interval for the transmission 
delay. 
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Step 8: Ci   verifies whether M7  ≟   H4   (M3   ||   rCi). Ci will quit the current 
session if the comparison is not equal.  
Step 9: If it holds, then Ci believes that Si is authenticated and then computes 
the following: KCi  =  rCi  .  W2  
The session key sk  =  H3  (IDCi,  IDSi,  TCi,  TSi,  W1,  W2,  KCi)  M8  =  M6  ⊕  M1  =  rSi  M9  =  H4(M6  ||  M8)  
Where M9 is the random value rSi of the server Si  and only the client Ci, which know M1  =  H4  (IDCi||  y), can send back the correct hashed 
value of M9  =  H4  (H4  (IDCi||  y)  ⊕  rSi)  ||  rSi). 
Step 10: Ci encrypts the message (IDCi,  IDSi,  TCi,  M9,)  then authenticates it and 
sends it to Si  C3  =  Enc{IDCi,  IDSi,  TCi,  M9,}a      mac3  =  MACk  (IDCi,  IDSi,  TCi,  M9)    A3  =  C3  ||  mac3  
Step 11: After receiving Ci’s message, Si checks the integrity of mac3. It 
then decrypts C3. 
Step 12: Next, Si verifies whether M9   ≟   H4   (M6   ||   rSi). If it holds, Si 
authenticates Ci  or otherwise rejects it. 
 
 
	   156	  
8.2	  BEHAVIOUR	  EVALUATION	  	  
As discussed previously, modelling with finite-state machines helps to understand 
the behaviour of complex protocols. There will be one amendment to the state 
machine, which is creating two EFSMs inside EFSMclient and EFSMserver. This 
amendment assists us to understand the interaction of the encrypt-then-authenticate 
method by validating the authenticity of the encrypted message. The goal for these 
machines is to verify and distinguish good ciphertexts from bad ones. The next 
section will discuss the new EFSM for verification and review the Server EFSM and 
the Client EFSM with these amendments.  
 
8.2.1	  VERIFIER	  EFSM	  
The EFSMverifier is an embedded machine within EFSMclient and EFSMserver where 
states themselves can have other machines. To be precise, it is a set of sub-states that 
are integrated as a nested finite state machine which are nested inside the states S5 
and S6 in EFSMserver and state C6 in the EFSMclient. It is only activated when the 
authentication and key agreement have started. The EFSMverifier is triggered when it 
obtains authentication information from EFSMclient or EFSMserver. It represents 
various transitions during the authentication and validation process. This machine is 
modelled using 5 states and 8 transitions. Table 8.1 describes the transitions 
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Figure	  8.1:	  The	  verifier	  machine	  modelled	  by	  EFSM	  
Transition Transition Direction Guards/Condition 
Validate 
C5 à V0 
S5 à V0 
S6 à V0 
 
Authenticity check V0 à V1  
Invalid V1 à V0 Client_MAC  !=  Server_MAC  
Integrity checked V1 à V2 Client_MAC  ==  Server_MAC  
Decrypted the ciphertext V2 à V3   
Freshness checked V3 à V4 
T  ̀–  TCi  ≤  ∆T    
Invalid  V3 à V0 T  ̀–  TCi  >  ∆T  
ID valid V4 à V0   
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§ State V0: this state accepts the authentication information that needs to be 
verified and sends an authenticity-checking request to V1.  
§ State V1: the EFSMverifier verifies the integrity of the received cipher message by 
recalculating the MAC value of the received message and comparing it with the 
attached MAC value. If the MAC values are identical, the machine triggers itself 
to the next state, V2, since the condition is fulfilled. However, if the comparison 
shows a different result, this would trigger to invalid state that then leads to 
termination.     
§ State V2:  while in this state, EFSMverifier decrypts the ciphertext since the MAC 
integrity check has been successful. After decryption is successful, the 
EFSMverifier transitions to the state V3. 
§ State V3: the EFSMverifier checks the freshness of T via T ̀ –   TCi   ≤   ∆T. If the 
freshness is valid, the EFSMverifier triggers itself to the next state. Otherwise, it 
produces invalid input if the freshness of T ̀ –  TCi  ≥  ∆T and changes to state V0. 
§ State V4: while in state V4, the EFSMverifier checks the validity of ID and based 
on the result it changes to state V0 either with event of valid ID or invalid ID. 
 
 
	   159	  
8.2.2	  Server	  EFSM	  
The EFSM at the server side represents the various on-going communications with 
the client at any point in time. It is modelled using 10 states, 24 transitions, and two 
nested EFSMs as detailed in Table 8.2. Figure 8.2 illustrates the server machine 
modelled by EFSM. 
 
Table	  8.2:	  THE	  TRANSITIONS	  SPECIFICATION	  OF	  THE	  SERVER-­‐SIDE	  EFSM	  
Transition Transition	  Direction Guards/Condition 
Waiting for clients S0 à S0 - 
Request to enrol S0 à R0 ClientEnrol  ==  True  
Client is registered  S0 à S1 R0àS0 ClientReg  ==  True  
Enter ID S0 à S1 ID  Valid  
Enter Password S1 à S2 Password  Valid  
Submit Biometric S2 à S3 Biometric  Valid  
Request client login  

















ID_attempt  ==  3  PW_attempt  ==  3  Bio_Attempt  ==  3  Invalid  ID  
Send SYN/ACK and C2 S5àS6 Validation  check  is  valid  
Client ACK and C3 
received S6àS7 Validation  check  is  valid  
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9) The EFSMserver will loop continuously while the server is waiting for 
clients. The machine advances to the next state once it is triggered by a 
login/enrol transition. 
10) When the EFSMserver is in the state S1, it checks the validity of the 
received ID. If ID is proved to be incorrect, Si will request Ci to enter the 
valid ID up to three times and EFSMserver will loop until Ci enters the 
valid ID or if the attempts exceed three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s 
account will be blocked and EFSMserver will change to state S4 from state 
S1. Generally, three attempts are made through our protocol steps to 
allow common errors. 
11) When the EFSMserver is in the state S2, it is triggered by a valid ID and it 
is now waiting for a valid PW. Once Si   receives PW, it verifies the 
validity of PW. If PW is proved to be invalid, Si will request Ci to enter 
the valid PW up to three times and EFSMserver will loop until Ci enters the 
valid PW or if the attempts exceed three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s 
account will be blocked and EFSMserver changes state to S4 from state S2.  
12) When the EFSMserver is in the state S3, it is triggered by a valid PW and it 
is now waiting for a valid Bio. Once Si receives Bio, it verifies the 
validity of Bio by comparing the imprinted Bio with the template stored. 
If Bio does not match the stored template, Si will request Ci to enter the 
valid Bio up to three times and the EFSMserver will loop until Ci enters the 
valid Bio or if the attempts exceed three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s 
account will be blocked and the EFSMserver changes state to S4 from state 
S3. 
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13) In state S5, the EFSMserver waits until it receives the login request SYN  =  A1   =   C1   ||   mac1 from the FSMclient to establish a connection by 
performing the three-way handshake.  
14) While in state S5, the EFSMserver activates the nested EFSMverifier and it 
waits for the validation check result. 
15) Once the validation has proved to be true. Si  generates a random number 
and timestamp, then Si replies with authenticated SYN/ACK  =  A2  =  C2  ||  mac2 to the EFSMclient, which is a combination of C2  =  Enc  {IDCi,  IDSi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7}a and Mac2  =  MACk  (IDCi,  IDSi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,  M7).  
16) In state S6, EFSMserver waits until it receives ACK from the EFSMclient. 
Once the authenticated ACK = A3  =  C3  ||  mac3 is received, the EFSMserver 
activates the nested EFSMverifier and waits for the validation check result.  
17) Once the validation check is proved to be true, the EFSMserver verifies M9≟H4  (M6  ||  rSi). In this point, Si authenticates Ci as a legitimate user.  
18) At state S5 and state S6, EFSMserver terminates the current session if any 
of the following situations occurs: 
§ The client ID is invalid 
§ The freshness of T ̀ –  TCi  ≥  ∆T  
§ A negative result when checking the integrity of mac1 and mac3 
§ M2  !=    (x  +  H1(IDCi)-­‐1.  W1    
§ M9  !=  H4  (M6  ||  rSi)    
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At any stage of EFSMserver activity, EFSMserver aborts the current session and changes 
to state S9 if the timeout exceeds the defined TIME_WAIT while waiting for packets. 
This feature helps to prevent an infinite wait when the EFSMclient fails to respond.  
 
8.2.3	  CLIENT	  EFSM	  
The EFSM at the client side represents the various on-going transmissions with the 
server at any point in time. It is modelled using 9 states, 22 transitions, and one 
nested EFSM as detailed in Table 8.3. Figure 8.3 shows the transitions diagram for 
the EFSMclient. 
1) First, the EFSMclient is in the initial state C0. That is when the request for 
register/login is initiated by itself. While in state C0, the EFSMserver checks 
whether Ci is enrolled or not. The next state will be determined according 
to the condition ClientReg  ==  True. 
2) In state C1, C2, C3, the FSMclient is waiting for validating ID, PW, and Bio. 
Once the client credentials are validated, the EFSMclient triggers itself and 
changes to state C5. 
3) In states C1, C2, C3, the client may be required to re-enter ID, PW, Bio in 
cases where they were incorrect. However, the client’s account will be 
blocked if the number of attempts exceeds three, which changes the above 
states to state C4.  
§ ID_attempt  <  3,  ID_attempt  =  ID_attempt  +1  
§ PW_attempt  <  3,  PW_attempt  =  PW_attempt  +1  
§ Bio_Attempt    <  3,  Bio_attempt  =  Bio_attempt  +1  











Transition	   Transition	  Direction	   Guards/Condition	  
Request to enrol C0 à R0 ClientEnrol  ==  True  
Client is registered / Enter ID C0 à C1 ClientReg  ==  True  
Enter Password C1 à C2 ID  valid  
Submit Biometric C2 à C3 Password  valid  

















ID_attempt  ==  3  PW_attempt  ==  3  Bio_Attempt  ==  3  
Client receives SYN/ACK 
(C2)  C5àC6   
Client sends ACK (C3) C6àC7 Validation  check  is  valid  
Authenticated by server C7àC8   
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4) In state C5, The EFSMclient generates a random number and a timestamp to 
calculate the encrypted login request {IDCi,  IDSi,  TCi,  W1,  M2,  M3}a and then 
computes  mac1  =  MACk  (IDCi,   IDSi,  TCi,  W1,  M2,  M3). It sends A1  =  C1   ||  mac1 to the EFSMserver. This request represents the SYN part in the three-
way handshake procedure.  
5) While in state C5, the FSMclient is waiting for the EFSMserver to respond 
after sending the login request to establish the connection. Once the 
authenticated SYN/ACK = A2   =   C2   ||   mac2 is received, the FSMclient 
changes to state C6. 
6) In state C6, the EFSMclient activates the nested EFSMverifier and waits for the 
validation check result. Once the validation check is proved to be true, the 
EFSMclient is validating the EFSMserver response M7  ≟  H4  (M4  ||  rCi). If Si  is 
proved to be honest, Ci authenticates Si at this stage. 
7) While in state C6, the EFSMclient computes the shared session key sk   =  H3(IDCi,   TCi,   TSi,   W1,   W2,   KCi) and finalises the handshake procedure by 
sending  authenticated encrypted ACK = A3  =  C3  ||  mac3 to Si, which is a 
combination of  C3  =  Enc{IDCi,  IDSi,  TCi,  M9,}a  and Mac3  =  MACk  (IDCi,  IDSi,  TCi,  M9).  
8) In state C7, the EFSMclient is waiting to be authenticated by Si.  
9) In state C8, the client terminates the current session if one of the following 
occurs: 
§ Negative result when checking the integrity of mac2 
§ T ̀ –  TSi  ≥  ∆T  
§ The server ID is invalid 
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§ M7  !=  H4  (M4  ||  rCi)  
 
8.2.4	  DISCUSSION	  
The state machine in Figure 8.4 represents the result of combining the three 
machines together after the modifications. The composite model executes efficiently 
and handles errors in a safe way according to their types. The modified protocol 
connection progresses from one state to another based on the data obtained from the 
messages exchanged. EFSM helps one to understand the behaviour of the protocol 
and logs the unwanted behaviours.  This mechanism is very useful for determining 
the types of errors the protocol experiences during running and it can be useful to 
investigate later on what causes these errors and learn from them.  
Based on the parallel behaviour, each machine goes through stages until it reaches 
the accepted state. For example, after successful authorisation, the EFSMclient 










Figure 8.4: The modified protocol modelled by EFSM 
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This comprehensive analysis distinguishes three types of errors that can be detected 
during the protocol run: 
§ Type I: Timeout errors  
This error occurs when the waiting time exceeds the predefined time interval or it 
occurs when the freshness check exceeds ∆T. 
§ Type II: Invalid errors 
This error is generated in case of invalid inputs, for example, invalid ID, invalid 
password, or invalid biometric.  
§ Type III: Terminate error 
This error detects if something suspicious occurs in cases where values did not 
match. A typical example of this error can be found in the integrity check, when the 
recomputed MAC value does not match the received MAC value. Another example 
is when there is a discrepancy in the results of the following equations: 
§ M2  !=  (x  +  H1(IDCi)-­‐1.  W1    
§ M7  !=  H4  (M3  ||  rCi)  
§ M9  !=  H4  (M6  ||  rSi)  
This error can pose a serious threat because it would only occur if the data has been 
modified or injected.   
 
	   170	  
8.3	  REVIEW	  OF	  SECURITY	  PROPERTIES	  	  
Security properties are considered one of the main pillars that effectively contribute 
to mitigate or eliminate vulnerabilities. They improve protocol efficiency in order to 
withstand any potential threat or weakness. Continually evaluating cryptography 
protocols and keeping up to date with the latest security threats and vulnerabilities 
are the key to maintain strong and robust protocols. A security hole in the protocol is 
like a gateway for attackers to invade a system. From the attacker’s point of view, 
any flaw in cryptographic protocols gives them the opportunity to gain unauthorised 
access and privileges. In addition, the successful result of any other exploits would 
give the attacker an advantage to take complete control of the affected target, i.e. 
install programmes, delay, modify or delete data. The next section formalises the 
types of security goals the modified protocol is capable of achieving.	  
 
8.3.1	  MUTUAL	  AUTHENTICATION	  AND	  SESSION	  KEY	  AGREEMENT	  
The modified protocol accomplishes mutual authentication and secret session key 
agreement based on ECC between a remote client and the server by establishing a 
three-way challenge-response handshake technique. First, the client Ci sends an 
authenticated encrypted login request message A1  =  C1  ||  mac1 to the server Si. Then Si verifies the received ciphertext by checking the MAC integrity. After validating, Si sends an authenticated encrypted challenge message A2  =  C2  ||  mac2 to Ci. Next, Ci checks the integrity of the encrypted message, then the validity of the received 
message M7  ≟  H4  (M3  ||  rCi) and accepts or rejects the server request according to the 
verification result. Finally, Ci sends an authenticated encrypted response message A3  =   C3||mac3 to Si. Upon receiving the message, Si checks the integrity of the 
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ciphertext then verifies if M9  ≟  H4  (M6  ||  rSi) holds. If so, Si authenticates client Ci 
and allows it access. During the process, both Si and Ci compute the session key sk  =  H3  (IDCi,,  IDSi  TCi,  TSi,  W1,  W2,  (rSi  .rCi  .P))  successfully.  
 
8.3.2	  CONFIDENTIALITY	   	  
Confidentiality or, as it is sometimes called, secrecy, is the capability to prevent an 
intruder from being able to capture sensitive data transmitted between two legitimate 
entities. In other words, confidentiality will be breached if a malicious intruder is 
able to listen in and derive an element from a set of plaintext messages passing 
between the honest nodes. There are three types of cryptographic algorithm that 
provide privacy and confidentiality: 
1) Symmetric cryptography that uses secret shared keys between entities 
2) Asymmetric cryptography that uses different key pairings for encryption and 
decryption.  
The modified protocol conceals the contents of transmitted data by using symmetric 
encryption. Encryption can handle the problem of privacy and it can protect the 
traffic from passive attacks such as eavesdropping and may be traffic analysis in case 
IPV6 is implemented. Also, hash functions can protect sensitive data and 
computation values from tampering.  	  
8.3.3	  INTEGRITY	  
Integrity is relates to the trustworthiness of data and resources in term of preventing 
improper and unauthorised modifications. MAC is one of the mathematical 
approaches providing a high level of integrity. The modified protocol relies on the 
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fact that integrity checks are performed before decrypting data since the MAC plays 
a significant role in data integrity and message authentication. Thus, it provides 
protection of the ciphertext as encryption is only susceptible to active attacks. 
Verification of data integrity requires the recipient to calculate the hash value of the 
MAC and then decrypt the ciphertext if the integrity check is passed. Otherwise, the 
recipient will terminate the session. This mechanism helps to distinguish between 
incorrect MACs and correct ones and discard any message with accidental 




Authentication ensures that the transmitted data is authentic and has not been 
tampered with. Authentication can be categorised into two ways: data origin 
authentication and entity authentication. The former is concerned with validating the 
authenticity of message contents and that the message originated from the claimed 
source. The latter is related to identifying the identity of the sender and ensuring the 
entity communicating with is indeed the correct agent that it is claimed to be (Ryan 
and Schneider, 2001; Dong and Chen, 2012).  
Using the cryptographic one-way hash function (COWH) ensures the authorship of 
the content due to secret key encryption. This method works as modification 
detection as well as it preserves data integrity. Another important point to stress is 
that COWH is more practical and increases efficiency instead of using a digital 
signature for the entire message. A keyed MAC is also used to validate the encrypted 
message as well as to verify the source of the sent ciphertext. The modified protocol 
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accomplishes data origin authenticity by certifying the authenticity of the encrypted 
message through the MAC. Entity authenticity is accomplished by verifying the 
following between the client and the server: 
§ The identity of the client IDCi 
§ The client’s password and biometric z  ì  =  H4  (PWCi  ||  fi) 
§ The identity of the server IDSi 
§ Verification through client’s private key: 
 M  2̀  =  (x  +  H1(IDCi)-­‐1.W1                  =  Pr_KCi  .  rCi  
                    =  M2  
§ Authenticating the server by the client through verifying the value of M7  ≟  H4  (M3  ||  rCi)  
§ Authenticating the client by the server through verifying the value M9  ≟  H4  (M6  ||  rSi)   
 
8.3.5	  NON-­‐REPUDIATION	  
Non-repudiation is the assurance that ensures the entities that are involved in the 
communication cannot later deny having sent or received the message. In the 
modified protocol, the generated MAC acts as an indicator of who sent the message 
and offers assurance of the source of the message. Since the client and the server 
have the same secret key, both entities can re-compute the MAC using their shared 
variables. In other words, the MAC confirms the authenticity of the message 
originator to be verified by the recipient. 
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8.4	  SECURITY	  EVALUATION	  
Petri Nets (PN) are used to model the concurrency of a complex version of the 
proposed protocol but with a significant modification as mentioned previously. The 
method of encrypt-then-authenticate will definitely improve the security of the 
protocol. The complex protocol consists of two honest entities, the client and the 
server.  First, PN is used to model and analyse the modified protocol. Then,	   an	  adversary	  entity	  is	  added	  to	  the	  trust	  model	  to	  analyse	  various	  attacks	  and	  test	  the	  protocol	  security.	  	  
	  	  
8.4.1	  THE	  CLIENT-­‐SERVER	  TRUST	  MODEL	  
The trust model for the modified protocol is based on the same assumptions in 
section 7.2. The Petri net model for the modified protocol is illustrated in Figure 8.5. 
The definitions of the places and the transitions used in this model are listed in Table 
8.4 and Table 8.5, respectively.   	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  8.5:	  Modelling	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  modified	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Table	  8.4:	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  PLACES	  -­‐	  THE	  MODIFIED	  TRSUST	  MODEL	  
Place	   Definition	   Place	   Definition	  
P1	   A	  point	  on	  elliptic	  	   P35	   M4	  
	   curve	  E	  with	  order	  n	   P36	   M5	  =	  M3 ⊕ M4	  
P2	   Client	  random	  number	   P37	   M7	  = H4(M3 || M5)	  
P3	   Client	  private	  key	   P38	   M6	  =	  M4 ⊕ rSi	  
P4	   M1=ei⊕z’i P39	   SYN/ACK	  =	  IDCi, IDSi, 	  
P5	   Client	  ID	   	   TSi, W2, M6, M7	  
P6	   Client	  timestamp	   P40	   Encrypted	  SYN/ACK	  
P7	   W1=r	  Ci	  .	  P	   P41	   MAC	  Secret	  Key	  k	  
P8	   M2=	  r	  Ci	  .	  Pr_K	  Ci	   P42	   Authenticated	  C2	  
P9	   M3=	  M1⊕rci	   P43	   Sent	  A2	  
P10	   SYN=IDCi, IDSi, TCi, 	   P44	   Received	  A2	  
	   W1, M2, M3 P45	   Message	  is	  not	  authentic	  	  
P11	   Shared	  secret	  key	  a	   P46	   Message	  is	  authentic	  
P12	   Encrypted	  message	  C1	   P47	   Decrypted	  C2	  
P13	   MAC	  Secret	  Key	  k	   P48	   Verification	  message	  
P14	   Authenticated	  ciphertext	  A1	   P49	   Rejected	  request	  
P15	   Sent	  A1	   P50	   Accepted	  request	  	  
P16	   Received	  A1	   P51	   Server	  ID	  
P17	   Message	  is	  not	  	   P52	   Server	  timestamp	  
	   authentic	   P53	   W2	  
P18	   Message	  is	  authentic	   P54	   M6	  
P19	   Shared	  secret	  key	  a	   P55	   Computed	  Kc	  
P20	   Decrypted	  C1	   P56	   Computed	  session	  key	  
P21	   Verification	  message	   P57	   M8	  
P22	   Rejected	  request	   P58	   M9	  
P23	   Accepted	  request	  	   P59	   ACK	  
P24	   M3	   P60	   C3=Encrypted	  ACK	  
P25	   W1	   P61	   A3=Authenticated	  ACK	  
P26	   Client	  timestamp	   P62	   Sent	  A3	  
P27	   Client	  ID	   P63	   Received	  A3	  
P28	   Server	  timestamp	   P64	   Message	  is	  not	  authentic	  	  
P29	   Server	  ID	   P65	   Message	  is	  authentic	  
P30	   Server	  random	  number	   P66	   Decrypted	  C1	  
P31	   A	  point	  on	  elliptic	  	   P67	   Verification	  message	  
	   curve	  E	  with	  order	  n	   P68	   Rejected	  request	  
P32	   Computed	  Ks	  	   P69	   Accepted	  request	  	  
P33	   W2=  rSi .P	   P70	   Client	  is	  authenticated	  
P34	   Computed	  session	  key	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Table	  8.5:	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  TRANSITIONS	  -­‐	  THE	  MODIFIED	  TRUST	  MODEL	  
Trans.	   Definition	   Trans.	   Definition	  
T1	   Perform	  multiplication	  	   T24	   Transmit	  A1	  
	   operation	  to	  compute	  w1	   T25	   Receive	  A1	  
T2	   Perform	  multiplication	  operation	  to	  compute	  M2	   T26	   Shared	  transition	  that	  check	  the	  integrity	  of	  	  
T3	   Perform	  XOR	  operation	  	   	   A2	  
	   to	  compute	  M3	   T27	   Decrypt	  C2	  
T4	   Create	  SYN	  request	   T28	   Verify	  
T5	   Encrypt	  SYN	  with	  a	   T29	   Drop	  the	  request	  
T6	   Compute	  the	  MAC	  value	  	   T30	   Accept	  
	   of	  C1	   T31	   Split	  the	  packet	  
T7	   Transmit	  A1	   T32	   Compute	  Kc	  
T8	   Receive	  A1	   T33	   Compute	  the	  session	  	  
T9	   Shared	  transition	  that	  	   	   Key	  SK	  
	   check	  the	  integrity	  of	  A1	   T34	   Compute	  M8	  
T10	   Decrypt	  C1	   T35	   Compute	  M9	  
T11	   Verify	   T36	   Create	  ACK	  =	  C3	  
T12	   Drop	  the	  request	   T37	   Encrypt	  
T13	   Accept	   T38	   Compute	  the	  MAC	  	  
T14	   Split	  the	  packet	   	   value	  of	  C3	  
T15	   Compute	  Ks	   T39	   Transmit	  A3	  
T16	   Compute	  W2	   T40	   Receive	  A3	  
T17	   Compute	  the	  session	  key	   T41	   Shared	  transition	  that	  	  
T18	   Perform	  XOR	  operation	  	   	   check	  the	  integrity	  of	  	  
	   to	  compute	  M5	   	   A3	  
T19	   Perform	  XOR	  operation	  	   T42	   Decrypt	  C1	  
	   to	  compute	  M6	   T43	   Verify	  
T20	   Concatenate	  M3	  and	  M5	  	   T44	   Drop	  the	  request	  
	   and	  hash	  the	  output	  to	  	   T45	   Accept	  
	   produce	  M7	   T46	   Authenticate	  the	  client	  
T21	   Create	  SYN/ACK	   	   	  
T22	   Encrypt	  SYN/ACK	  =	  C2	   	   	  
T23	   Compute	  the	  MAC	  value	  of	  C2	   	   	  	  
 
Figure 8.5 shows the complex PN model for the modified protocol. The left part of 
the model represents the client C  and the right part of model represents the server S . 
The client-server trust model contains 70 places and 46 transitions including three 
shared transitions. The places in the modelled protocol represent the state of the net, 
storage for requests, messages, ciphers, or session keys. Each place can be assigned 
with one or more tokens, and each token represents a specific data item. The 
transitions in the modelled protocol define particular functions or procedures. The 
marking of the PN model determines the actual state of the net, which constitutes the 
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number of tokens in the specific places. The simulation of the modified trust model 
focuses on the messages exchanged between the entities and mutual authentication. 
The behaviour of the net can be divided into four stages as follows: 
Simulating Stage 1:  
This is the initial phase where C  attempts to communicate with S  and establish a 
secure session key. C  consumes a token from each place: P1, P2, P3, and P4 to 
generate P7, P8, and P9, by firing transitions T1, T2, T3. This simulation corresponds 
to the following:  
§ W1  =    rCi  .  P  
§ M2  =    rCi  .  Pr_KCi  
§ M3  =    M1  ⊕  rCi  
Next, C  consumes one token for the timestamp P6 and two tokens of P5, (one token 
for IDC and another for IDS) together with the generated tokens in P7, P8, and P9 to 
compute the SYN request via T4. This simulation creates the login request, which 
corresponds to (IDCi,  IDSi,  TCi,  W1,  M2,  M3). At this stage, the method of encrypt-then-
authenticate is applied by enabling the T5 and consuming one token of P11 as the 
secret key to encrypt P10. This part of the simulation achieves only the first segment 
of the mechanism to produce the encrypted message P12. The second segment to 
complete the other part of the mechanism is simulated by firing T6 and consuming 
one token from P13. This allows the net to calculate the MAC value of the encrypted 
message and append it to the ciphertext. Finally, C  sends P15 to S . 
 














Simulating Stage II:  
This stage represents the second part of the handshake. S  must ensure the 
authenticity of received encrypted SYN = P10. The transitions T9 and T11 help S  to 
validate the SYN request. Transition T9 is a shared transition that checks the integrity 
of the received ciphertext. T9 is a nested component of the net that consists of six 
places and three transitions (Figure 8.6). The goal of this component is checking the 
integrity of the ciphertext.  This is achieved by computing the MAC value of the 
ciphertext and then comparing it with the received MAC value. If the values are not 
equal, S  terminates the session, otherwise it proceeds to T11. The next step is to 
verify the freshness of time via T11 and based on the verification result S  will drop 
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Figure	  8.6.	  The	  client	  encrypts	  SYN	  request	  




















Once the validation and verification are checked, S  splits the packets via T14 and 
distributes tokens to the corresponding places P24, P25, P26, and P27 in order to 
compute the session key P34. This simulation produces new values for the following 
places: 
§ P33: W2  =    rSi  .  P 
§ P32: KSi  =    rSi  .  W1 
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Figure	  8.7:	  The	  server	  checks	  the	  integrity	  of	  encrypted	  SYN	  request	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§ P34: 	  sk  =  H3  (IDCi,  IDSi,  TCi,  TSi,  W1,  W2,  KSi) 
The next simulation computes P36, P37 and P38, via T18, T20, and T19 respectively, 
which correspond to the following: 
§ M5  =  M3  ⊕  M4  =  rCi  
§ M6  =  M4  ⊕  rSi  
§ M7  =  H4(M3  ||  M5)  
At this stage, S  is ready to formulate the P39 =SYN/ACK message via T21. In order for S  to apply the mechanism encrypt-then-authenticate, the SYN/ACK must be first 
encrypted via T22 with key P19 then authenticated via T23. Then S  sends the 
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  Figure	  8.9:	  The	  server	  computes	  the	  session	  key	  and	  SYN/ACK	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Simulating Stage III:  
This stage represents the third part of the handshake, where C  receives SYN/ACK 
and replies with an ACK. When C  receives P44 it checks for the integrity of the 
ciphertext via T26. This transition is a shared transition and its functionality is very 
similar to T9. Once the verification for the integrity of the ciphertext is proved to be 
authentic, the next simulation enables T27 to decrypt P46 with secret key P11. Then 
transition T28 verifies the freshness of the message. The next simulation relies on the 
packet received to calculate the session key. Transition T31 splits the packet and 
generates tokens to P51, P52, and P53 and T32 is fired to compute P55 = KC. At this 
stage, C  can securely compute the session key P56 via T33. At this moment, C  must 
generate an ACK message and send it to S  to complete the authentication key 
agreement phase. The simulation fires T34 to generate P57 and T35 to generate P58 by 
consuming one token from P4 and P54, and from P54 and P57, respectively. This step 
corresponds to the following in the protocol: 
§ M8  =  M6  ⊕  M1    
§ M9  =  H4(M6  ||  M8)  
At this stage, C  is ready to formulate the P59 =ACK message via T36. In order for C   to 
apply the mechanism encrypt-then-authenticate, the ACK must be first encrypted via 
T37 with the shared key P11 then authenticated via T38. Then C  sends the 
authenticated encrypted message to C  via T39. 
 




















Simulating Stage IV:  
This stage represents the final part of the handshake, where S receives the ACK and 
authenticates C . When S  receives P63 it checks for the integrity of the ciphertext via 
T41. This transition is a shared transition and its functionality is very similar to T9 and 
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Figure	  8.11:	  The	  client	  applies	  the	  encrypt-­‐then-­‐authenticate	  method	  to	  ACK	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next simulation enables T42 to decrypt P65 with secret key P19. Then transition T28 
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Figure	  8.12:	  The	  server	  checks	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  encrypted	  ACK	  
Figure	  8.13:	  The	  server	  authenticates	  the	  client	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8.4.2	  TRUST	  MODEL	  WITH	  ADVERSARY	  	  
The modified protocol should be designed to withstand attacks and should prove its 
soundness even if an adversary has control over the communication channel and 
attempts to delay, delete, or modify the contents of the original messages. To verify 
whether the modified protocol satisfies its desired specifications, it is fundamental to 
model the modified protocol and test its performance against attacks. Adding an 
adversary entity for the modified client-server trust model allows predicating the 
protocol behaviour. The adversary is modelled as a separate entity that can control 
the channel between the client and the server. The following assumptions are 
considered for the adversary model: 
1) The adversary can eavesdrop, intercept, and store a message. It may block or 
pass any of these messages. Additionally, it may construct forged messages 
from captured data and inject them into the channel. 
2) The adversary has zero knowledge, in such that it does not possess any 
elements of messages transmitted between the legitimate nodes, but it can 
learn by observing the traffic. 
3) The traffic between client and server is encrypted then authenticated.  
4) MAC functions are secure against chosen-message attacks. 
5) Symmetric encryption functions are secure against chosen-plaintext attacks. 
The attack model for the modified protocol is illustrated in Figure 8.14. The 
definitions of the places and the transitions used in this model are listed in Table 8.6 
and Table 8.7 respectively.   
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Adversary	  	   Server	  	  Client	  
Figure	  8.14:	  The	  modified	  trust	  model	  with	  adversary	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Table	  8.6:	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  PLACES	  -­‐	  THE	  MODIFIED	  TRUST	  MODEL	  	  WITH	  ADVERSARY	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Place	   Definition	   Place	   Definition	  
P1	   Client	  random	  number	   P27	   Sent	  A2	  
P2	   Client	  timestamp	   P28	   Intercepted	  A2	  
P3	   SYN	  request	   P29	   Passed	  A2	  
P4	   Login	  request	   P30	   Received	  A2	  
P5	   Symmetric	  key	   P31	   Message	  is	  not	  authentic	  
P6	   Ciphertext	  C1	   P32	   Message	  is	  authentic	  
P7	   MAC	  secret	  key	  	   P33	   Decrypted	  C1	  
P8	   Authenticated	  ciphertext	  	   P34	   Verification	  message	  
P9	   Sent	  A1	   P35	   Rejected	  request	  
P10	   Intercepted	  A1	   P36	   Accepted	  request	  –	  S	  is	  	  
P11	   Passed	  A1	   	   authenticated	  
P12	   Received	  A1	  	   P37	   Session	  Key	  
P13	   Message	  is	  not	  authentic	   P38	   ACK	  	  
P14	   Message	  is	  authentic	   P39	   Ciphertext	  
P15	   Symmetric	  key	   P40	   Authenticated	  ciphertext	  
P16	   Decrypted	  C1	   P41	   Sent	  A3	  
P17	   Verification	  message	   P42	   Intercepted	  A3	  
P18	   Drop	  request	   P43	   Passed	  A3	  
P19	   Accepted	  request	  	   P44	   Received	  A3	  
P20	   Server	  random	  number	   P45	   Message	  is	  not	  authentic	  
P21	  	   Server	  timestamp	   P46	   Message	  is	  authentic	  
P22	   Session	  key	   P47	   Decrypted	  C1	  
P23	   SYN/ACK	  	   P48	   Verification	  message	  
P24	   Ciphertext	  C2	   P49	   Drop	  request	  
P25	   MAC	  secret	  key	   P50	   Accepted	  request	  
P26	   Authenticated	  ciphertext	   P51	   Client	  is	  authenticated	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Table	  8.7.	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  TRANSITIONS	  –	  THE	  MODIFIED	  TRUST	  MODEL	  	  WITH	  ADVERSARY	  	  
Trans.	   Definition	   Trans.	   Definition	  
T1	   Compute	  login	  request	  	   T19	   Receive	  A1	  
T2	   Encrypt	  MSG	   T20	   Shared	  transition	  that	  check	  the	  	  
T3	   Compute	  MAC	  value	  and	   	   integrity	  of	  A2	  
	   append	  it	  to	  the	  ciphertext	   T21	   Decrypt	  C2	  
T4	   Send	  authenticated	  	   T22	   Verify	  
	   ciphertext	   T23	   Drop	  the	  request	  
T5	   Intercept	  	   T24	   Accept	  
T6	   Pass	   T25	   Compute	  session	  key	  and	  ACK	  
T7	   Receive	  	   T26	   Encrypt	  MSG	  
T8	   Shared	  transition	  that	  	   T27	   Compute	  MAC	  value	  and	  append	  
	   check	  the	  integrity	  of	  A1	   	   append	  it	  to	  the	  ciphertext	  
T9	   Decrypt	  C1	   T28	   Transmit	  A3	  
T10	   Verify	   T29	   Intercept	  	  
T11	   Drop	  the	  request	   T30	   Pass	  
T12	   Accept	   T31	   Receive	  A3	  
T13	   Compute	  SYN/ACK	  and	  	   T32	   Shared	  transition	  that	  check	  the	  	  
	   session	  key	   	   integrity	  of	  A3	  
T14	   Encrypt	  MSG	   T33	   Decrypt	  C3	  
T15	   Compute	  MAC	  value	  and	  	   T34	   Verify	  
	   append	  it	  to	  the	  ciphertext	   T35	   Drop	  the	  request	  
T16	   Transmit	  A1	   T36	   Accept	  
T17	   Intercept	  	   T37	   Authenticate	  
T18	   Pass	   	   	  	  	  	  	  
By simulating the modified protocol in Figure 8.14, both the client and the server 
function exactly as the trust model discussed previously in section 8.4.1 and the 
adversary entity only passes the intercepted token via transitions T6, T17, T36. Note 
that the adversary may listen to conversations between the client and the server but 
since the traffic between them is encrypted, it is hard for it to decrypt the ciphertext 
without knowing the corresponding decryption key. This proves the benefit gained 
from encrypting the traffic and how it creates a private channel between entities. The 
modified protocol will also detect any modification applied even if the adversary 
flips a bit in the ciphertext. Verifying the encrypted message using the authentication 
code allows the modified protocol to discard any illegitimate messages.   
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8.4.3	  SECURITY	  ANALYSIS	  
The modified authentication and key agreement protocol is secure and improves 
several aspects. The analysis suggests that the modified protocol is well designed for 
data confidentiality by using symmetric cryptography during the handshake 
procedure. Also, it ensures data integrity by applying a Message Authentication 
Code function (MAC) to the ciphertext. Typically, both the client and the server 
transmit the MAC value during transmission. However, both the client and the server 
will be aware if an adversary alters the ciphertext because the integrity check of the 
MAC value will fail. Besides, when the communication session between Ci  and Si is 
over, the session key sk is discarded and a new session key is established in every 
protocol run. The modified protocol is aimed at initiating secure authentication and 
communication between the client and server by building a robust mechanism 
between communicating parties. The presented protocol may be described as a three-
way handshake procedure to establish a reliable connection and ensure secure data 
sharing. Moreover, it shows resistance to various attacks as follows. 
 
8.4.3.1 Resistance to impersonation attacks  
It is extremely difficult for an attacker to mount a successful impersonation as a 
legitimate user or server. From the user side, the attacker cannot fabricate a feasible 
encrypted message Enc{IDCi,   IDSi,  TCi,  W1,  M2,  M3}a   ||  MACk  (IDCi,   IDSi,  TCi,  W1  M2,  M3) without knowing the secret value of y in H4(IDCi||   y). Similarly, the attacker 
cannot extract ei  =  H4  (IDCi||  y)  ⊕  H4  (PWCi||  fi) from the central database without Ci’s password and biometrics data. Therefore, if the attacker sends a fake login 
message, Si will reject the request by the verification test of H4(IDCi  ||   y) after the 
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decryption of the message {IDCi,   IDSi,  TCi,  W1,  M2,  M3}a   ||  MACk  (IDCi,   IDSi,  TCi,  W1,  M2,   M3). From the server side, the attacker cannot produce a feasible encrypted 
message {IDCi,   IDSi,   TSi,  W1,  M6,  M7   ||  MACk  (IDCi   ,   IDSi,   TSi,  W1,  M6,  M7)}  without 
knowing the secret value of H4(IDCi||  y) or the secret value of a or k. Therefore, if 
the attacker sends a fake authentication message to Ci, the attack will be detected 
when Ci verifies the MAC value. Thus, the modified protocol is secure against 
impersonation attacks. 
 
8.4.3.2 Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks, reflection attacks, and parallel 
session attacks 
The modified protocol provides mutual authentication with the key agreement 
protocol so both parties are assured of the other’s identity. The modified protocol 
includes the identifier of the client (IDC), as well as the identifier of the server (IDS). 
Including both client and server identifiers in every message prevent attacks such as 
parallel session attacks. 
Since the protocol is resistant to impersonation attack. The adversary cannot 
fabricate feasible messages without knowing the secret key for symmetric encryption 
or MAC secret key. Those secret keys are agreed on between Ci and Si via a secure 
channel. If the adversary attempts to send a fake encrypted message, it will be 
detected by the verification of the MAC value. Thus, the modified protocol is secure 
against the man-in-the-middle attack, reflection attack, and parallel sessions attack.  
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8.4.3.3 Resistance to denial-of-service attacks 
The modified version of the proposed protocol can withstand denial-of-service 
attack, because when the client Ci imprints the personal biometrics Bio*Ci, the Si will 
check the validity of Bio*Ci with stored template by checking whether d(BioCi,  Bio*Ci)  <  τ  holds. According to Li et al. (2011) the Bio*Ci could pass the verification process 
even though there is some slight difference between BioCi, Bio*Ci. 
Another way to tackle denial-of-service-attack is applying MAC to the ciphered 
message. When a ciphered message is received, the MAC is validated first before 
decrypting. This mechanism allows the source to discard invalid packets and 
determine if the packets truly correspond to the sent packets. This helps to filter the 
traffic and hinders any prior disruption to the target machine. Thus, this denies any 
spoofing illegitimate requests. Another advantage can be seen with appending the 
MAC to the ciphertext is to identify if an adversary has injected encrypted pieces of 
data in the original ciphertext and to be able to check the integrity of the transmitted 
data.  
 
8.4.3.4 Resistance to replay attacks 
In order to validate the authenticity of messages exchanged between Ci and Si, the 
freshness of timestamps is constantly checked as to whether they are within an 
allowable time period or not. For example, the verification request will fail if T ̀ –  TCi  >   ∆T. This will cause the session to be terminated. Also, both the client and the 
server generate a new random number and a timestamp for every new session. Even 
if an adversary intercepts the authenticated ciphertext, it cannot decrypt the 
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ciphertext since it does not know the secret key. Thus, he/she cannot forge a fake 
login message or use it later to launch a replay attack. 
 
8.4.3.5 Resistance to passive attacks  
Due to the difficulty in detecting passive attacks, the modified protocol is sufficient 
against eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Typically, encrypting the message traffic 
is sufficient to prevent the success of these attacks. Authenticating the ciphertext is a 
significant way to ensure integrity and authenticity.  
 
8.4.3.6 Resistance to ciphertext attacks 
There is crucial difference between encryption and authenticated encryption. 
Encryption alone does not guarantee the authenticity of the encrypted message or 
whether the message has been modified while in transit or storage. Relying only on 
encryption would compromise the integrity of data. Furthermore, symmetric key 
encryption is susceptible to known-plaintext attacks, chosen plaintext attacks, 
differential and linear cryptanalysis (Courtois et al., 2008; Acton, 2013). The 
modified proposed protocol relies on the encrypt-then-authenticate approach, which 
can achieve the highest level of security in authenticated encryption (Krawczyk, 
2001; Courtois et al, 2008). This approach can recognise improperly constructed 
ciphertext and prevent any attempts to gain an advantage against encrypted data. The 
client and the server check whether the message is authentic by validating the 
integrity of the encrypted message.  
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8.5	  SUMMARY	  
This chapter started with modifying the protocol design by applying the encrypt-
then-authenticate method. Then it explains the details of the finite-state verification 
of the modified protocol and identifies the functionality of each phase with the new 
enhancements. Also, it analyses the behaviour of each machine created for each 
phase and how they interrelate together. The composite model executes efficiently 
and handles errors in a safe way according to their types. The modified protocol 
connection progresses from one state to another based on the data obtained from the 
message exchanged. The use of EFSM helps to understand the behaviour of the 
protocol and logs unwanted behaviours. This mechanism is very useful for 
determining the types of errors the protocol experiences during running and these can 
be useful to retrospectively investigate what causes these errors and to learn from 
them.  
Furthermore, the chapter deals with the simulation of the modified protocol. it 
describes the behaviour of the modified protocol using the Petri net formalism to 
verify and improve the protocol by employing encrypt-then-authenticate routine to 
the modified protocol. This proves that the modified protocol is resistant to man-in-
the-middle attacks, reflection attacks, parallel session attacks, impersonation attacks, 
replay attacks and forgery attacks. The analysis shows that the modified protocol is 
efficient and provides secure communication over insecure channels. The 
identification of the requirement for these particular modifications was the result of 
the exhaustive analysis, which helps to determine any faults with the protocol. 
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Client	  Ci	   	   Registration	  Centre	  Ri	  (1)	  IDci,	  PWci,	  Bioci,	  	  	   	  	  (3)	  IDCi,	  H4(.),	  Enc{}a/Dec{	  }a,	  MACK(	  ),	  fi,	  ei,	  τ,	  Pr_K	  Ci	  
(2)	  Computes:	  	  
• fi	  =	  H4(Bioci)	  
• ei	  =	  H4(IDci||y)⊕H4(PWCi||fi)	  




Client	  Ci	   	   Server	  Si	  (2) Enters	  	  ID’	  Ci	  	  and	  PW’Ci	  	  	  (3)	  Inputs	  Bio’Ci	  	  (5)	  Computes:	  
• z’i	  =	  H4(PWCi	  ||fi)	  
• M1=ei⊕z’i	  
• W1=r	  Ci	  .	  P	  
• M2=	  r	  Ci	  .	  Pr_K	  Ci	  
• M3=	  M1⊕rci	  (6)	  C1	  =	  Enc{IDCi,	  IDSi,	  TCi,	  W1,	  M2,	  M3}a	  	  (7)	  mac1=MACk	  (IDCi,	  IDSi,	  TCi,	  W1,	  M2,	  M3)	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (8)	  	  A1	  =	  C1	  ||	  mac1	  
	  (2)Verifies	  the	  authenticity	  of	  ID’Ci	  and	  PW’Ci	  	  	  (4)	  Verifies	  	  	  Accept	  if	  d(BioCi,	  Bio*Ci)	  <	  τ	  	  	  Reject	  if	  d(BioCi,	  Bio*Ci)	  	  ≥	  τ	  	  









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (8)	  Checks	  the	  integrity	  of	  	  	  A2	  =	  C2	  ||	  mac2	  (9)	  Decrypts	  C2,	  then	  checks	  validity	  of	  IDSi	  and	  freshness	  of	  TSi	  (10)	  Verifies	  M7	  ?=	  H4(M4||rCi)	  
Server	  Si	  is	  authenticated	  (11)	  Computes:	  
• KCi	  =rCi	  .	  W2	  
• Sk	  =	  H3(IDCi,	  TCi,	  TSi,	  W1,	  W2,	  KCi)	  	  
• M8=M6⊕M1	  =rSi	  
• M9=	  H4(M6||M8)	  (12)	  C3	  =	  Enc{IDCi,	  IDSi,	  TCi,	  M9,}a	  	  	  (13)	  mac3	  =	  MACk	  (IDCi,	  IDSi,	  TCi,	  M9)	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (7)	  	  A2	  =	  C2	  ||	  mac2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (14)	  	  A3	  =	  C3	  ||	  mac3	  	  
(1)	  Checks	  the	  integrity	  of	  	  	  A1	  =	  C1	  ||	  mac1	  (2)	  Decrypts	  C1,	  then	  checks	  validity	  of	  IDci	  and	  freshness	  of	  Tci	  (3)	  Computes	  and	  verifie:	  M	  2̀	  =	  	  (x	  +	  H1(IDCi)-­‐1.	  W1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  Pr_KCi	  .	  rCi	  	  	  =	  M2	  	  (4)	  Computes:	  
• M4=H4(IDCi||y)	  
• W2=rSi	  .P	  
• KSi=rSi.W1	  
• Sk=H3(IDCi,	  TCi,	  TSi	  W1,	  W2,	  KSi)	  	  
• M5=M3⊕M4	  =	  rCi	  
• M6=M4	  ⊕	  rSi	  
• M7	  =	  H4(M3||M5)	  (5)	  C2	  =	  Enc	  {IDCi,	  IDSi,	  TSi,	  W2,	  M6,	  M7}a	  (6)	  mac2=MACk	  (IDCi,	  IDSi,	  TSi,	  W2,	  M6,	  M7)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (15)	  Checks	  the	  integrity	  of	  	  	  A3	  =	  C3	  ||	  mac3	  (16)	  Decrypts	  C3,	  then	  checks	  validity	  of	  IDCi	  and	  freshness	  of	  TCi	  (17)	  Verifies	  M9?=	  H4(M6⊕rSi)	  
Client	  Ci	  is	  authenticated	  	  















Organisations globally look for strong authentication solutions because maintaining a 
robust level of security and adequate efficiency are considered a long-term 
investment. Authentication can be accomplished in different ways but it is important 
to choose an appropriate environment and methods. This thesis offers a unique 
authentication protocol that uses a variety of cryptographic mechanisms to secure the 
authentication process and to securely establish a protected channel and key 
exchange. The main contribution of this thesis is the development of an 
authentication protocol that integrates two-factor authentication, which requires two 
distinctive forms of identification when validating a client. The security of the 
9 
Conclusions, Limitations 
and Future Works	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proposed protocol is increased by including something the client physically has 
(biometric data, in this case) and something the client knows (password). As a result, 
the authentication process is not susceptible to password guessing and password 
attacks. The scope of the thesis has been carefully crafted to develop a robust 
security protocol that fulfils the following: 
1. Mutual authentication between the client and the server via a three-way 
handshake over Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). 
2. Freshness is always assured by random numbers and timestamps. 
3. The integrity and secrecy of the protocol accomplished via the encrypt-then-
authenticate method.  
Cryptography can be thought of as an art, which requires researchers and developers 
to mix and combine various techniques and methods in order to secure protocols. 
This thesis combines the results of two schemes as a foundation to derive a 
multifactor authentication protocol. It focuses comprehensively on answering the 
question of whether these schemes provide secure communications. Unfortunately, 
the result of combination does not completely guarantee confidentiality, integrity and 
authenticity and it is found to be vulnerable to attacks. One of the flaws found is the 
risk of eavesdropping, which can be damaging. To avoid this, a symmetric 
encryption is applied to provide secrecy. However, encryption alone does not 
provide integrity for the ciphertext: an adversary can flip a bit in the encrypted 
message and transmit the modified ciphertext. For this reason, message 
authentication is used to ensure ciphertext integrity. As a result, the composition of 
encryption and authentication provides truly secure communication when is 
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embedded in the modified protocol; both secrecy and integrity are achieved. Protocol 
9.1 summaries the messages flow for the proposed protocol. 
 







1 C à S Enc{IDCi,  IDSi,TCi,  W1,  M2,  M3}a  ||  MACk({IDCi,  IDSi,TCi,  W1,  M2,  M3}a)  
2 Sà C Enc{IDCi,  IDSi,TSi,W2,  M6,M7}a  ||  MACk({IDCi,  TSi,  W2,  M6,M7}a)  
3 C à S Enc{IDCi,  IDSi,TCi  M9}a  ||  MACk({IDCi,  IDSi,TCi  M9}a)  
 
The existence of design weaknesses or implementation errors can lead to unexpected 
and undesirable events, compromising system security. Therefore, the Finite State 
Machine analysis is used to provide a mechanism for error detection and error 
reporting. In addition, Petri nets are used to ensure the soundness of the protocol 
analysis. This approach is a very useful tool for modelling and simulating a range of 
possible attacks on the proposed protocol. The key features of using Petri nets can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. The ability to model the concurrency of the protocol progress with tokens. 
2. The ability to model intermediate and final objectives as places. 
3. The ability to model transitions as commands and inputs. 
Adding an adversary to the model encourages discovery and discussion of scenarios 
where the system is under malicious attack. The range of attacks tests the behaviour 
of the protocol while validating it with PN. It reveals the necessity to provide the 
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server ID to prevent attacks such as reflection attack while maintaining secrecy of 
the traffic between the client and server. Chapter 6 answers one of the questions 
raised in Chapter 4 that the authenticate-then-encrypt method is not a very secure 
approach. Section 7.5 shows that the adversary still has the ability to freely 
manipulate ciphertexts even when assuming that the symmetric key encryption is a 
well secured scheme and that the MAC is strongly unforgeable. It is also noted in the 
analysis that the server spends extra time to deal with decryption first then to validate 
the MAC value. Chapter 8 demonstrates the modifications needed to improve the 
proposed protocol. FSM was used once again to evaluate the desired functionalities 
and behaviour while PN was used to test whether the modified protocol satisfies the 
security requirements. The modified protocol is proven to be resilient to various 
attacks and it sustains a good balance between security and efficiency (Table 9.1).  
 
Table	  9.1:	  Summary	  of	  security	  analysis	  
 
Security Factors The new Protocol Mechanism 
Multifactor authentication Yes Biometric, sender and recipient’s IDs 
are presented 
Session key agreement Yes Based on ECC 
Man-in-the-middle attack resistance Yes Symmetric encryption 
Replay attack resistance Yes Random numbers and timestamps 
Reflection attack resistance Yes Symmetric encryption and ID 
Parallel session attack resistance Yes Symmetric encryption 
Impersonation attack resistance Yes  
Forgery attack resistance  Yes Secret value 
Ciphertext attack resistance Yes Encrypt-then-authenticate 
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In light of this, this thesis makes the argument that authentication based on biometric 
and ID-based cryptography offers a competitive authentication practice with the 
strongly desirable properties of confidentiality, integrity and authenticity (Table 9.2).  
 







Encryption MAC Data integrity 
Authentication   
exchanged 
Entity authentication  Yes Yes  Yes 
Data origin 
authentication 
Yes Yes   
Confidentiality Yes    
Traffic flow 
confidentiality 
Yes    
Data integrity Yes Yes Yes  




There were some unavoidable limitations due to the time limit. First, an extensive 
study needs to be conducted during the handshake. The protocol may be suspected to 
SYN flood. This attack leads to DoS or DDoS attack and it take place when multiple 
external hosts start but do not finish the three way handshake, exhausting the system 
with a half open connection network queue. These attacks can be mitigated by 
adopting approaches like SYN cache and SYN cookies to prevent this issue.  
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Second, An in-depth analysis should to be conducted on the performance evaluation. 
The performance of the protocol can be evaluated in two aspects: security strength 
and the cost of computation. Theoretically, the computation cost for the protocol is 
relatively low and efficient due to utilising fast operations such as symmetric 
encryption, hash operations and XOR operations. Also, having the protocol based on 
ECC adds another advantage in terms of fast performance and reliable security. 
Then, the result of the performance test needs to be compared with current similar 
protocols to measure efficiency and performance.  
Finally, biometric authentications are based on probabilistic measures. 
Characteristically, the process of authentication depends on the decision of 
confidence scores, which are in the range between 0% and 100%. The performance 
of biometric systems is highly sensitive and it can be significantly affected by change 
in the acquisition of biometrics, for example, due to skin damage or injury. 
Consequently, using hash functions to protect biometric data might not be the best 
solution because any slight change that occurs during acquisition of the biometric 
data can produce a different hash value. Therefore, it was challenging to find a 
suitable lightweight algorithm that handles biometric data accurately and achieves 
the revocability property within the time limit of the research.  
 
9.3	  FUTURE	  WORK	  
In the future, it will be more efficient and practical to investigate the new protocol in 
multi-server environments and with multi-clients such that it can be applied to more 
applications in electronic government. The most straightforward way to simulate and 
validate this approach is using coloured Petri net (CPN). The reason behind 
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considering CPN over PN is that each client and server can be assigned a unique 
colour, making the evaluation processes easier and more efficient (Al-zzoni et al., 
2005). CPN is a high-level nets that are widely used for many different practical 
purposes. One of the reasons for the large success for CPN is that they allow more 
succinct and manageable descriptions without loosing the possibility of formal 
analysis (Jensen and Kristensen, 2009). 
Another area worth investigating is securing the biometric templates since they are 
prone to vulnerabilities such as circumvention, covert acquisition, collusion and 
coercion, denial of Service, and repudiation (Maltoni et al., 2009). 
Another potential possibility for future work involves chaotic systems (Dachselt et 
al., 2001; Kocarev et al., 2001) and developing a novel key agreement protocol 
based on chaotic maps and ID-based encryption. Chaotic systems have been used to 
design secure communication protocols (Pecora and Carroll, 1990; Dachselt et al., 
2001; Kocarev et al., 2001; Wong 2002) 
Finally, perhaps the most interesting area for future work involves utilising biometric 
data as the identity of the client instead of using the ID of the user. Then applying 
this change to the proposed protocol in this thesis. This transition would produce a 
fuzzy protocol similar to the work of researchers such as Sahai et al. (2005), Dodis et 
al. (2006), Beak et al. (2007), or Scheirer et al. (2007).  
To conclude, this thesis demonstrates a new authentication protocol based on 
biometric and ID-based cryptography over ECC. The new protocol has been 
thoroughly validated and formally verified via formal approaches. One of the new 
protocol merits is to provide a solid structure that one can implement stronger 
defence mechanisms. For example, the MAC mechanism used in the protocol can be 
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replaced by a stronger one such as HMAC-SHA-1 depending on the desired security 
level. The same goes for symmetric encryption and one-way hash functions. Besides 
other advantages such as secure mutual authentication and key agreement, this 
protocol can be successfully implemented in distributed systems such as e-
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 <text x="468.5" y="347.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">R2</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="198.5" cy="341.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="186.5" y="347.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">R3</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="198.5" cy="172.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="186.5" y="178.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">R0</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" cx="49.5" 
cy="172.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" points="480.5,202.5 
480.5,311.5"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="480.5,311.5 
485.5,303.5 475.5,303.5"/> 
 <text x="397.5" y="263.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Enter PW</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" points="450.5,341.5 
228.5,341.5"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="228.5,341.5 
236.5,346.5 236.5,336.5"/> 
 <text x="293.5" y="362.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Submit Bio</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" points="198.5,311.5 
198.5,202.5"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="198.5,202.5 
193.5,210.5 203.5,210.5"/> 
 <text x="203.5" y="263.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Enrolled</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" points="480.5,142.5 
480.5,142.5"/> 
 <text x="485.5" y="148.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Validate ID</text> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="480.5,142.5 
485.5,134.5 475.5,134.5"/> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
506.659,355.945 A 22.5,22.5 0 1 1 484.946,371.05"/> 
 <text x="524.5" y="417.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Re-enter PW</text> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="484.946,371.05 
479.783,378.946 489.781,379.151"/> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" points="228.5,172.5 
450.5,172.5"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="450.5,172.5 
442.5,167.5 442.5,177.5"/> 
 <text x="304.5" y="193.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Enter ID</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
186.136,368.705 A 22.5,22.5 0 1 1 169.386,348.234"/> 
 <text x="-20.5" y="404.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Submit 5 Templates</text> 
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 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="169.386,348.234 
161.112,343.702 161.686,353.685"/> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
70.732,151.494 A 92.051,92.051 0 0 1 177.268,151.494"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="70.732,151.494 
80.15,150.942 74.363,142.786"/> 
 <text x="83.5" y="125.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Enroll = 1</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
177.272,193.511 A 92.036,92.036 0 0 1 70.728,193.511"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="177.272,193.511 
167.855,194.064 173.643,202.219"/> 
 <text x="83.5" y="231.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-






<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?> 
<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" 
"http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd"> 
 
<svg width="800" height="600" version="1.1" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="535.5" cy="296.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="523.5" y="302.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">C9</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="535.5" cy="296.5" rx="24" ry="24"/> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="236.5" cy="296.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="224.5" y="302.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">C2</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="195.5" cy="129.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="183.5" y="135.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">C1</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="203.5" cy="57.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="191.5" y="63.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">C0</text> 
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 <text x="438.5" y="63.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">R0</text> 
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 <text x="93.5" y="370.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">C4</text> 
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 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="105.5" cy="364.5" rx="24" ry="24"/> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="310.5" cy="379.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="298.5" y="385.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">C3</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="498.5" cy="412.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="486.5" y="418.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">C5</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="618.5" cy="500.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="606.5" y="506.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">C6</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="754.5" cy="497.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="742.5" y="503.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">C7</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="754.5" cy="497.5" rx="24" ry="24"/> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="291.5" cy="511.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="279.5" y="517.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">C8</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="291.5" cy="511.5" rx="24" ry="24"/> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
225.343,128.931 A 86.076,86.076 0 0 1 263.213,283.184"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="225.343,128.931 
232.474,135.108 234.02,125.228"/> 
 <text x="303.5" y="195.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Re-enter</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
219.385,82.2 A 42.023,42.023 0 0 1 216.419,108.889"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="219.385,82.2 
216.202,91.081 225.973,88.952"/> 
 <text x="226.5" y="102.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Re-enter</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" points="535.5,266.5 
535.5,266.5"/> 
 <text x="540.5" y="272.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Validate ID</text> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="535.5,266.5 
540.5,258.5 530.5,258.5"/> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
420.61,60.057 A 1273.834,1273.834 0 0 1 233.39,60.057"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="420.61,60.057 
412.264,55.658 412.999,65.631"/> 
 <text x="284.5" y="84.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Registered</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
229.354,42.329 A 218.99,218.99 0 0 1 424.646,42.329"/> 
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 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="229.354,42.329 
238.744,43.237 234.285,34.286"/> 
 <text x="258.5" y="10.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Request to enroll</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
176.212,107.511 A 38.577,38.577 0 0 1 179.855,74.718"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="176.212,107.511 
178.338,98.32 168.882,101.572"/> 
 <text x="98.5" y="95.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Enter ID</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="202.653,158.635 229.347,267.365"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="229.347,267.365 
232.296,258.404 222.584,260.788"/> 
 <text x="130.5" y="223.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Enter PW</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
259.586,277.379 A 216.799,216.799 0 0 1 512.414,277.379"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="512.414,277.379 
508.83,268.653 502.999,276.777"/> 
 <text x="352.5" y="227.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Timeout</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
223.628,119.121 A 247.669,247.669 0 0 1 526.52,267.895"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="526.52,267.895 
528.338,258.637 518.996,262.204"/> 
 <text x="408.5" y="124.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Timeout</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
327.016,354.496 A 182.746,182.746 0 0 1 506.703,288.212"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="506.703,288.212 
499.843,281.735 497.875,291.539"/> 
 <text x="337.5" y="285.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Timeout</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="507.616,383.919 526.384,325.081"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="526.384,325.081 
519.189,331.184 528.716,334.222"/> 
 <text x="524.5" y="367.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Timeout</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="607.194,472.712 546.806,324.288"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="546.806,324.288 
545.189,333.583 554.452,329.814"/> 
 <text x="584.5" y="395.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Timeout</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
84.832,342.843 A 133.01,133.01 0 0 1 165.653,131.811"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="84.832,342.843 
83.978,333.448 76.013,339.494"/> 
 <text x="2.5" y="212.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Invalid</text> 
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 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
108.733,334.851 A 80.131,80.131 0 0 1 210.392,282.081"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="108.733,334.851 
115.848,328.656 106.283,325.741"/> 
 <text x="87.5" y="277.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Invalid</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
286.443,397.329 A 140.926,140.926 0 0 1 126.706,385.641"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="126.706,385.641 
129.805,394.551 136.073,386.759"/> 
 <text x="172.5" y="439.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Invalid</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="471.436,425.444 318.564,498.556"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="318.564,498.556 
327.938,499.615 323.624,490.594"/> 
 <text x="308.5" y="452.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Terminate</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="588.517,501.509 321.483,510.491"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="321.483,510.491 
329.647,515.22 329.31,505.225"/> 
 <text x="412.5" y="495.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Terminate</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
596.928,521.331 A 301.388,301.388 0 0 1 113.919,393.281"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="113.919,393.281 
111.821,402.479 121.268,399.198"/> 
 <text x="267.5" y="608.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Invalid</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="522.692,430.241 594.308,482.759"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="594.308,482.759 
590.813,473.996 584.9,482.06"/> 
 <text x="465.5" y="477.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">SYN/ACK</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="340.048,384.687 468.952,407.313"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="468.952,407.313 
461.937,401.006 460.208,410.855"/> 
 <text x="299.5" y="423.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Valid Login Reg.</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
280.969,382.529 A 59.749,59.749 0 0 1 230.117,325.491"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="280.969,382.529 
273.799,376.397 272.316,386.287"/> 
 <text x="148.5" y="383.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Submit Bio</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
266.212,297.535 A 64.448,64.448 0 0 1 312.867,349.864"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="266.212,297.535 
272.605,304.472 275.249,294.828"/> 
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 <text x="302.5" y="308.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Re-enter</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" points="146.5,25.5 
177.34,42.814"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="177.34,42.814 
172.812,34.538 167.917,43.258"/> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="648.493,499.838 724.507,498.162"/> 






<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?> 
<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" 
"http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd"> 
 
<svg width="800" height="600" version="1.1" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="535.5" cy="296.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="524.5" y="302.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">S9</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="535.5" cy="296.5" rx="24" ry="24"/> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="236.5" cy="296.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="225.5" y="302.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">S2</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="195.5" cy="129.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="184.5" y="135.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">S1</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="203.5" cy="57.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="192.5" y="63.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">S0</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="450.5" cy="57.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="438.5" y="63.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">R0</text> 
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 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="105.5" cy="364.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="94.5" y="370.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">S4</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="105.5" cy="364.5" rx="24" ry="24"/> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="310.5" cy="379.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="299.5" y="385.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">S3</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="498.5" cy="412.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="487.5" y="418.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">S5</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="618.5" cy="500.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="607.5" y="506.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">S6</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="618.5" cy="500.5" rx="24" ry="24"/> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="291.5" cy="511.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="280.5" y="517.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">S8</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="291.5" cy="511.5" rx="24" ry="24"/> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" points="535.5,266.5 
535.5,266.5"/> 
 <text x="540.5" y="272.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Validate ID</text> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="535.5,266.5 
540.5,258.5 530.5,258.5"/> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
420.61,60.057 A 1273.834,1273.834 0 0 1 233.39,60.057"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="420.61,60.057 
412.264,55.658 412.999,65.631"/> 
 <text x="284.5" y="84.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Registered</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
229.354,42.329 A 218.99,218.99 0 0 1 424.646,42.329"/> 
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 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="229.354,42.329 
238.744,43.237 234.285,34.286"/> 
 <text x="258.5" y="10.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Request to enroll</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
176.212,107.511 A 38.577,38.577 0 0 1 179.855,74.718"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="176.212,107.511 
178.338,98.32 168.882,101.572"/> 
 <text x="98.5" y="95.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Enter ID</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="202.653,158.635 229.347,267.365"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="229.347,267.365 
232.296,258.404 222.584,260.788"/> 
 <text x="130.5" y="223.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Enter PW</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
259.586,277.379 A 216.799,216.799 0 0 1 512.414,277.379"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="512.414,277.379 
508.83,268.653 502.999,276.777"/> 
 <text x="352.5" y="227.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Timeout</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
223.628,119.121 A 247.669,247.669 0 0 1 526.52,267.895"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="526.52,267.895 
528.338,258.637 518.996,262.204"/> 
 <text x="408.5" y="124.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Timeout</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
327.016,354.496 A 182.746,182.746 0 0 1 506.703,288.212"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="506.703,288.212 
499.843,281.735 497.875,291.539"/> 
 <text x="337.5" y="285.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Timeout</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="507.616,383.919 526.384,325.081"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="526.384,325.081 
519.189,331.184 528.716,334.222"/> 
 <text x="524.5" y="367.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Timeout</text> 
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 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="607.194,472.712 546.806,324.288"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="546.806,324.288 
545.189,333.583 554.452,329.814"/> 
 <text x="584.5" y="395.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Timeout</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
84.832,342.843 A 133.01,133.01 0 0 1 165.653,131.811"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="84.832,342.843 
83.978,333.448 76.013,339.494"/> 
 <text x="2.5" y="212.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Invalid</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
108.733,334.851 A 80.131,80.131 0 0 1 210.392,282.081"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="108.733,334.851 
115.848,328.656 106.283,325.741"/> 
 <text x="87.5" y="277.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Invalid</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
286.443,397.329 A 140.926,140.926 0 0 1 126.706,385.641"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="126.706,385.641 
129.805,394.551 136.073,386.759"/> 
 <text x="172.5" y="439.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Invalid</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="471.436,425.444 318.564,498.556"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="318.564,498.556 
327.938,499.615 323.624,490.594"/> 
 <text x="308.5" y="452.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Terminate</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="588.517,501.509 321.483,510.491"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="321.483,510.491 
329.647,515.22 329.31,505.225"/> 
 <text x="412.5" y="495.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Terminate</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
596.928,521.331 A 301.388,301.388 0 0 1 113.919,393.281"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="113.919,393.281 
111.821,402.479 121.268,399.198"/> 
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 <text x="267.5" y="608.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Invalid</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="522.692,430.241 594.308,482.759"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="594.308,482.759 
590.813,473.996 584.9,482.06"/> 
 <text x="511.5" y="477.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">ACK</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" 
points="340.048,384.687 468.952,407.313"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="468.952,407.313 
461.937,401.006 460.208,410.855"/> 
 <text x="372.5" y="419.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">SYN</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
280.969,382.529 A 59.749,59.749 0 0 1 230.117,325.491"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="280.969,382.529 
273.799,376.397 272.316,386.287"/> 
 <text x="148.5" y="383.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Submit Bio</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
173.62,57.065 A 22.5,22.5 0 1 1 185.67,33.519"/> 
 <text x="-5.5" y="21.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Waiting for client</text> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="185.67,33.519 
186.51,24.122 177.592,28.647"/> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
225.011,134.197 A 22.5,22.5 0 1 1 209.723,155.781"/> 
 <text x="256.5" y="188.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Re-enter</text> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="209.723,155.781 
207.55,164.962 217.023,161.757"/> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
250.723,270.219 A 22.5,22.5 0 1 1 266.011,291.803"/> 
 <text x="297.5" y="249.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Re-enter</text> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="266.011,291.803 
273.951,296.899 274.071,286.899"/> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
328.969,356.007 A 22.5,22.5 0 1 1 340.381,379.869"/> 
	   224	  
 <text x="378.5" y="345.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Re-enter</text> 






<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?> 
<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" 
"http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd"> 
 
<svg width="800" height="600" version="1.1" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="440.5" cy="88.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="428.5" y="94.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">V1</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="537.5" cy="199.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="525.5" y="205.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">V2</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="493.5" cy="348.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="481.5" y="354.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">V3</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="198.5" cy="341.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="186.5" y="347.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">V4</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" 
cx="198.5" cy="166.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="186.5" y="172.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">V0</text> 
 <ellipse stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" cx="-7.5" 
cy="166.5" rx="30" ry="30"/> 
 <text x="-12.5" y="172.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">v</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
466.978,102.518 A 167.653,167.653 0 0 1 527.157,171.382"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="527.157,171.382 
528.255,162.012 519.216,166.289"/> 
 <text x="507.5" y="124.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Integrity checked</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
544.441,228.619 A 130.815,130.815 0 0 1 515.145,327.823"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="515.145,327.823 
524.105,324.868 516.415,318.475"/> 
 <text x="547.5" y="293.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Decrypted done</text> 
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 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
464.383,355.707 A 505.739,505.739 0 0 1 227.242,350.08"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="227.242,350.08 
233.685,356.972 236.26,347.309"/> 
 <text x="269.5" y="389.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Freshness checked</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
180.557,317.545 A 126.861,126.861 0 0 1 180.557,190.455"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="180.557,190.455 
172.222,194.875 180.877,199.884"/> 
 <text x="92.5" y="259.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">ID valid</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
213.566,140.601 A 174.163,174.163 0 0 1 413.145,76.274"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="413.145,76.274 
407.228,68.926 403.948,78.373"/> 
 <text x="156.5" y="62.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Authenticity check</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
225.6,179.368 A 1449.769,1449.769 0 0 1 469.843,330.053"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="225.6,179.368 
230.599,187.368 234.982,178.379"/> 
 <text x="356.5" y="239.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Not valid</text> 
 <polygon stroke="black" stroke-width="1" points="198.5,311.5 
198.5,196.5"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="198.5,196.5 
193.5,204.5 203.5,204.5"/> 
 <text x="203.5" y="260.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Not valid</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
418.842,109.235 A 260.716,260.716 0 0 1 228.19,170.685"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="228.19,170.685 
235.751,176.327 236.575,166.361"/> 
 <text x="329.5" y="181.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Not valid</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
16.701,148.85 A 154.989,154.989 0 0 1 174.299,148.85"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="174.299,148.85 
169.952,140.477 164.868,149.088"/> 
 <text x="61.5" y="118.5" font-family="Times New Roman" font-
size="20">Validate</text> 
 <path stroke="black" stroke-width="1" fill="none" d="M 
170.46,177.116 A 251.749,251.749 0 0 1 20.54,177.116"/> 
 <polygon fill="black" stroke-width="1" points="20.54,177.116 
26.688,184.271 29.666,174.725"/> 
































Trust Model with Adversary 
 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> 
<pnml xmlns="http://www.informatik.hu-berlin.de/top/pnml/ptNetb"> 
<shared-transition name="T8" urgent="false"/> 
<shared-transition name="T20" urgent="false"/> 
<shared-transition name="T32" urgent="false"/> 
<constant name="periodC" value="7"/> 
<constant name="PeriodS" value="5"/> 
<constant name="Deadline" value="5"/> 
<net active="true" id="TAPN1" type="P/T net"> 
B 
Appendix: 
Petri Nets	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<place id="P1" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P1" 
nameOffsetX="22.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="30.0" 
positionY="105.0"/> 
<place id="P2" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P2" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="15.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P4" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P4" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="105.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P6" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P6" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="180.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P16" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P16" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="780.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P18" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P18" 
nameOffsetX="53.0" nameOffsetY="-17.0" positionX="750.0" 
positionY="30.0"/> 
<place id="P19" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P19" 
nameOffsetX="48.0" nameOffsetY="31.0" positionX="795.0" 
positionY="240.0"/> 
<place id="P20" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P20" 
nameOffsetX="2.0" nameOffsetY="22.0" positionX="885.0" 
positionY="270.0"/> 
<place id="P22" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P22" 
nameOffsetX="29.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="795.0" 
positionY="315.0"/> 
<place id="P23" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P23" 
nameOffsetX="3.0" nameOffsetY="3.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P24" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P24" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="735.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P33" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P33" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="90.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P34" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P34" 
nameOffsetX="63.0" nameOffsetY="36.0" positionX="150.0" 
positionY="480.0"/> 
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<place id="P36" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P36" 
nameOffsetX="98.0" nameOffsetY="-18.0" positionX="30.0" 
positionY="585.0"/> 
<place id="P21" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P21" 
nameOffsetX="38.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="885.0" 
positionY="360.0"/> 
<place id="P3" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P3" 
nameOffsetX="11.0" nameOffsetY="3.0" positionX="30.0" 
positionY="195.0"/> 
<place id="P37" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P37" 
nameOffsetX="28.0" nameOffsetY="1.0" positionX="135.0" 
positionY="585.0"/> 
<place id="P38" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P38" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="90.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P46" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P46" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="-7.0" positionX="720.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P49" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P49" 
nameOffsetX="69.0" nameOffsetY="-18.0" positionX="660.0" 
positionY="735.0"/> 
<place id="P50" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P50" 
nameOffsetX="54.0" nameOffsetY="30.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="855.0"/> 
<place id="P26" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P26" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="630.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P39" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P39" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="-7.0" positionX="180.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P42" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P42" 
nameOffsetX="35.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="450.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P43" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P43" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="540.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P14" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P14" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="705.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
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<place id="P12" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P12" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-7.0" positionX="630.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P35" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P35" 
nameOffsetX="57.0" nameOffsetY="23.0" positionX="270.0" 
positionY="555.0"/> 
<place id="P48" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P48" 
nameOffsetX="79.0" nameOffsetY="-22.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="735.0"/> 
<place id="P17" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P17" 
nameOffsetX="62.0" nameOffsetY="-12.0" positionX="870.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P9" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P9" 
nameOffsetX="15.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="360.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P10" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P10" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="450.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P32" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P32" 
nameOffsetX="33.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="180.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P15" initialMarking="3" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P15" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="735.0" positionY="210.0"/> 
<place id="P8" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P8" 
nameOffsetX="22.0" nameOffsetY="-6.0" positionX="270.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P13" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P13" 
nameOffsetX="37.0" nameOffsetY="1.0" positionX="705.0" 
positionY="90.0"/> 
<place id="P25" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P25" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="765.0" positionY="450.0"/> 
<place id="P27" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P27" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="540.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P28" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P28" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="450.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P29" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P29" 
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nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="360.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P31" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P31" 
nameOffsetX="12.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="165.0" 
positionY="315.0"/> 
<place id="P40" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P40" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="1.0" positionX="270.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P41" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P41" 
nameOffsetX="14.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="360.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P45" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P45" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="720.0" 
positionY="585.0"/> 
<place id="P47" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P47" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="810.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P51" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P51" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="660.0" positionY="855.0"/> 
<place id="P7" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P7" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="180.0" positionY="225.0"/> 
<place id="P5" initialMarking="3" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P5" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="120.0" positionY="225.0"/> 
<place id="P11" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P11" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="540.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P30" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P30" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="270.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P44" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P44" 
nameOffsetX="28.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="630.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T1" infiniteServer="false" name="T1" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="41.0" positionX="60.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T2" infiniteServer="false" name="T2" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="48.0" positionX="135.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T10" infiniteServer="false" name="T10" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="51.0" positionX="825.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
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<transition angle="0" id="T13" infiniteServer="false" name="T13" 
nameOffsetX="10.0" nameOffsetY="42.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="315.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T21" infiniteServer="false" name="T21" 
nameOffsetX="10.0" nameOffsetY="52.0" positionX="135.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T22" infiniteServer="false" name="T22" 
nameOffsetX="10.0" nameOffsetY="39.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="180" id="T25" infiniteServer="false" name="T25" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="30.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T32" infiniteServer="false" name="T32" 
nameOffsetX="41.0" nameOffsetY="43.0" positionX="675.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T34" infiniteServer="false" name="T34" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="180" id="T3" infiniteServer="false" name="T3" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="42.0" positionX="225.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T15" infiniteServer="false" name="T15" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="690.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T30" infiniteServer="false" name="T30" 
nameOffsetX="18.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="495.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="270" id="T24" infiniteServer="false" name="T24" 
nameOffsetX="40.0" nameOffsetY="38.0" positionX="30.0" 
positionY="480.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T35" infiniteServer="false" name="T35" 
nameOffsetX="39.0" nameOffsetY="40.0" positionX="720.0" 
positionY="735.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="90" id="T36" infiniteServer="false" name="T36" 
nameOffsetX="53.0" nameOffsetY="31.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="795.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T11" infiniteServer="false" name="T11" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="40.0" positionX="810.0" 
positionY="30.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T12" infiniteServer="false" name="T12" 
nameOffsetX="52.0" nameOffsetY="14.0" positionX="870.0" 
positionY="240.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T5" infiniteServer="false" name="T5" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="51.0" positionX="405.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T6" infiniteServer="false" name="T6" 
nameOffsetX="15.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="495.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T8" infiniteServer="false" name="T8" 
nameOffsetX="32.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="660.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
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<transition angle="0" id="T14" infiniteServer="false" name="T14" 
nameOffsetX="29.0" nameOffsetY="52.0" positionX="780.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T4" infiniteServer="false" name="T4" 
nameOffsetX="20.0" nameOffsetY="48.0" positionX="315.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T20" infiniteServer="false" name="T20" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="225.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T9" infiniteServer="false" name="T9" 
nameOffsetX="40.0" nameOffsetY="39.0" positionX="735.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T16" infiniteServer="false" name="T16" 
nameOffsetX="39.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="585.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T18" infiniteServer="false" name="T18" 
nameOffsetX="42.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="405.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T17" infiniteServer="false" name="T17" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="48.0" positionX="495.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T27" infiniteServer="false" name="T27" 
nameOffsetX="43.0" nameOffsetY="41.0" positionX="225.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T28" infiniteServer="false" name="T28" 
nameOffsetX="13.0" nameOffsetY="48.0" positionX="315.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T29" infiniteServer="false" name="T29" 
nameOffsetX="40.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="405.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T33" infiniteServer="false" name="T33" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="765.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T26" infiniteServer="false" name="T26" 
nameOffsetX="49.0" nameOffsetY="51.0" positionX="135.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T37" infiniteServer="false" name="T37" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="720.0" 
positionY="855.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T7" infiniteServer="false" name="T7" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="585.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T19" infiniteServer="false" name="T19" 
nameOffsetX="18.0" nameOffsetY="51.0" positionX="315.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T31" infiniteServer="false" name="T31" 
nameOffsetX="41.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="585.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="90" id="T23" infiniteServer="false" name="T23" 
nameOffsetX="46.0" nameOffsetY="39.0" positionX="270.0" 
positionY="480.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
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<arc id="Tc to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P2" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="41" yCoord="164"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="66" yCoord="167"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="generateLoginRequest to LgoinRqst" inscription="1" 
source="T1" target="P4" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="76" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="102" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="LgoinRqst to Encrypt" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P4" 
target="T2" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="131" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="141" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Encrypt to Cipher1" inscription="1" source="T2" target="P6" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="151" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="177" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG1 to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P16" target="T10" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="806" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="831" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rs to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P20" target="T13" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="896" yCoord="296"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="895" yCoord="326"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="872" yCoord="322"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Accept to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P19" 
target="T13" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="809" yCoord="266"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="812" yCoord="286"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="854" yCoord="289"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="867" yCoord="312"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T6 to SK_s" inscription="1" source="T13" target="P22" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="861" yCoord="327"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="821" yCoord="327"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T6 to SYN_ACK" inscription="1" source="T13" target="P23" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="867" yCoord="342"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="867" yCoord="387"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Decrypt_ to MSG2" inscription="1" source="T21" target="P33" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="141" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="116" yCoord="402"/> 
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</arc> 
<arc id="MSG2 to T9" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P33" target="T22" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="87" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="61" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T9 to Reject2" inscription="1" source="T22" target="P34" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="57" yCoord="417"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="55" yCoord="458"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="147" yCoord="487"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Ts to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P21" target="T13" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="896" yCoord="357"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="896" yCoord="342"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="871" yCoord="332"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Requst to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P3" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="54" yCoord="198"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="68" yCoord="188"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="72" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Tc to T12" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P2" target="T25" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="18" yCoord="174"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="21" yCoord="171"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="21" yCoord="651"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="37" yCoord="651"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T12 to SK_c" inscription="1" source="T25" target="P37" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="47" yCoord="651"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="81" yCoord="606"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="132" yCoord="599"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T12 to ACK" inscription="1" source="T25" target="P38" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="46" yCoord="661"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="87" yCoord="658"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="_Decrypt to MSG3" inscription="1" source="T32" target="P46" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="691" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="717" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Cipher1 to Receive_Cipher1" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P6" target="T3" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="206" yCoord="160"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="232" yCoord="156"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="Cipher2 to T20" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P24" 
target="T15" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="732" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="706" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Intercept_MSG_ to MSG2_A_" inscription="1" source="T15" 
target="P26" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="696" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="656" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Accept2 to T12" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P36" 
target="T25" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="41" yCoord="611"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="41" yCoord="641"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="xMSG3x to SendMSG3_" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P42" 
target="T30" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="476" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="501" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SendMSG3_ to XMSG3X_" inscription="1" source="T30" 
target="P43" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="511" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="537" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P28 to T17" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="P34" 
target="T24" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="147" yCoord="491"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="57" yCoord="491"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T17 to P30" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="T24" 
target="P36" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="42" yCoord="497"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="42" yCoord="582"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P37 to T24" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P48" 
target="T35" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="852" yCoord="747"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="736" yCoord="747"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T24 to P38" inscription="1" source="T35" target="P49" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="726" yCoord="747"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="686" yCoord="747"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P37 to T25" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="P48" 
target="T36" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="866" yCoord="761"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="866" yCoord="801"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T25 to P39" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="T36" 
target="P50" type="transport" weight="1"> 
	   236	  
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="866" yCoord="811"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="866" yCoord="852"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T23 to P37" inscription="1" source="T34" target="P48" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="867" yCoord="672"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="867" yCoord="732"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T7 to P13" inscription="1" source="T10" target="P17" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="841" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="867" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P13 to T8" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P17" 
target="T11" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="882" yCoord="147"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="884" yCoord="97"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="826" yCoord="42"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T8 to P14" inscription="1" source="T11" target="P18" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="816" yCoord="42"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="776" yCoord="42"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P13 to T9" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="P17" 
target="T12" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="882" yCoord="176"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="882" yCoord="237"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T9 to P15" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="T12" 
target="P19" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="876" yCoord="252"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="821" yCoord="252"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P9 to T5" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P9" target="T5" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="386" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="411" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T5 to P10" inscription="1" source="T5" target="P10" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="421" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="447" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P12 to T8" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P12" target="T8" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="656" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="666" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T8 to P13" inscription="1" source="T8" target="P14" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="676" yCoord="162"/> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="702" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T15 to P25" inscription="1" source="T14" target="P24" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="786" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="761" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P1 to T22__" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P1" target="T25" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="27" yCoord="118"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="14" yCoord="119"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="14" yCoord="659"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="36" yCoord="661"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P1 to T1" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P1" target="T1" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="49" yCoord="129"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="67" yCoord="157"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T3 to P8" inscription="1" source="T3" target="P8" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="242" yCoord="161"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="267" yCoord="161"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P8 to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P8" target="T4" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="296" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="321" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T4 to P9" inscription="1" source="T4" target="P9" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="331" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="357" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T17 to P27" inscription="1" source="T20" target="P32" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="231" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="206" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P27 to T18" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P32" target="T21" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="177" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="151" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P10 to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P10" target="T6" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="476" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="501" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Decrypt to MSG1" inscription="1" source="T9" target="P16" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="751" yCoord="162"/> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="777" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P14 to T9" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P15" target="T9" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="747" yCoord="207"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="747" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P13 to T9" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P14" target="T9" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="731" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="741" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T8 to P13" inscription="1" source="T8" target="P13" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="672" yCoord="147"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="673" yCoord="103"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="702" yCoord="102"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P15 to T14" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P15" target="T14" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="747" yCoord="237"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="747" yCoord="342"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="788" yCoord="341"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="792" yCoord="387"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P25 to T15" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P25" target="T15" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="762" yCoord="460"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="725" yCoord="458"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="702" yCoord="417"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P26 to T16" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P26" target="T16" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="627" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="601" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P28 to T18" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P28" target="T18" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="447" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="421" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T18 to P29" inscription="1" source="T18" target="P29" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="411" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="386" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T20 to P31" inscription="1" source="T20" target="P31" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="237" yCoord="387"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="228" yCoord="336"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="191" yCoord="329"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="T17 to P28" inscription="1" source="T17" target="P28" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="501" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="476" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P27 to T17" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P27" target="T17" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="537" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="511" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T27 to P40" inscription="1" source="T27" target="P40" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="241" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="267" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P40 to T28" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P40" target="T28" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="296" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="321" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T28 to P41" inscription="1" source="T28" target="P41" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="331" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="357" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P41 to T29" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P41" target="T29" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="386" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="411" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T29 to P42" inscription="1" source="T29" target="P42" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="421" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="447" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T32 to P45" inscription="1" source="T32" target="P45" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="687" yCoord="642"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="688" yCoord="613"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="717" yCoord="602"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P38 to T26" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P38" target="T26" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="116" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="141" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T26 to P39" inscription="1" source="T26" target="P39" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="151" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="177" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="P39 to T27" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P39" target="T27" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="206" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="231" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P46 to T33" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P46" target="T33" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="746" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="771" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T33 to P47" inscription="1" source="T33" target="P47" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="781" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="807" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P47 to T34" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P47" target="T34" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="836" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="861" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P50 to T37" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P50" target="T37" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="852" yCoord="867"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="736" yCoord="867"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T37 to P51" inscription="1" source="T37" target="P51" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="726" yCoord="867"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="686" yCoord="867"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P23 to T14" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P23" target="T14" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="852" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="796" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T6 to P11" inscription="1" source="T6" target="P11" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="511" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="537" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P11 to T7" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P11" target="T7" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="566" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="591" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T7 to P12" inscription="1" source="T7" target="P12" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="601" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="627" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T16 to P27" inscription="1" source="T16" target="P27" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="591" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="566" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P29 to T19" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P29" target="T19" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="357" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="331" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T19 to P30" inscription="1" source="T19" target="P30" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="321" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="296" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P30 to T20" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P30" target="T20" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="267" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="241" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P43 to T31" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P43" target="T31" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="566" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="591" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T31 to P44" inscription="1" source="T31" target="P44" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="601" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="627" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P44 to T32" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P44" target="T32" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="656" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="681" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T16 to P29" inscription="1" source="T23" target="P35" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="281" yCoord="496"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="281" yCoord="552"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P28 to T16" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P34" 
target="T23" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="176" yCoord="492"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="266" yCoord="492"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P15 to T33" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P15" target="T33" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="761" yCoord="222"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="928" yCoord="223"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="928" yCoord="583"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="778" yCoord="583"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="777" yCoord="642"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="P5 to T2" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P5" target="T2" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="132" yCoord="222"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="133" yCoord="193"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="147" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P7 to T3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P7" target="T3" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="192" yCoord="222"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="193" yCoord="193"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="231" yCoord="166"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P5 to T21" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P5" target="T21" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="132" yCoord="251"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="133" yCoord="358"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="147" yCoord="387"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P5 to T26" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P5" target="T26" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="117" yCoord="237"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="13" yCoord="238"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="13" yCoord="703"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="133" yCoord="703"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="147" yCoord="672"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P7 to T27" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P7" target="T27" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="192" yCoord="251"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="193" yCoord="283"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="13" yCoord="283"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="13" yCoord="718"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="208" yCoord="718"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="5" xCoord="237" yCoord="672"/> 
</arc> 
</net> 
<query active="true" approximationDenominator="2" capacity="0" 
discreteInclusion="false" enableOverApproximation="false" 
enableUnderApproximation="false" extrapolationOption="AUTOMATIC" 
gcd="true" hashTableSize="MB_16" inclusionPlaces="*NONE*" 
name="Query Comment/Name Here" overApproximation="true" pTrie="true" 
query="EF true" reduction="true" reductionOption="VerifyTAPN" 



















<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> 
<pnml xmlns="http://www.informatik.hu-berlin.de/top/pnml/ptNetb"> 
<constant name="periodC" value="7"/> 
<constant name="PeriodS" value="5"/> 
<constant name="Deadline" value="5"/> 
<net active="true" id="TAPN1" type="P/T net"> 
<place id="P1" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P1" 
nameOffsetX="22.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="105.0"/> 
<place id="P2" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P2" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P4" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P4" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="150.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P5" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P5" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="270.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P11" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P11" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="675.0" 
positionY="120.0"/> 
<place id="P14" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P14" 
nameOffsetX="67.0" nameOffsetY="-20.0" positionX="840.0" 
positionY="60.0"/> 
<place id="P15" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P15" 
nameOffsetX="76.0" nameOffsetY="-20.0" positionX="840.0" 
positionY="240.0"/> 
<place id="P16" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P16" 
nameOffsetX="29.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="870.0" 
positionY="315.0"/> 
<place id="P18" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P18" 
nameOffsetX="18.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="735.0" 
positionY="270.0"/> 
<place id="P20" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P20" 
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nameOffsetX="21.0" nameOffsetY="7.0" positionX="675.0" 
positionY="360.0"/> 
<place id="P22" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P22" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="555.0" 
positionY="360.0"/> 
<place id="P27" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P27" 
nameOffsetX="30.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="165.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P28" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P28" 
nameOffsetX="100.0" nameOffsetY="-14.0" positionX="60.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P30" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P30" 
nameOffsetX="114.0" nameOffsetY="5.0" positionX="60.0" 
positionY="525.0"/> 
<place id="P17" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P17" 
nameOffsetX="32.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="870.0" 
positionY="375.0"/> 
<place id="P3" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P3" 
nameOffsetX="11.0" nameOffsetY="3.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="195.0"/> 
<place id="P31" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P31" 
nameOffsetX="28.0" nameOffsetY="1.0" positionX="120.0" 
positionY="570.0"/> 
<place id="P32" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P32" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="150.0" 
positionY="600.0"/> 
<place id="P26" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P26" 
nameOffsetX="22.0" nameOffsetY="-6.0" positionX="270.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P36" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P36" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="-7.0" positionX="675.0" 
positionY="600.0"/> 
<place id="P38" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P38" 
nameOffsetX="79.0" nameOffsetY="-21.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="510.0"/> 
<place id="P39" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P39" 
nameOffsetX="63.0" nameOffsetY="-19.0" positionX="870.0" 
positionY="690.0"/> 
<place id="P6" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P6" 
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nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="-6.0" positionX="375.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P7" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P7" 
nameOffsetX="13.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="420.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P24" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P24" 
nameOffsetX="11.0" nameOffsetY="7.0" positionX="420.0" 
positionY="315.0"/> 
<place id="P19" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P19" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="690.0" 
positionY="300.0"/> 
<place id="P21" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P21" 
nameOffsetX="33.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="675.0" 
positionY="420.0"/> 
<place id="P23" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P23" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="555.0" 
positionY="420.0"/> 
<place id="P25" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P25" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="405.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P33" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P33" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="-7.0" positionX="270.0" 
positionY="600.0"/> 
<place id="P34" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P34" 
nameOffsetX="35.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="420.0" 
positionY="600.0"/> 
<place id="P35" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P35" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="555.0" 
positionY="600.0"/> 
<place id="P10" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P10" 
nameOffsetX="35.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="555.0" 
positionY="180.0"/> 
<place id="P12" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P12" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="42.0" positionX="675.0" 
positionY="180.0"/> 
<place id="P8" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P8" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="43.0" positionX="450.0" 
positionY="180.0"/> 
<place id="P9" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P9" 
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nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-7.0" positionX="555.0" 
positionY="120.0"/> 
<place id="P29" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P29" 
nameOffsetX="126.0" nameOffsetY="14.0" positionX="60.0" 
positionY="255.0"/> 
<place id="P37" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P37" 
nameOffsetX="122.0" nameOffsetY="7.0" positionX="795.0" 
positionY="600.0"/> 
<place id="P13" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P13" 
nameOffsetX="114.0" nameOffsetY="4.0" positionX="780.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T1" infiniteServer="false" name="T1" 
nameOffsetX="30.0" nameOffsetY="51.0" positionX="105.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T2" infiniteServer="false" name="T2" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="210.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T6" infiniteServer="false" name="T6" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="615.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T7" infiniteServer="false" name="T7" 
nameOffsetX="15.0" nameOffsetY="52.0" positionX="735.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T10" infiniteServer="false" name="T10" 
nameOffsetX="28.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="765.0" 
positionY="360.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T11" infiniteServer="false" name="T11" 
nameOffsetX="45.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="615.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T14" infiniteServer="false" name="T14" 
nameOffsetX="10.0" nameOffsetY="52.0" positionX="210.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T15" infiniteServer="false" name="T15" 
nameOffsetX="35.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="120.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="180" id="T18" infiniteServer="false" name="T18" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="60.0" 
positionY="600.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T19" infiniteServer="false" name="T19" 
nameOffsetX="16.0" nameOffsetY="49.0" positionX="210.0" 
positionY="600.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T22" infiniteServer="false" name="T22" 
nameOffsetX="41.0" nameOffsetY="43.0" positionX="615.0" 
positionY="600.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T23" infiniteServer="false" name="T23" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="735.0" 
positionY="600.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
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<transition angle="180" id="T3" infiniteServer="false" name="T3" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="330.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="180" id="T4" infiniteServer="false" name="T4" 
nameOffsetX="37.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="375.0" 
positionY="225.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T5" infiniteServer="false" name="T5" 
nameOffsetX="14.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="495.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T12" infiniteServer="false" name="T12" 
nameOffsetX="16.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="495.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T13" infiniteServer="false" name="T13" 
nameOffsetX="43.0" nameOffsetY="43.0" positionX="330.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T20" infiniteServer="false" name="T20" 
nameOffsetX="50.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="330.0" 
positionY="600.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T21" infiniteServer="false" name="T21" 
nameOffsetX="18.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="495.0" 
positionY="600.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="90" id="T17" infiniteServer="false" name="T17" 
nameOffsetX="54.0" nameOffsetY="28.0" positionX="60.0" 
positionY="465.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="90" id="T16" infiniteServer="false" name="T16" 
nameOffsetX="56.0" nameOffsetY="30.0" positionX="60.0" 
positionY="300.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T24" infiniteServer="false" name="T24" 
nameOffsetX="11.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="795.0" 
positionY="510.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T25" infiniteServer="false" name="T25" 
nameOffsetX="13.0" nameOffsetY="40.0" positionX="795.0" 
positionY="690.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T8" infiniteServer="false" name="T8" 
nameOffsetX="11.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="780.0" 
positionY="60.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T9" infiniteServer="false" name="T9" 
nameOffsetX="35.0" nameOffsetY="38.0" positionX="780.0" 
positionY="240.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<arc id="Tc to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P2" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="71" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="111" yCoord="163"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rc to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P1" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="69" yCoord="125"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="112" yCoord="156"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="generateLoginRequest to LgoinRqst" inscription="1" 
source="T1" target="P4" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="121" yCoord="162"/> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="147" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="LgoinRqst to Encrypt" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P4" 
target="T2" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="176" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="216" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Encrypt to Cipher1" inscription="1" source="T2" target="P5" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="226" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="267" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Decrypt to MSG1" inscription="1" source="T6" target="P11" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="632" yCoord="157"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="673" yCoord="138"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG1 to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P11" target="T7" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="700" yCoord="138"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="742" yCoord="157"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rs to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P16" target="T10" 
type="timed" weight="2"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="870" yCoord="337"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="843" yCoord="363"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="782" yCoord="371"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Accept to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P15" 
target="T10" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="852" yCoord="266"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="854" yCoord="324"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="782" yCoord="364"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T6 to SK_s" inscription="1" source="T10" target="P18" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="777" yCoord="357"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="764" yCoord="339"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="751" yCoord="296"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T6 to SYN_ACK" inscription="1" source="T10" target="P20" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="771" yCoord="373"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="741" yCoord="388"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="701" yCoord="376"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SYN_ACK to Encrypt_" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P20" 
target="T11" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="673" yCoord="378"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="632" yCoord="397"/> 
</arc> 
	   249	  
<arc id="Decrypt_ to MSG2" inscription="1" source="T14" target="P27" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="216" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="191" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG2 to T9" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P27" target="T15" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="162" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="136" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T9 to Reject2" inscription="1" source="T15" target="P28" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="126" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="86" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Ts to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P17" target="T10" 
type="timed" weight="2"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="867" yCoord="385"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="848" yCoord="384"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="781" yCoord="378"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Requst to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P3" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="71" yCoord="204"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="95" yCoord="200"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="111" yCoord="170"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rc to T12" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P1" target="T18" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="42" yCoord="118"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="5" yCoord="123"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="5" yCoord="618"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="66" yCoord="616"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Tc to T12" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P2" target="T18" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="67" yCoord="172"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="63" yCoord="168"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="18" yCoord="168"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="18" yCoord="603"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="67" yCoord="606"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T12 to SK_c" inscription="1" source="T18" target="P31" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="77" yCoord="606"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="108" yCoord="603"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="120" yCoord="591"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T12 to ACK" inscription="1" source="T18" target="P32" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="76" yCoord="616"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="147" yCoord="612"/> 
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</arc> 
<arc id="ACK to _Encrypt" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P32" 
target="T19" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="176" yCoord="612"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="216" yCoord="612"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="_Decrypt to MSG3" inscription="1" source="T22" target="P36" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="631" yCoord="612"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="672" yCoord="612"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG3 to T15" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P36" 
target="T23" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="701" yCoord="612"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="741" yCoord="612"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Cipher1 to Receive_Cipher1" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P5" target="T3" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="296" yCoord="161"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="337" yCoord="161"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Receive_Cipher1 to XCipher1X" inscription="1" source="T3" 
target="P6" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="347" yCoord="161"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="372" yCoord="161"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="FakeMSG to Encrypt__" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P7" 
target="T5" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="446" yCoord="161"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="502" yCoord="157"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Encrypt_ to Cipher2" inscription="1" source="T11" 
target="P22" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="622" yCoord="397"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="580" yCoord="378"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Cipher2 to T20" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P22" 
target="T12" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="553" yCoord="378"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="512" yCoord="397"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T20 to P9" inscription="1" source="T12" target="P24" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="502" yCoord="397"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="434" yCoord="374"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="432" yCoord="341"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Compute to A_SK" inscription="1" source="T10" target="P19" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="772" yCoord="366"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="741" yCoord="358"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="711" yCoord="323"/> 
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</arc> 
<arc id="Compute to SYNACK_A" inscription="1" source="T10" 
target="P21" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="771" yCoord="380"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="742" yCoord="432"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="702" yCoord="432"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SYNACK_A to SendMSG_" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P21" 
target="T11" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="673" yCoord="425"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="631" yCoord="407"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SendMSG_ to MSG2_A" inscription="1" source="T11" 
target="P23" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="621" yCoord="407"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="580" yCoord="425"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG2_A to Intercept_MSG_" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P23" target="T12" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="553" yCoord="425"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="511" yCoord="407"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Intercept_MSG_ to MSG2_A_" inscription="1" source="T12" 
target="P25" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="501" yCoord="407"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="431" yCoord="403"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG2_A_ to _SendMSG_" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P25" 
target="T13" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="402" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="346" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="_SendMSG_ to SYN_ACK" inscription="1" source="T13" 
target="P26" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="336" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="296" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Accept2 to T12" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P30" 
target="T18" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="71" yCoord="551"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="71" yCoord="596"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SYN_ACK to RecieveMSG2" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P26" 
target="T14" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="267" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="226" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SendMSG3 to MSG3_" inscription="1" source="T19" 
target="P33" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="226" yCoord="612"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="267" yCoord="612"/> 
</arc> 
	   252	  
<arc id="MSG3_ to Intercept_MSG3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P33" 
target="T20" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="296" yCoord="612"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="336" yCoord="612"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Intercept_MSG3 to xMSG3x" inscription="1" source="T20" 
target="P34" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="346" yCoord="612"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="417" yCoord="612"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="xMSG3x to SendMSG3_" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P34" 
target="T21" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="446" yCoord="612"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="501" yCoord="612"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SendMSG3_ to XMSG3X_" inscription="1" source="T21" 
target="P35" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="511" yCoord="612"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="552" yCoord="612"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="XMSG3X_ to _ReceiveMSG3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P35" 
target="T22" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="581" yCoord="612"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="621" yCoord="612"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG1_C to ReceiveMSG" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P10" 
target="T6" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="580" yCoord="185"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="621" yCoord="167"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="ReceiveMSG to MSG1_C_" inscription="1" source="T6" 
target="P12" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="631" yCoord="167"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="673" yCoord="185"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG1_C_ to Verify_" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P12" 
target="T7" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="700" yCoord="185"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="741" yCoord="167"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="XMSG1X to DuplicateMSG" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P6" 
target="T4" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="386" yCoord="176"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="386" yCoord="221"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="DuplicateMSG to xMSG1_A" inscription="1" source="T4" 
target="P7" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="392" yCoord="231"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="421" yCoord="226"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="429" yCoord="176"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="DuplicateMSG to xMSG1_C" inscription="1" source="T4" 
target="P8" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="391" yCoord="241"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="436" yCoord="241"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="454" yCoord="205"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="xMSG1_C to Send_MSG" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P8" 
target="T5" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="474" yCoord="184"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="501" yCoord="167"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Cipher1_i to Decrypt" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P9" 
target="T6" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="580" yCoord="138"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="622" yCoord="157"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Encrypt__ to Cipher1_i" inscription="1" source="T5" 
target="P9" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="512" yCoord="157"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="553" yCoord="138"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P28 to T16" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P28" 
target="T16" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="71" yCoord="387"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="71" yCoord="316"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T16 to P29" inscription="1" source="T16" target="P29" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="71" yCoord="306"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="71" yCoord="281"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P28 to T17" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="P28" 
target="T17" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="71" yCoord="416"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="71" yCoord="471"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T17 to P30" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="T17" 
target="P30" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="71" yCoord="481"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="71" yCoord="522"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P37 to T24" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P37" 
target="T24" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="807" yCoord="597"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="807" yCoord="529"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="807" yCoord="537"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T24 to P38" inscription="1" source="T24" target="P38" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="811" yCoord="522"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="852" yCoord="522"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="P37 to T25" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="P37" 
target="T25" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="807" yCoord="626"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="807" yCoord="687"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T25 to P39" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="T25" 
target="P39" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="811" yCoord="702"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="867" yCoord="702"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T23 to P37" inscription="1" source="T23" target="P37" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="751" yCoord="612"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="792" yCoord="612"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T7 to P13" inscription="1" source="T7" target="P13" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="751" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="777" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P13 to T8" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P13" 
target="T8" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="792" yCoord="147"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="792" yCoord="87"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T8 to P14" inscription="1" source="T8" target="P14" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="796" yCoord="72"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="837" yCoord="72"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P13 to T9" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="P13" 
target="T9" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="792" yCoord="176"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="792" yCoord="237"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T9 to P15" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="T9" 
target="P15" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="796" yCoord="252"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="837" yCoord="252"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Send_MSG to MSG1_C" inscription="1" source="T5" 
target="P10" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="511" yCoord="167"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="553" yCoord="185"/> 
</arc> 
</net> 
<query active="true" approximationDenominator="2" capacity="0" 
discreteInclusion="false" enableOverApproximation="false" 
enableUnderApproximation="false" extrapolationOption="AUTOMATIC" 
gcd="true" hashTableSize="MB_16" inclusionPlaces="*NONE*" 
name="Query Comment/Name Here" overApproximation="true" pTrie="true" 
query="EF true" reduction="true" reductionOption="VerifyTAPN" 
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> 
<pnml xmlns="http://www.informatik.hu-berlin.de/top/pnml/ptNetb"> 
<constant name="periodC" value="7"/> 
<constant name="PeriodS" value="5"/> 
<constant name="Deadline" value="5"/> 
<net active="true" id="TAPN1" type="P/T net"> 
<labels border="false" height="20" positionX="125" positionY="24" 
width="77">Client-Side</labels> 
<labels border="false" height="35" positionX="801" positionY="55" 
width="77">Server-Side</labels> 
<labels border="false" height="17" positionX="368" positionY="28" 
width="134">          Intruder</labels> 
<place id="P1" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P1" 
nameOffsetX="22.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="105.0"/> 
<place id="P2" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P2" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P4" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P4" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-6.0" positionX="225.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P5" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P5" 
nameOffsetX="29.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="375.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P13" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P13" 
nameOffsetX="41.0" nameOffsetY="-6.0" positionX="255.0" 
positionY="435.0"/> 
<place id="P3" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P3" 
nameOffsetX="11.0" nameOffsetY="3.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="210.0"/> 
<place id="P14" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P14" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="255.0" 
positionY="510.0"/> 
<place id="P6" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P6" 
nameOffsetX="36.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="510.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
	   256	  
<place id="P9" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P9" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-6.0" positionX="255.0" 
positionY="255.0"/> 
<place id="P7" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P7" 
nameOffsetX="32.0" nameOffsetY="4.0" positionX="510.0" 
positionY="255.0"/> 
<place id="P8" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P8" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="375.0" 
positionY="255.0"/> 
<place id="P10" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P10" 
nameOffsetX="127.0" nameOffsetY="5.0" positionX="195.0" 
positionY="345.0"/> 
<place id="P16" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P16" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="510.0" 
positionY="510.0"/> 
<place id="P15" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P15" 
nameOffsetX="31.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="375.0" 
positionY="510.0"/> 
<place id="P11" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P11" 
nameOffsetX="118.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="270.0"/> 
<place id="P12" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P12" 
nameOffsetX="75.0" nameOffsetY="-15.0" positionX="60.0" 
positionY="435.0"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T1" infiniteServer="false" name="T1" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="49.0" positionX="135.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T2" infiniteServer="false" name="T2" 
nameOffsetX="18.0" nameOffsetY="49.0" positionX="315.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="90" id="T7" infiniteServer="false" name="T7" 
nameOffsetX="-7.0" nameOffsetY="20.0" positionX="195.0" 
positionY="285.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T6" infiniteServer="false" name="T6" 
nameOffsetX="10.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="315.0" 
positionY="255.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T3" infiniteServer="false" name="T3" 
nameOffsetX="30.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="435.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T5" infiniteServer="false" name="T5" 
nameOffsetX="32.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="435.0" 
positionY="255.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
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<transition angle="0" id="T10" infiniteServer="false" name="T10" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="60.0" 
positionY="510.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T11" infiniteServer="false" name="T11" 
nameOffsetX="14.0" nameOffsetY="51.0" positionX="315.0" 
positionY="510.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T12" infiniteServer="false" name="T12" 
nameOffsetX="50.0" nameOffsetY="42.0" positionX="435.0" 
positionY="510.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T8" infiniteServer="false" name="T8" 
nameOffsetX="32.0" nameOffsetY="51.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="345.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T9" infiniteServer="false" name="T9" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="48.0" positionX="195.0" 
positionY="435.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="90" id="T4" infiniteServer="false" name="T4" 
nameOffsetX="40.0" nameOffsetY="36.0" positionX="570.0" 
positionY="210.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<arc id="Tc to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P2" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="71" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="141" yCoord="163"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rc to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P1" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="70" yCoord="123"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="142" yCoord="156"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="generateLoginRequest to LgoinRqst" inscription="1" 
source="T1" target="P4" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="151" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="222" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="LgoinRqst to Encrypt" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P4" 
target="T2" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="251" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="321" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Encrypt to Cipher1" inscription="1" source="T2" target="P5" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="331" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="372" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Requst to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P3" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="68" yCoord="211"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="96" yCoord="186"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="141" yCoord="170"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="xMSG2x to SendMSG2" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P7" 
target="T5" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="507" yCoord="267"/> 
	   258	  
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="451" yCoord="267"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SendMSG2 to Fake_SYNACK" inscription="1" source="T5" 
target="P8" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="441" yCoord="267"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="401" yCoord="267"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Login_MSG to Intercept_MSG" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P5" target="T3" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="401" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="441" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Intercept_MSG to LoginMSG_" inscription="1" source="T3" 
target="P6" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="451" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="507" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Verify_ to Accept" inscription="1" source="T7" target="P10" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="206" yCoord="301"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="206" yCoord="342"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="ReceiveMSG to _MSG2" inscription="1" source="T6" 
target="P9" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="321" yCoord="267"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="281" yCoord="267"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="_MSG2 to Verify_" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P9" 
target="T7" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="252" yCoord="267"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="210" yCoord="270"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="206" yCoord="291"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rc to T20" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P1" target="T10" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="42" yCoord="118"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="15" yCoord="120"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="15" yCoord="525"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="66" yCoord="527"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Tc to T20" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P2" target="T10" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="42" yCoord="163"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="30" yCoord="165"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="30" yCoord="510"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="67" yCoord="517"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T20 to ACK" inscription="1" source="T10" target="P14" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="76" yCoord="527"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="252" yCoord="522"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="T20 to C_SK" inscription="1" source="T10" target="P13" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="77" yCoord="517"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="195" yCoord="510"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="255" yCoord="456"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="ACK to SendACk" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P14" 
target="T11" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="281" yCoord="522"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="321" yCoord="522"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="ReceiveACK to _ACK" inscription="1" source="T12" 
target="P16" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="451" yCoord="522"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="507" yCoord="522"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SendACk to ACK_" inscription="1" source="T11" target="P15" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="331" yCoord="522"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="372" yCoord="522"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="ACK_ to ReceiveACK" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P15" 
target="T12" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="401" yCoord="522"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="441" yCoord="522"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P12 to T8" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P10" 
target="T8" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="192" yCoord="357"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="61" yCoord="357"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T8 to P13" inscription="1" source="T8" target="P11" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="57" yCoord="342"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="57" yCoord="296"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P12 to T9" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="P10" 
target="T9" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="207" yCoord="371"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="207" yCoord="432"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T9 to P14" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="T9" 
target="P12" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="201" yCoord="447"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="86" yCoord="447"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P14 to T10" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P12" target="T10" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="72" yCoord="461"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="72" yCoord="507"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="P10 to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P8" target="T6" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="372" yCoord="267"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="331" yCoord="267"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P6 to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P6" target="T4" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="536" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="584" yCoord="164"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="581" yCoord="216"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T4 to P9" inscription="1" source="T4" target="P7" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="581" yCoord="226"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="584" yCoord="269"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="536" yCoord="267"/> 
</arc> 
</net> 
<query active="true" approximationDenominator="2" capacity="0" 
discreteInclusion="false" enableOverApproximation="false" 
enableUnderApproximation="false" extrapolationOption="AUTOMATIC" 
gcd="true" hashTableSize="MB_16" inclusionPlaces="*NONE*" 
name="Query Comment/Name Here" overApproximation="true" pTrie="true" 
query="EF true" reduction="true" reductionOption="VerifyTAPN" 




































Parallel Session Attack 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> 
<pnml xmlns="http://www.informatik.hu-berlin.de/top/pnml/ptNetb"> 
<constant name="periodC" value="7"/> 
<constant name="PeriodS" value="5"/> 
<constant name="Deadline" value="5"/> 
<net active="true" id="TAPN1" type="P/T net"> 
<labels border="false" height="18" positionX="93" positionY="0" 
width="75">Client-Side</labels> 
<labels border="false" height="18" positionX="739" positionY="0" 
width="75">Server-Side</labels> 
<labels border="false" height="15" positionX="381" positionY="0" 
width="132">          Intruder</labels> 
<place id="P1" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P1" 
nameOffsetX="9.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="13.0" 
positionY="70.0"/> 
<place id="P2" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P2" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="5.0" 
positionY="121.0"/> 
<place id="P4" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P4" 
nameOffsetX="29.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="97.0" 
positionY="121.0"/> 
<place id="P5" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P5" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="181.0" 
positionY="121.0"/> 
<place id="P8" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P8" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="481.0" 
positionY="121.0"/> 
<place id="P10" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P10" 
nameOffsetX="65.0" nameOffsetY="-18.0" positionX="715.0" 
positionY="73.0"/> 
<place id="P9" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P9" 
nameOffsetX="69.0" nameOffsetY="-18.0" positionX="565.0" 
positionY="121.0"/> 
<place id="P12" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P12" 
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nameOffsetX="47.0" nameOffsetY="13.0" positionX="637.0" 
positionY="265.0"/> 
<place id="P14" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P14" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="1.0" positionX="481.0" 
positionY="253.0"/> 
<place id="P13" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P13" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="628.0" 
positionY="316.0"/> 
<place id="P3" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P3" 
nameOffsetX="9.0" nameOffsetY="5.0" positionX="13.0" 
positionY="170.0"/> 
<place id="P15" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P15" 
nameOffsetX="31.0" nameOffsetY="4.0" positionX="481.0" 
positionY="301.0"/> 
<place id="P16" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P16" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="385.0" 
positionY="301.0"/> 
<place id="P17" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P17" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-6.0" positionX="290.0" 
positionY="301.0"/> 
<place id="P18" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P18" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="290.0" 
positionY="373.0"/> 
<place id="P19" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P19" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="385.0" 
positionY="373.0"/> 
<place id="P20" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P20" 
nameOffsetX="29.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="470.0" 
positionY="373.0"/> 
<place id="P27" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P27" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="1.0" positionX="487.0" 
positionY="545.0"/> 
<place id="P28" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P28" 
nameOffsetX="13.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="385.0" 
positionY="545.0"/> 
<place id="P22" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P22" 
nameOffsetX="66.0" nameOffsetY="-17.0" positionX="715.0" 
positionY="325.0"/> 
<place id="P23" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P23" 
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nameOffsetX="83.0" nameOffsetY="-15.0" positionX="613.0" 
positionY="460.0"/> 
<place id="P24" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P24" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="661.0" 
positionY="496.0"/> 
<place id="P25" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P25" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="673.0" 
positionY="545.0"/> 
<place id="P26" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P26" 
nameOffsetX="9.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="526.0" 
positionY="508.0"/> 
<place id="P6" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P6" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="3.0" positionX="277.0" 
positionY="121.0"/> 
<place id="P7" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P7" 
nameOffsetX="22.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="385.0" 
positionY="121.0"/> 
<place id="P11" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P11" 
nameOffsetX="112.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="565.0" 
positionY="241.0"/> 
<place id="P21" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P21" 
nameOffsetX="59.0" nameOffsetY="-15.0" positionX="565.0" 
positionY="373.0"/> 
<place id="P29" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P29" 
nameOffsetX="30.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="290.0" 
positionY="545.0"/> 
<transition angle="180" id="T1" infiniteServer="false" name="T1" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="49.0" positionX="61.0" 
positionY="121.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T2" infiniteServer="false" name="T2" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="51.0" positionX="133.0" 
positionY="121.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T5" infiniteServer="false" name="T5" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="41.0" positionX="433.0" 
positionY="121.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T6" infiniteServer="false" name="T6" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="48.0" positionX="517.0" 
positionY="121.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T9" infiniteServer="false" name="T9" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="40.0" positionX="565.0" 
positionY="301.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T10" infiniteServer="false" name="T10" 
nameOffsetX="37.0" nameOffsetY="48.0" positionX="433.0" 
positionY="301.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
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<transition angle="0" id="T11" infiniteServer="false" name="T11" 
nameOffsetX="15.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="337.0" 
positionY="301.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T12" infiniteServer="false" name="T12" 
nameOffsetX="36.0" nameOffsetY="43.0" positionX="241.0" 
positionY="301.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T13" infiniteServer="false" name="T13" 
nameOffsetX="7.0" nameOffsetY="41.0" positionX="337.0" 
positionY="373.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T14" infiniteServer="false" name="T14" 
nameOffsetX="36.0" nameOffsetY="43.0" positionX="433.0" 
positionY="373.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T19" infiniteServer="false" name="T19" 
nameOffsetX="42.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="433.0" 
positionY="545.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T15" infiniteServer="false" name="T15" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="52.0" positionX="517.0" 
positionY="373.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="180" id="T18" infiniteServer="false" name="T18" 
nameOffsetX="44.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="613.0" 
positionY="545.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T3" infiniteServer="false" name="T3" 
nameOffsetX="31.0" nameOffsetY="48.0" positionX="217.0" 
positionY="121.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T4" infiniteServer="false" name="T4" 
nameOffsetX="14.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="337.0" 
positionY="121.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="90" id="T8" infiniteServer="false" name="T8" 
nameOffsetX="-7.0" nameOffsetY="26.0" positionX="565.0" 
positionY="181.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T7" infiniteServer="false" name="T7" 
nameOffsetX="18.0" nameOffsetY="39.0" positionX="715.0" 
positionY="121.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T16" infiniteServer="false" name="T16" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="40.0" positionX="715.0" 
positionY="373.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T17" infiniteServer="false" name="T17" 
nameOffsetX="42.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="565.0" 
positionY="460.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T20" infiniteServer="false" name="T20" 
nameOffsetX="11.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="337.0" 
positionY="545.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<arc id="Tc to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P2" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="31" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="67" yCoord="133"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rc to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P1" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="35" yCoord="92"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="68" yCoord="126"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="generateLoginRequest to LgoinRqst" inscription="1" 
source="T1" target="P4" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="78" yCoord="132"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="94" yCoord="132"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="LgoinRqst to Encrypt" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P4" 
target="T2" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="123" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="139" yCoord="133"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Encrypt to Cipher1" inscription="1" source="T2" target="P5" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="149" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="178" yCoord="133"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Decrypt to MSG1" inscription="1" source="T5" target="P8" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="449" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="478" yCoord="133"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG1 to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P8" target="T6" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="507" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="523" yCoord="133"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rs to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P12" target="T9" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="634" yCoord="278"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="600" yCoord="281"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="582" yCoord="308"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T6 to SK_s" inscription="1" source="T9" target="P14" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="572" yCoord="308"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="549" yCoord="274"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="507" yCoord="267"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Ts to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P13" target="T9" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="625" yCoord="325"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="581" yCoord="318"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Requst to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P3" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="30" yCoord="167"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="38" yCoord="146"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="67" yCoord="140"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SYNACK_A to SendMSG_" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P15" 
target="T10" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="478" yCoord="313"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="449" yCoord="313"/> 
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</arc> 
<arc id="SendMSG_ to MSG2_A" inscription="1" source="T10" 
target="P16" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="439" yCoord="313"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="411" yCoord="313"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG2_A to Intercept_MSG_" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P16" target="T11" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="382" yCoord="313"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="353" yCoord="313"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Intercept_MSG_ to MSG2_A_" inscription="1" source="T11" 
target="P17" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="343" yCoord="313"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="316" yCoord="313"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="_MSG2 to FabricateMSG2" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P17" 
target="T12" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="287" yCoord="313"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="257" yCoord="313"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="FabricateMSG2 to xMSG2x" inscription="1" source="T12" 
target="P18" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="247" yCoord="313"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="237" yCoord="309"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="237" yCoord="381"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="287" yCoord="384"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="xMSG2x to SendMSG2" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P18" 
target="T13" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="316" yCoord="385"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="343" yCoord="385"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SendMSG2 to LoginReq2" inscription="1" source="T13" 
target="P19" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="353" yCoord="385"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="382" yCoord="385"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="LoginReq2 to RecieveMSG2_" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P19" target="T14" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="411" yCoord="385"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="439" yCoord="385"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="RecieveMSG2_ to SYN_A" inscription="1" source="T14" 
target="P20" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="449" yCoord="385"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="467" yCoord="385"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SYNACK_A to Recieve3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P27" 
target="T19" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="484" yCoord="557"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="449" yCoord="557"/> 
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</arc> 
<arc id="Recieve3 to SYN_ACK_" inscription="1" source="T19" 
target="P28" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="439" yCoord="557"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="411" yCoord="557"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Compute to SYNACK_C" inscription="1" source="T9" 
target="P15" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="571" yCoord="318"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="507" yCoord="314"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Verify_ to Accept" inscription="1" source="T6" target="P9" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="533" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="562" yCoord="133"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SYN_A to _Verify" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P20" 
target="T15" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="496" yCoord="385"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="523" yCoord="385"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Accept_ to T19" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P23" 
target="T18" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="624" yCoord="486"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="624" yCoord="541"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rc_ to T19" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P24" target="T18" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="670" yCoord="522"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="667" yCoord="538"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="630" yCoord="551"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Ts_ to T19" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P25" target="T18" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="670" yCoord="558"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="629" yCoord="561"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T19 to SK_A" inscription="1" source="T18" target="P26" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="620" yCoord="551"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="591" yCoord="518"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="552" yCoord="519"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T19 to SYNACK_A" inscription="1" source="T18" target="P27" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="619" yCoord="561"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="513" yCoord="557"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P5 to T3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P5" target="T3" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="207" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="223" yCoord="133"/> 
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</arc> 
<arc id="T3 to P6" inscription="1" source="T3" target="P6" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="233" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="274" yCoord="133"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P6 to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P6" target="T4" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="303" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="343" yCoord="133"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T4 to P7" inscription="1" source="T4" target="P7" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="353" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="382" yCoord="133"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P7 to T5" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P7" target="T5" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="411" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="439" yCoord="133"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P9 to T7" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P9" 
target="T7" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="591" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="721" yCoord="133"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T7 to P10" inscription="1" source="T7" target="P10" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="727" yCoord="118"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="727" yCoord="99"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P9 to T8" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="P9" 
target="T8" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="576" yCoord="147"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="576" yCoord="187"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T8 to P11" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="T8" 
target="P11" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="576" yCoord="197"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="576" yCoord="238"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P11 to T9" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P11" target="T9" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="577" yCoord="267"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="577" yCoord="298"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T15 to P21" inscription="1" source="T15" target="P21" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="533" yCoord="385"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="562" yCoord="385"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="P21 to T16" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P21" 
target="T16" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="591" yCoord="385"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="721" yCoord="385"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T16 to P22" inscription="1" source="T16" target="P22" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="727" yCoord="370"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="727" yCoord="351"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P21 to T17" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="P21" 
target="T17" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="577" yCoord="399"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="577" yCoord="457"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T17 to P23" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="T17" 
target="P23" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="581" yCoord="472"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="610" yCoord="472"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P28 to T20" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P28" target="T20" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="382" yCoord="557"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="353" yCoord="557"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T20 to P29" inscription="1" source="T20" target="P29" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="343" yCoord="557"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="316" yCoord="557"/> 
</arc> 
</net> 
<query active="true" approximationDenominator="2" capacity="0" 
discreteInclusion="false" enableOverApproximation="false" 
enableUnderApproximation="false" extrapolationOption="AUTOMATIC" 
gcd="true" hashTableSize="MB_16" inclusionPlaces="*NONE*" 
name="Query Comment/Name Here" overApproximation="true" pTrie="true" 
query="EF true" reduction="true" reductionOption="VerifyTAPN" 























<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> 
<pnml xmlns="http://www.informatik.hu-berlin.de/top/pnml/ptNetb"> 
<constant name="periodC" value="7"/> 
<constant name="PeriodS" value="5"/> 
<constant name="Deadline" value="5"/> 
<net active="true" id="TAPN1" type="P/T net"> 
<place id="P1" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P1" 
nameOffsetX="22.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="30.0" 
positionY="105.0"/> 
<place id="P2" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P2" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="26.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P4" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P4" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="105.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P6" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P6" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="195.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P15" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P15" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="765.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P17" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P17" 
nameOffsetX="83.0" nameOffsetY="-19.0" positionX="795.0" 
positionY="60.0"/> 
<place id="P18_" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P18_" 
nameOffsetX="59.0" nameOffsetY="-20.0" positionX="795.0" 
positionY="240.0"/> 
<place id="P19" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P19" 
nameOffsetX="29.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="900.0" 
positionY="270.0"/> 
<place id="P21" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P21" 
nameOffsetX="29.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="810.0" 
positionY="315.0"/> 
<place id="P22" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P22" 
	   271	  
nameOffsetX="3.0" nameOffsetY="3.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="375.0"/> 
<place id="P25" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P25" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="675.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P28" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P28" 
nameOffsetX="40.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="180.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P29" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P29" 
nameOffsetX="99.0" nameOffsetY="-20.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P31" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P31" 
nameOffsetX="114.0" nameOffsetY="5.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="540.0"/> 
<place id="P20" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P20" 
nameOffsetX="36.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="900.0" 
positionY="375.0"/> 
<place id="P3" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P3" 
nameOffsetX="11.0" nameOffsetY="3.0" positionX="30.0" 
positionY="195.0"/> 
<place id="P32" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P32" 
nameOffsetX="28.0" nameOffsetY="1.0" positionX="120.0" 
positionY="615.0"/> 
<place id="P33_" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P33_" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="150.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P36" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P36" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="-7.0" positionX="735.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P38" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P38" 
nameOffsetX="102.0" nameOffsetY="-13.0" positionX="945.0" 
positionY="600.0"/> 
<place id="P39" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P39" 
nameOffsetX="63.0" nameOffsetY="-19.0" positionX="960.0" 
positionY="735.0"/> 
<place id="P11" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P11" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-6.0" positionX="495.0" 
positionY="165.0"/> 
<place id="P23" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P23" 
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nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="420.0"/> 
<place id="P26" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P26" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="480.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P34_" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P34_" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="-7.0" positionX="270.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P35_" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P35_" 
nameOffsetX="35.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="480.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P35" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P35" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="615.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P13" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P13" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="675.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P12" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P12" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-7.0" positionX="585.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P30" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P30" 
nameOffsetX="126.0" nameOffsetY="14.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="255.0"/> 
<place id="P37" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P37" 
nameOffsetX="122.0" nameOffsetY="7.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="645.0"/> 
<place id="P16" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P16" 
nameOffsetX="79.0" nameOffsetY="-11.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P5" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P5" nameOffsetX="-
1.0" nameOffsetY="10.0" positionX="105.0" positionY="210.0"/> 
<place id="P7" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P7" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="240.0" positionY="270.0"/> 
<place id="P9" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P9" 
nameOffsetX="15.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="375.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<place id="P10" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P10" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="465.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
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<place id="P27" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P27" 
nameOffsetX="33.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="285.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P14" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P14" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="720.0" positionY="270.0"/> 
<place id="P24" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P24" 
nameOffsetX="28.0" nameOffsetY="-7.0" positionX="765.0" 
positionY="390.0"/> 
<place id="P8" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P8" 
nameOffsetX="22.0" nameOffsetY="-6.0" positionX="285.0" 
positionY="150.0"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T1" infiniteServer="false" name="T1" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="41.0" positionX="60.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T2" infiniteServer="false" name="T2" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="150.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T9" infiniteServer="false" name="T9" 
nameOffsetX="6.0" nameOffsetY="40.0" positionX="720.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T10" infiniteServer="false" name="T10" 
nameOffsetX="15.0" nameOffsetY="52.0" positionX="810.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T13" infiniteServer="false" name="T13" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="870.0" 
positionY="315.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T14" infiniteServer="false" name="T14" 
nameOffsetX="33.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="810.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T18" infiniteServer="false" name="T18" 
nameOffsetX="10.0" nameOffsetY="52.0" positionX="240.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T19" infiniteServer="false" name="T19" 
nameOffsetX="35.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="105.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="180" id="T22__" infiniteServer="false" 
name="T22__" nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="75.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T199" infiniteServer="false" name="T199" 
nameOffsetX="16.0" nameOffsetY="49.0" positionX="210.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T22_" infiniteServer="false" name="T22_" 
nameOffsetX="41.0" nameOffsetY="43.0" positionX="675.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T23_" infiniteServer="false" name="T23_" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="795.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
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<transition angle="180" id="T3" infiniteServer="false" name="T3" 
nameOffsetX="38.0" nameOffsetY="39.0" positionX="240.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="180" id="T6" infiniteServer="false" name="T6" 
nameOffsetX="37.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="465.0" 
positionY="240.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T16" infiniteServer="false" name="T16" 
nameOffsetX="40.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="630.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T20__" infiniteServer="false" name="T20__" 
nameOffsetX="50.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="330.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T21_" infiniteServer="false" name="T21_" 
nameOffsetX="18.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="555.0" 
positionY="645.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="270" id="T21" infiniteServer="false" name="T21" 
nameOffsetX="54.0" nameOffsetY="28.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="480.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="90" id="T20" infiniteServer="false" name="T20" 
nameOffsetX="56.0" nameOffsetY="30.0" positionX="45.0" 
positionY="300.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T24_" infiniteServer="false" name="T24_" 
nameOffsetX="11.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="600.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T25_" infiniteServer="false" name="T25_" 
nameOffsetX="13.0" nameOffsetY="40.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="735.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T11" infiniteServer="false" name="T11" 
nameOffsetX="51.0" nameOffsetY="18.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="60.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T12" infiniteServer="false" name="T12" 
nameOffsetX="35.0" nameOffsetY="38.0" positionX="855.0" 
positionY="240.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T5" infiniteServer="false" name="T5" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="51.0" positionX="420.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T7" infiniteServer="false" name="T7" 
nameOffsetX="14.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="540.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T8" infiniteServer="false" name="T8" 
nameOffsetX="32.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="630.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T15" infiniteServer="false" name="T15" 
nameOffsetX="29.0" nameOffsetY="52.0" positionX="720.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T4" infiniteServer="false" name="T4" 
nameOffsetX="20.0" nameOffsetY="48.0" positionX="330.0" 
positionY="150.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T17" infiniteServer="false" name="T17" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="330.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
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<arc id="Tc to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P2" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="52" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="66" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="generateLoginRequest to LgoinRqst" inscription="1" 
source="T1" target="P4" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="76" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="102" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="LgoinRqst to Encrypt" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P4" 
target="T2" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="131" yCoord="160"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="157" yCoord="157"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Encrypt to Cipher1" inscription="1" source="T2" target="P6" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="166" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="192" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Decrypt to MSG1" inscription="1" source="T9" target="P15" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="736" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="762" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG1 to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P15" target="T10" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="791" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="816" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rs to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P19" target="T13" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="910" yCoord="296"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="908" yCoord="324"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="887" yCoord="322"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Accept to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P18_" 
target="T13" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="808" yCoord="266"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="810" yCoord="284"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="882" yCoord="287"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="882" yCoord="312"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T6 to SK_s" inscription="1" source="T13" target="P21" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="877" yCoord="322"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="836" yCoord="325"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T6 to SYN_ACK" inscription="1" source="T13" target="P22" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="876" yCoord="332"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="862" yCoord="344"/> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="865" yCoord="372"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SYN_ACK to Encrypt_" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P22" 
target="T14" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="852" yCoord="390"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="827" yCoord="397"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Decrypt_ to MSG2" inscription="1" source="T18" target="P28" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="246" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="206" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG2 to T9" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P28" target="T19" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="177" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="121" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T9 to Reject2" inscription="1" source="T19" target="P29" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="111" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="71" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Ts to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P20" target="T13" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="906" yCoord="372"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="894" yCoord="340"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="886" yCoord="332"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Requst to generateLoginRequest" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P3" target="T1" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="53" yCoord="197"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="66" yCoord="186"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="72" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Tc to T12" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P2" target="T22__" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="23" yCoord="167"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="19" yCoord="169"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="19" yCoord="649"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="82" yCoord="651"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T12 to SK_c" inscription="1" source="T22__" target="P32" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="92" yCoord="651"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="109" yCoord="649"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="121" yCoord="637"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T12 to ACK" inscription="1" source="T22__" target="P33_" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="91" yCoord="661"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="147" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="ACK to _Encrypt" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P33_" 
target="T199" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="176" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="216" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="_Decrypt to MSG3" inscription="1" source="T22_" 
target="P36" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="691" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="732" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG3 to T15" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P36" 
target="T23_" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="761" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="801" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Cipher1 to Receive_Cipher1" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P6" target="T3" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="221" yCoord="161"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="247" yCoord="161"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Cipher2 to T20" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P25" 
target="T16" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="672" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="646" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SYNACK_A to SendMSG_" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P23" 
target="T14" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="854" yCoord="424"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="826" yCoord="407"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Intercept_MSG_ to MSG2_A_" inscription="1" source="T16" 
target="P26" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="636" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="506" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Accept2 to T12" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P31" 
target="T22__" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="61" yCoord="566"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="86" yCoord="641"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SendMSG3 to MSG3_" inscription="1" source="T199" 
target="P34_" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="226" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="267" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG3_ to Intercept_MSG3" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="P34_" target="T20__" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="296" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="336" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Intercept_MSG3 to xMSG3x" inscription="1" source="T20__" 
target="P35_" type="normal" weight="1"> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="346" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="477" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="xMSG3x to SendMSG3_" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P35_" 
target="T21_" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="506" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="561" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="SendMSG3_ to XMSG3X_" inscription="1" source="T21_" 
target="P35" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="571" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="612" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="XMSG3X_ to _ReceiveMSG3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P35" 
target="T22_" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="641" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="681" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="DuplicateMSG to xMSG1_A" inscription="1" source="T6" 
target="P11" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="482" yCoord="251"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="497" yCoord="242"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="504" yCoord="191"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P28 to T16" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P29" 
target="T20" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="56" yCoord="387"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="56" yCoord="316"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T16 to P29" inscription="1" source="T20" target="P30" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="56" yCoord="306"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="56" yCoord="281"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P28 to T17" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="P29" 
target="T21" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="57" yCoord="416"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="57" yCoord="487"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T17 to P30" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="T21" 
target="P31" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="57" yCoord="497"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="57" yCoord="537"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P37 to T24" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P37" 
target="T24_" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="869" yCoord="642"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="868" yCoord="650"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="867" yCoord="627"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T24 to P38" inscription="1" source="T24_" target="P38" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="871" yCoord="612"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="942" yCoord="612"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P37 to T25" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="P37" 
target="T25_" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="867" yCoord="671"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="867" yCoord="732"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T25 to P39" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="T25_" 
target="P39" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="871" yCoord="747"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="957" yCoord="747"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T23 to P37" inscription="1" source="T23_" target="P37" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="811" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="852" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T7 to P13" inscription="1" source="T10" target="P16" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="826" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="852" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P13 to T8" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P16" 
target="T11" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="867" yCoord="147"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="867" yCoord="87"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T8 to P14" inscription="1" source="T11" target="P17" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="861" yCoord="72"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="821" yCoord="72"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P13 to T9" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="P16" 
target="T12" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="867" yCoord="176"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="867" yCoord="237"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T9 to P15" inscription="[0,Deadline]:1" source="T12" 
target="P18_" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="861" yCoord="252"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="821" yCoord="252"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P5 to T2" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P5" target="T2" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="117" yCoord="207"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="117" yCoord="192"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="156" yCoord="167"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P9 to T5" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P9" target="T5" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="401" yCoord="162"/> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="426" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T5 to P10" inscription="1" source="T5" target="P10" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="436" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="462" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P10 to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P10" target="T6" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="476" yCoord="176"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="476" yCoord="236"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Encrypt__ to Cipher1_i" inscription="1" source="T7" 
target="P12" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="556" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="582" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="FakeMSG to Encrypt__" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P11" 
target="T7" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="518" yCoord="167"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="524" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="546" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P12 to T8" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P12" target="T8" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="611" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="636" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T8 to P13" inscription="1" source="T8" target="P13" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="646" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="672" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P13 to T9" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P13" target="T9" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="701" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="726" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P14 to T15" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P14" target="T15" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="732" yCoord="297"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="732" yCoord="342"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="732" yCoord="387"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T14 to P24" inscription="1" source="T14" target="P24" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="816" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="791" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P24 to T15" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P24" target="T15" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="762" yCoord="402"/> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="736" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T15 to P25" inscription="1" source="T15" target="P25" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="726" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="701" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P7 to T3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P7" target="T3" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="252" yCoord="267"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="252" yCoord="192"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="251" yCoord="176"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T3 to P7" inscription="1" source="T3" target="P7" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="251" yCoord="176"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="252" yCoord="192"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="252" yCoord="267"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P7 to T18" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P7" target="T18" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="252" yCoord="297"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="252" yCoord="357"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="252" yCoord="387"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T18 to P7" inscription="1" source="T18" target="P7" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="252" yCoord="387"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="252" yCoord="357"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="252" yCoord="297"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P1 to T22__" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P1" 
target="T22__" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="27" yCoord="117"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="12" yCoord="117"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="12" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="81" yCoord="661"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P1 to T1" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P1" target="T1" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="52" yCoord="127"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="72" yCoord="147"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T15 to P14" inscription="1" source="T15" target="P14" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="732" yCoord="387"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="732" yCoord="342"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="732" yCoord="297"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P14 to T9" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P14" target="T9" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="732" yCoord="267"/> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="732" yCoord="192"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="732" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T9 to P14" inscription="1" source="T9" target="P14" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="732" yCoord="177"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="732" yCoord="207"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="732" yCoord="267"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T3 to P8" inscription="1" source="T3" target="P8" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="257" yCoord="161"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="282" yCoord="161"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P8 to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P8" target="T4" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="311" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="336" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T4 to P9" inscription="1" source="T4" target="P9" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="346" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="372" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T17 to P27" inscription="1" source="T17" target="P27" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="336" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="311" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG2_A_ to _SendMSG_" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P26" 
target="T17" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="477" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="346" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P27 to T18" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P27" target="T18" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="282" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="256" yCoord="402"/> 
</arc> 
</net> 
<query active="true" approximationDenominator="2" capacity="0" 
discreteInclusion="false" enableOverApproximation="false" 
enableUnderApproximation="false" extrapolationOption="AUTOMATIC" 
gcd="true" hashTableSize="MB_16" inclusionPlaces="*NONE*" 
name="Query Comment/Name Here" overApproximation="true" pTrie="true" 
query="EF true" reduction="true" reductionOption="VerifyTAPN" 
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Modified Trust Model (Complex) 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> 
<pnml xmlns="http://www.informatik.hu-berlin.de/top/pnml/ptNetb"> 
<shared-place initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
name="SecretKey"/> 
<shared-transition name="T9" urgent="false"/> 
<shared-transition name="T26" urgent="false"/> 
<shared-transition name="T41" urgent="false"/> 
<constant name="Deadline" value="30"/> 
<constant name="Period" value="20"/> 
<constant name="Reject" value="30"/> 
<constant name="Accept" value="98"/> 
<net active="true" id="TAPN1" type="P/T net"> 
<place id="P1" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P1" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="60.0" positionY="45.0"/> 
<place id="P7" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P7" 
nameOffsetX="18.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="165.0" 
positionY="45.0"/> 
<place id="P2" initialMarking="4" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P2" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="60.0" positionY="90.0"/> 
<place id="P3" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P3" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="60.0" positionY="135.0"/> 
<place id="P8" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P8" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="43.0" positionX="165.0" 
positionY="105.0"/> 
<place id="P4" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P4" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="60.0" positionY="180.0"/> 
<place id="P9" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P9" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="40.0" positionX="165.0" 
positionY="165.0"/> 
<place id="P5" initialMarking="3" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P5" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="60.0" positionY="225.0"/> 
<place id="P6" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P6" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="60.0" positionY="270.0"/> 
<place id="P10" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P10" 
nameOffsetX="37.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="255.0" 
positionY="165.0"/> 
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<place id="P11" initialMarking="3" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P11" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="225.0" positionY="405.0"/> 
<place id="P12" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P12" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="300.0" positionY="225.0"/> 
<place id="P13" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P13" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="41.0" positionX="330.0" 
positionY="345.0"/> 
<place id="P14" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P14" 
nameOffsetX="21.0" nameOffsetY="-7.0" positionX="345.0" 
positionY="165.0"/> 
<place id="P15" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P15" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="435.0" 
positionY="165.0"/> 
<place id="P16" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P16" 
nameOffsetX="18.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="510.0" 
positionY="165.0"/> 
<place id="P17" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P17" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="585.0" positionY="90.0"/> 
<place id="P18" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P18" 
nameOffsetX="18.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="585.0" 
positionY="180.0"/> 
<place id="P19" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P19" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="615.0" positionY="225.0"/> 
<place id="P20" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P20" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="660.0" 
positionY="165.0"/> 
<place id="P21" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P21" 
nameOffsetX="53.0" nameOffsetY="-18.0" positionX="750.0" 
positionY="165.0"/> 
<place id="P22" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P22" 
nameOffsetX="50.0" nameOffsetY="-19.0" positionX="870.0" 
positionY="90.0"/> 
<place id="P23" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P23" 
nameOffsetX="112.0" nameOffsetY="5.0" positionX="750.0" 
positionY="285.0"/> 
<place id="P31" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P31" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="810.0" 
positionY="450.0"/> 
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<place id="P30" initialMarking="3" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P30" 
nameOffsetX="28.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="810.0" 
positionY="405.0"/> 
<place id="P28" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P28" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="600.0" 
positionY="330.0"/> 
<place id="P33" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P33" 
nameOffsetX="32.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="690.0" 
positionY="450.0"/> 
<place id="P32" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P32" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="675.0" 
positionY="405.0"/> 
<place id="P29" initialMarking="2" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P29" 
nameOffsetX="20.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="585.0" 
positionY="375.0"/> 
<place id="P24" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P24" 
nameOffsetX="40.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="840.0" 
positionY="360.0"/> 
<place id="P26" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P26" 
nameOffsetX="7.0" nameOffsetY="4.0" positionX="690.0" 
positionY="255.0"/> 
<place id="P27" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P27" 
nameOffsetX="36.0" nameOffsetY="4.0" positionX="630.0" 
positionY="285.0"/> 
<place id="P25" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P25" 
nameOffsetX="31.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="765.0" 
positionY="360.0"/> 
<place id="P34" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P34" 
nameOffsetX="15.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="585.0" 
positionY="450.0"/> 
<place id="P35" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P35" 
nameOffsetX="36.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="825.0" 
positionY="510.0"/> 
<place id="P36" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P36" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="720.0" 
positionY="495.0"/> 
<place id="P38" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P38" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="720.0" 
positionY="555.0"/> 
	   286	  
<place id="P37" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P37" 
nameOffsetX="41.0" nameOffsetY="3.0" positionX="615.0" 
positionY="495.0"/> 
<place id="P39" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P39" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="555.0" 
positionY="540.0"/> 
<place id="P40" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P40" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="525.0" positionY="585.0"/> 
<place id="P41" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P41" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="585.0" positionY="585.0"/> 
<place id="P42" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P42" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-7.0" positionX="525.0" 
positionY="660.0"/> 
<place id="P43" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P43" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="420.0" 
positionY="660.0"/> 
<place id="P44" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P44" 
nameOffsetX="30.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="345.0" 
positionY="660.0"/> 
<place id="P46" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P46" 
nameOffsetX="13.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="270.0" 
positionY="660.0"/> 
<place id="P45" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P45" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="270.0" 
positionY="570.0"/> 
<place id="P48" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P48" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="75.0" positionY="660.0"/> 
<place id="P49" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt;= Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P49" 
nameOffsetX="76.0" nameOffsetY="-22.0" positionX="75.0" 
positionY="495.0"/> 
<place id="P50" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P50" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="75.0" positionY="810.0"/> 
<place id="P47" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P47" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="4.0" positionX="180.0" 
positionY="660.0"/> 
<place id="P52" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P52" 
nameOffsetX="30.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="150.0" 
positionY="900.0"/> 
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<place id="P51" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P51" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="150.0" positionY="855.0"/> 
<place id="P53" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P53" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="120.0" 
positionY="930.0"/> 
<place id="P54" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P54" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="75.0" positionY="1065.0"/> 
<place id="P55" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P55" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="195.0" positionY="960.0"/> 
<place id="P56" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P56" 
nameOffsetX="31.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="300.0" 
positionY="945.0"/> 
<place id="P57" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P57" 
nameOffsetX="18.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" positionX="180.0" 
positionY="1035.0"/> 
<place id="P58" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P58" 
nameOffsetX="31.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="285.0" 
positionY="1035.0"/> 
<place id="P59" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P59" 
nameOffsetX="39.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="270.0" 
positionY="1140.0"/> 
<place id="P60" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P60" nameOffsetX="-
4.0" nameOffsetY="17.0" positionX="135.0" positionY="1140.0"/> 
<place id="P61" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P61" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="315.0" positionY="1200.0"/> 
<place id="P62" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P62" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-6.0" positionX="435.0" 
positionY="1200.0"/> 
<place id="P63" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P63" 
nameOffsetX="29.0" nameOffsetY="0.0" positionX="510.0" 
positionY="1200.0"/> 
<place id="P65" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P65" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="5.0" positionX="600.0" 
positionY="1125.0"/> 
<place id="P66" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P66" 
nameOffsetX="28.0" nameOffsetY="1.0" positionX="705.0" 
positionY="1125.0"/> 
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<place id="P67" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; Deadline" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P67" 
nameOffsetX="100.0" nameOffsetY="-12.0" positionX="795.0" 
positionY="1125.0"/> 
<place id="P68" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P68" 
nameOffsetX="15.0" nameOffsetY="5.0" positionX="795.0" 
positionY="990.0"/> 
<place id="P69" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P69" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="795.0" positionY="1260.0"/> 
<place id="P70" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P70" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="660.0" positionY="1260.0"/> 
<place id="P64" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P64" 
nameOffsetX="17.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="555.0" 
positionY="1125.0"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T1" infiniteServer="false" name="T1" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="120.0" 
positionY="45.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T2" infiniteServer="false" name="T2" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="120.0" 
positionY="105.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T3" infiniteServer="false" name="T3" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="120.0" 
positionY="165.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T4" infiniteServer="false" name="T4" 
nameOffsetX="39.0" nameOffsetY="40.0" positionX="210.0" 
positionY="165.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T5" infiniteServer="false" name="T5" 
nameOffsetX="32.0" nameOffsetY="3.0" positionX="300.0" 
positionY="165.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T6" infiniteServer="false" name="T6" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="52.0" positionX="330.0" 
positionY="255.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T7" infiniteServer="false" name="T7" 
nameOffsetX="9.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="390.0" 
positionY="165.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T8" infiniteServer="false" name="T8" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="41.0" positionX="465.0" 
positionY="165.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T9" infiniteServer="false" name="T9" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="49.0" positionX="540.0" 
positionY="165.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T10" infiniteServer="false" name="T10" 
nameOffsetX="39.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="615.0" 
positionY="165.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T11" infiniteServer="false" name="T11" 
nameOffsetX="20.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="705.0" 
positionY="165.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
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<transition angle="0" id="T12" infiniteServer="false" name="T12" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="41.0" positionX="870.0" 
positionY="165.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="90" id="T13" infiniteServer="false" name="T13" 
nameOffsetX="-5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="750.0" 
positionY="225.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T16" infiniteServer="false" name="T16" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="765.0" 
positionY="435.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T15" infiniteServer="false" name="T15" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="720.0" 
positionY="390.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="135" id="T17" infiniteServer="false" name="T17" 
nameOffsetX="36.0" nameOffsetY="48.0" positionX="630.0" 
positionY="420.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="225" id="T14" infiniteServer="false" name="T14" 
nameOffsetX="9.0" nameOffsetY="39.0" positionX="720.0" 
positionY="330.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T18" infiniteServer="false" name="T18" 
nameOffsetX="28.0" nameOffsetY="43.0" positionX="780.0" 
positionY="495.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T19" infiniteServer="false" name="T19" 
nameOffsetX="38.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="780.0" 
positionY="555.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T20" infiniteServer="false" name="T20" 
nameOffsetX="28.0" nameOffsetY="48.0" positionX="660.0" 
positionY="495.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="135" id="T21" infiniteServer="false" name="T21" 
nameOffsetX="6.0" nameOffsetY="1.0" positionX="555.0" 
positionY="495.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="135" id="T23" infiniteServer="false" name="T23" 
nameOffsetX="41.0" nameOffsetY="41.0" positionX="555.0" 
positionY="630.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T22" infiniteServer="false" name="T22" 
nameOffsetX="9.0" nameOffsetY="41.0" positionX="510.0" 
positionY="540.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="180" id="T24" infiniteServer="false" name="T24" 
nameOffsetX="24.0" nameOffsetY="49.0" positionX="465.0" 
positionY="660.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T25" infiniteServer="false" name="T25" 
nameOffsetX="14.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="390.0" 
positionY="660.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T26" infiniteServer="false" name="T26" 
nameOffsetX="22.0" nameOffsetY="49.0" positionX="315.0" 
positionY="660.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T27" infiniteServer="false" name="T27" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="48.0" positionX="225.0" 
positionY="660.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T29" infiniteServer="false" name="T29" 
nameOffsetX="39.0" nameOffsetY="34.0" positionX="75.0" 
positionY="555.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
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<transition angle="0" id="T30" infiniteServer="false" name="T30" 
nameOffsetX="43.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="75.0" 
positionY="735.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T28" infiniteServer="false" name="T28" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="150.0" 
positionY="660.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T31" infiniteServer="false" name="T31" 
nameOffsetX="8.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="75.0" 
positionY="870.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T32" infiniteServer="false" name="T32" 
nameOffsetX="35.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="150.0" 
positionY="960.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T33" infiniteServer="false" name="T33" 
nameOffsetX="31.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="250.0" 
positionY="945.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T34" infiniteServer="false" name="T34" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="51.0" positionX="135.0" 
positionY="1035.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T35" infiniteServer="false" name="T35" 
nameOffsetX="41.0" nameOffsetY="37.0" positionX="225.0" 
positionY="1035.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T36" infiniteServer="false" name="T36" 
nameOffsetX="51.0" nameOffsetY="-3.0" positionX="330.0" 
positionY="1035.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T38" infiniteServer="false" name="T38" 
nameOffsetX="29.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="135.0" 
positionY="1200.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T39" infiniteServer="false" name="T39" 
nameOffsetX="-5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="390.0" 
positionY="1200.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T40" infiniteServer="false" name="T40" 
nameOffsetX="40.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="465.0" 
positionY="1200.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T41" infiniteServer="false" name="T41" 
nameOffsetX="33.0" nameOffsetY="41.0" positionX="555.0" 
positionY="1200.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T42" infiniteServer="false" name="T42" 
nameOffsetX="34.0" nameOffsetY="46.0" positionX="645.0" 
positionY="1125.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T43" infiniteServer="false" name="T43" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="49.0" positionX="750.0" 
positionY="1125.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T44" infiniteServer="false" name="T44" 
nameOffsetX="-5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="795.0" 
positionY="1035.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T45" infiniteServer="false" name="T45" 
nameOffsetX="41.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="795.0" 
positionY="1200.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T46" infiniteServer="false" name="T46" 
nameOffsetX="19.0" nameOffsetY="51.0" positionX="735.0" 
positionY="1260.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
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<transition angle="0" id="T37" infiniteServer="false" name="T37" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="195.0" 
positionY="1140.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<arc id="Pc to T0" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P1" target="T1" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="86" yCoord="55"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="127" yCoord="52"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T0 to w1" inscription="1" source="T1" target="P7" 
type="normal" weight="2"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="136" yCoord="57"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="162" yCoord="57"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rc to T0" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P2" target="T1" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="86" yCoord="102"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="118" yCoord="103"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="118" yCoord="73"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="126" yCoord="62"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rc to T2" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P2" target="T2" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="86" yCoord="104"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="127" yCoord="112"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Prv_C to T2" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P3" target="T2" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="86" yCoord="147"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="118" yCoord="148"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="118" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="126" yCoord="122"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T2 to M2" inscription="1" source="T2" target="P8" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="136" yCoord="117"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="162" yCoord="117"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rc to T3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P2" target="T3" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="85" yCoord="108"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="103" yCoord="118"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="103" yCoord="163"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="127" yCoord="172"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M1 to T3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P4" target="T3" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="86" yCoord="189"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="126" yCoord="182"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T3 to M3" inscription="1" source="T3" target="P9" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="136" yCoord="177"/> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="162" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="w1 to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P7" target="T4" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="191" yCoord="57"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="223" yCoord="58"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="222" yCoord="162"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M2 to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P8" target="T4" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="191" yCoord="117"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="208" yCoord="118"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="208" yCoord="163"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="217" yCoord="171"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M3 to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P9" target="T4" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="191" yCoord="177"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="216" yCoord="178"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="ID to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P5" target="T4" 
type="timed" weight="2"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="86" yCoord="237"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="193" yCoord="238"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="193" yCoord="208"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="216" yCoord="185"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Tc to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P6" target="T4" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="86" yCoord="282"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="223" yCoord="283"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="222" yCoord="192"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T4 to MSG" inscription="1" source="T4" target="P10" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="226" yCoord="177"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="252" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MSG to T5" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P10" target="T5" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="281" yCoord="175"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="307" yCoord="172"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="ScrtK to T5" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P11" target="T5" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="237" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="238" yCoord="298"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="306" yCoord="182"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T5 to C1" inscription="1" source="T5" target="P12" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="312" yCoord="192"/> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="312" yCoord="222"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MACkey to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P13" 
target="T6" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="342" yCoord="342"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="342" yCoord="282"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="C1 to T6" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P12" target="T6" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="318" yCoord="250"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="318" yCoord="250"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="336" yCoord="267"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T6 to A1" inscription="1" source="T6" target="P14" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="346" yCoord="267"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="358" yCoord="268"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="357" yCoord="191"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="A1 to T7" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P14" target="T7" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="371" yCoord="177"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="396" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T7 to P15" inscription="1" source="T7" target="P15" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="406" yCoord="177"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="432" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P15 to T8" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P15" target="T8" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="461" yCoord="177"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="471" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T8 to P16" inscription="1" source="T8" target="P16" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="481" yCoord="177"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="507" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P16 to IntegrityCheck" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P16" 
target="T9" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="536" yCoord="177"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="546" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="IntegrityCheck to P21" inscription="1" source="T9" 
target="P18" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="556" yCoord="182"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="582" yCoord="188"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="IntegrityCheck to P20" inscription="1" source="T9" 
target="P17" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="557" yCoord="172"/> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="598" yCoord="163"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="597" yCoord="116"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P21 to T10" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P18" target="T10" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="610" yCoord="184"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="621" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P22 to T10" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P19" target="T10" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="627" yCoord="222"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="627" yCoord="192"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T10 to P23" inscription="1" source="T10" target="P20" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="631" yCoord="177"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="657" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P23 to T11" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P20" target="T11" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="686" yCoord="177"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="711" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T11 to P24" inscription="1" source="T11" target="P21" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="721" yCoord="177"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="747" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P24 to T12" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P21" 
target="T12" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="776" yCoord="177"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="876" yCoord="177"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T12 to P25" inscription="1" source="T12" target="P22" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="882" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="882" yCoord="116"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P24 to T13" inscription="[0,Period]:1" source="P21" 
target="T13" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="761" yCoord="191"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="761" yCoord="231"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T13 to P26" inscription="[0,Period]:1" source="T13" 
target="P23" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="761" yCoord="241"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="761" yCoord="282"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Ps to T14" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P31" target="T16" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="807" yCoord="458"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="781" yCoord="452"/> 
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</arc> 
<arc id="Rs to T14" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P30" target="T16" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="809" yCoord="425"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="782" yCoord="442"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T14 to W2" inscription="1" source="T16" target="P33" 
type="normal" weight="2"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="771" yCoord="447"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="716" yCoord="459"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rs to T15" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P30" target="T15" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="807" yCoord="415"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="736" yCoord="407"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T15 to Ks" inscription="1" source="T15" target="P32" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="726" yCoord="402"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="701" yCoord="411"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P26 to T17" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P23" target="T14" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="754" yCoord="310"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="742" yCoord="331"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T17 to Tc_" inscription="1" source="T14" target="P26" 
type="normal" weight="2"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="732" yCoord="334"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="708" yCoord="280"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T17 to IDc_" inscription="1" source="T14" target="P27" 
type="normal" weight="2"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="724" yCoord="341"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="655" yCoord="304"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T17 to M3_" inscription="1" source="T14" target="P24" 
type="normal" weight="3"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="739" yCoord="341"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="837" yCoord="368"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T17 to W1_" inscription="1" source="T14" target="P25" 
type="normal" weight="2"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="732" yCoord="348"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="763" yCoord="364"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="W1_ to T15" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P25" target="T15" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="764" yCoord="380"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="737" yCoord="397"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="T18 to M5" inscription="1" source="T18" target="P36" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="786" yCoord="507"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="746" yCoord="507"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M4 to T19" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P35" target="T19" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="827" yCoord="533"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="823" yCoord="538"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="797" yCoord="559"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T19 to M6" inscription="1" source="T19" target="P38" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="786" yCoord="567"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="746" yCoord="567"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M5 to T20" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P36" target="T20" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="717" yCoord="505"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="677" yCoord="502"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M6 to T21" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P38" target="T21" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="717" yCoord="564"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="628" yCoord="553"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="577" yCoord="518"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M7 to T21" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P37" target="T21" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="612" yCoord="507"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="576" yCoord="509"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T21 to P42" inscription="1" source="T21" target="P39" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="563" yCoord="510"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="565" yCoord="537"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P22 to T23" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P19" target="T22" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="612" yCoord="237"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="523" yCoord="238"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="522" yCoord="537"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P42 to T23" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P39" target="T22" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="552" yCoord="552"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="526" yCoord="552"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T23 to P43" inscription="1" source="T22" target="P40" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="522" yCoord="567"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="530" yCoord="583"/> 
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</arc> 
<arc id="P43 to T22" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P40" target="T23" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="544" yCoord="610"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="556" yCoord="631"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P44 to T22" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P41" target="T23" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="588" yCoord="609"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="570" yCoord="637"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T22 to P45" inscription="1" source="T23" target="P42" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="563" yCoord="645"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="547" yCoord="661"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P45 to T24" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P42" target="T24" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="522" yCoord="671"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="482" yCoord="671"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T24 to P46" inscription="1" source="T24" target="P43" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="472" yCoord="671"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="446" yCoord="671"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P46 to T25" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P43" target="T25" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="417" yCoord="672"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="406" yCoord="672"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T25 to P47" inscription="1" source="T25" target="P44" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="396" yCoord="672"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="371" yCoord="672"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P47 to Integrity_C" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P44" 
target="T26" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="342" yCoord="672"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="331" yCoord="672"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Integrity_C to P48" inscription="1" source="T26" 
target="P46" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="321" yCoord="677"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="296" yCoord="674"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Integrity_C to P49" inscription="1" source="T26" 
target="P45" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="322" yCoord="667"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="283" yCoord="628"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="282" yCoord="596"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="P48 to T27" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P46" target="T27" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="267" yCoord="672"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="241" yCoord="672"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T16 to SK_s" inscription="1" source="T17" target="P34" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="638" yCoord="435"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="609" yCoord="453"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M3_ to T18" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P24" target="T18" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="850" yCoord="386"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="838" yCoord="478"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="797" yCoord="502"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T20 to M7" inscription="1" source="T20" target="P37" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="666" yCoord="507"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="641" yCoord="507"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="W2 to T21" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P33" target="T21" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="687" yCoord="465"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="643" yCoord="478"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="573" yCoord="506"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="IDS to T21" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P29" target="T21" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="582" yCoord="387"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="553" yCoord="388"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="562" yCoord="494"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Ts to T21" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P28" target="T21" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="597" yCoord="345"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="553" yCoord="358"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="565" yCoord="497"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="IDc_ to T21" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P27" 
target="T21" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="627" yCoord="301"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="553" yCoord="328"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="568" yCoord="500"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P50 to T28" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P48" 
target="T29" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="87" yCoord="657"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="87" yCoord="582"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T28 to P51" inscription="1" source="T29" target="P49" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="87" yCoord="552"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="87" yCoord="521"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T27 to P53" inscription="1" source="T27" target="P47" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="231" yCoord="672"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="206" yCoord="672"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P53 to T30" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P47" target="T28" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="177" yCoord="672"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="166" yCoord="672"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P50 to T29" inscription="[0,Period]:1" source="P48" 
target="T30" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="87" yCoord="686"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="87" yCoord="732"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T29 to P52" inscription="[0,Period]:1" source="T30" 
target="P50" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="87" yCoord="762"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="87" yCoord="807"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P52 to T31" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P50" target="T31" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="87" yCoord="836"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="87" yCoord="867"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T31 to W2_" inscription="1" source="T31" target="P53" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="91" yCoord="888"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="122" yCoord="930"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="W2_ to T32" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P53" target="T32" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="142" yCoord="952"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="157" yCoord="967"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Rc to T32" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P2" target="T32" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="57" yCoord="102"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="13" yCoord="103"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="28" yCoord="973"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="133" yCoord="973"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="156" yCoord="977"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T32 to Kc" inscription="1" source="T32" target="P55" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="166" yCoord="972"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="192" yCoord="972"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="Kc to T33" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P55" target="T33" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="221" yCoord="970"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="256" yCoord="965"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Tc to T33" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P6" target="T33" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="57" yCoord="282"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="28" yCoord="283"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="28" yCoord="1018"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="253" yCoord="1018"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="262" yCoord="972"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T31 to Ts_" inscription="1" source="T31" target="P52" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="92" yCoord="881"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="148" yCoord="905"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T31 to IDs_" inscription="1" source="T31" target="P51" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="92" yCoord="874"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="147" yCoord="868"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Ts_ to T33" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P52" target="T33" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="175" yCoord="918"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="256" yCoord="958"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="IDs_ to T33" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P51" 
target="T33" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="173" yCoord="876"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="257" yCoord="951"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="w1 to T33" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P7" target="T33" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="177" yCoord="42"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="178" yCoord="28"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="13" yCoord="28"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="28" yCoord="1018"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="253" yCoord="1018"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="5" xCoord="262" yCoord="972"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T33 to SK_" inscription="1" source="T33" target="P56" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="266" yCoord="957"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="297" yCoord="957"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M6_ to T34" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P54" target="T34" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="100" yCoord="1070"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="141" yCoord="1052"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="T34 to M8" inscription="1" source="T34" target="P57" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="151" yCoord="1047"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="177" yCoord="1047"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M8 to T35" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P57" target="T35" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="206" yCoord="1047"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="231" yCoord="1047"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M6_ to T35" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P54" target="T35" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="101" yCoord="1077"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="118" yCoord="1078"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="238" yCoord="1078"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="237" yCoord="1062"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T35 to M9" inscription="1" source="T35" target="P58" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="241" yCoord="1047"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="282" yCoord="1047"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T31 to M6_" inscription="1" source="T31" target="P54" 
type="normal" weight="2"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="87" yCoord="897"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="87" yCoord="1062"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="ID to T36" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P5" target="T36" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="57" yCoord="237"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="28" yCoord="238"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="28" yCoord="1108"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="328" yCoord="1093"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="342" yCoord="1062"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Tc to T36" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P6" target="T36" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="57" yCoord="282"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="28" yCoord="283"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="28" yCoord="1108"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="328" yCoord="1093"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="342" yCoord="1062"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="IDs_ to T36" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P51" 
target="T36" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="176" yCoord="869"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="343" yCoord="898"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="342" yCoord="1032"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M9 to T36" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P58" target="T36" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="311" yCoord="1047"/> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="336" yCoord="1047"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T36 to P65" inscription="1" source="T36" target="P59" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="342" yCoord="1062"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="331" yCoord="1146"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="296" yCoord="1150"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P68 to T38" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P60" target="T38" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="147" yCoord="1166"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="147" yCoord="1197"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T38 to P69" inscription="1" source="T38" target="P61" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="151" yCoord="1212"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="312" yCoord="1212"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P69 to T39" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P61" target="T39" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="341" yCoord="1212"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="396" yCoord="1212"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T39 to P62" inscription="1" source="T39" target="P62" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="406" yCoord="1212"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="432" yCoord="1212"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P62 to T40" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P62" target="T40" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="461" yCoord="1212"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="471" yCoord="1212"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T40 to P63" inscription="1" source="T40" target="P63" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="481" yCoord="1212"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="492" yCoord="1212"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="507" yCoord="1212"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P63 to T41" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P63" target="T41" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="536" yCoord="1212"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="561" yCoord="1212"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T41 to P65" inscription="1" source="T41" target="P65" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="571" yCoord="1212"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="612" yCoord="1212"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="612" yCoord="1152"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P65 to T42" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P65" target="T42" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="626" yCoord="1137"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="651" yCoord="1137"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T42 to P66" inscription="1" source="T42" target="P66" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="661" yCoord="1137"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="702" yCoord="1137"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P66 to T43" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P66" target="T43" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="731" yCoord="1137"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="756" yCoord="1137"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T43 to P67" inscription="1" source="T43" target="P67" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="766" yCoord="1137"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="792" yCoord="1137"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P67 to T44" inscription="[Deadline,Deadline]" source="P67" 
target="T44" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="807" yCoord="1122"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="807" yCoord="1062"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T44 to P68" inscription="1" source="T44" target="P68" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="807" yCoord="1032"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="807" yCoord="1016"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P67 to T45" inscription="[0,Period]:1" source="P67" 
target="T45" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="807" yCoord="1151"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="807" yCoord="1197"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T45 to P69" inscription="[0,Period]:1" source="T45" 
target="P69" type="transport" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="807" yCoord="1227"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="807" yCoord="1257"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P69 to T46" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P69" target="T46" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="792" yCoord="1272"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="751" yCoord="1272"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T46 to P70" inscription="1" source="T46" target="P70" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="741" yCoord="1272"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="686" yCoord="1272"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P35 to T18" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P35" target="T18" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="822" yCoord="518"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="796" yCoord="512"/> 
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</arc> 
<arc id="P32 to T17" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P32" target="T17" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="673" yCoord="423"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="651" yCoord="434"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P26 to T17" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P26" target="T17" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="696" yCoord="281"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="643" yCoord="425"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P27 to T17" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P27" target="T17" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="641" yCoord="311"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="639" yCoord="421"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P28 to T17" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P28" target="T17" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="615" yCoord="356"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="631" yCoord="421"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P29 to T17" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P29" target="T17" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="607" yCoord="397"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="631" yCoord="421"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P26 to T21" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P26" target="T21" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="687" yCoord="267"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="552" yCoord="267"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="570" yCoord="503"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T28 to P48" inscription="1" source="T28" target="P48" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="156" yCoord="672"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="101" yCoord="672"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="M1 to T34" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P4" target="T34" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="57" yCoord="192"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="28" yCoord="193"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="28" yCoord="898"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="28" yCoord="1048"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="142" yCoord="1042"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P11 to T27" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P11" target="T27" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="237" yCoord="431"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="237" yCoord="657"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P59 to T37" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P59" target="T37" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="267" yCoord="1152"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="211" yCoord="1152"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T37 to P60" inscription="1" source="T37" target="P60" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="201" yCoord="1152"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="161" yCoord="1152"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P11 to T37" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P11" target="T37" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="222" yCoord="417"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="12" yCoord="417"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="12" yCoord="1122"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="207" yCoord="1122"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="207" yCoord="1137"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P25 to T17" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P25" target="T17" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="762" yCoord="372"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="687" yCoord="372"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="647" yCoord="430"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P33 to T17" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P33" target="T17" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="687" yCoord="456"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="652" yCoord="443"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P24 to T20" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P24" target="T20" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="865" yCoord="378"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="882" yCoord="387"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="882" yCoord="597"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="702" yCoord="597"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="702" yCoord="522"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="5" xCoord="676" yCoord="512"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P13 to T38" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P13" target="T38" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="327" yCoord="357"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="12" yCoord="357"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="15" yCoord="1212"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="141" yCoord="1212"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P19 to T42" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P19" target="T42" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="642" yCoord="237"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="897" yCoord="237"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="897" yCoord="942"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="657" yCoord="942"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="4" xCoord="657" yCoord="1122"/> 
</arc> 
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<arc id="T41 to P64" inscription="1" source="T41" target="P64" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="567" yCoord="1197"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="567" yCoord="1151"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P30 to T19" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P30" target="T19" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="837" yCoord="417"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="867" yCoord="417"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="867" yCoord="567"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="3" xCoord="797" yCoord="566"/> 
</arc> 
</net> 
<net active="true" id="Integrity1" type="P/T net"> 
<place id="Authenticated_msg" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; 
inf" markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" 
name="Authenticated_msg" nameOffsetX="65.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" 
positionX="105.0" positionY="120.0"/> 
<place id="Recieved_MAC_Value" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; 
inf" markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" 
name="Recieved_MAC_Value" nameOffsetX="69.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" 
positionX="300.0" positionY="60.0"/> 
<place id="Cipher" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="Cipher" 
nameOffsetX="30.0" nameOffsetY="44.0" positionX="240.0" 
positionY="120.0"/> 
<place id="MAC_Key" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="MAC_Key" 
nameOffsetX="-5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="300.0" 
positionY="195.0"/> 
<place id="Computed_MAC_Value" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; 
inf" markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" 
name="Computed_MAC_Value" nameOffsetX="76.0" nameOffsetY="39.0" 
positionX="375.0" positionY="120.0"/> 
<place id="Result" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="Result" 
nameOffsetX="37.0" nameOffsetY="45.0" positionX="495.0" 
positionY="120.0"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T9" infiniteServer="false" name="T9" 
nameOffsetX="-18.0" nameOffsetY="188.0" positionX="30.0" 
positionY="120.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="Split" infiniteServer="false" name="Split" 
nameOffsetX="27.0" nameOffsetY="2.0" positionX="180.0" 
positionY="120.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="Compute" infiniteServer="false" 
name="Compute" nameOffsetX="35.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" 
positionX="300.0" positionY="120.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="Compare" infiniteServer="false" 
name="Compare" nameOffsetX="36.0" nameOffsetY="-5.0" 
positionX="450.0" positionY="120.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<arc id="IntegrityCheck to A1" inscription="1" source="T9" 
target="Authenticated_msg" type="normal" weight="1"> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="46" yCoord="132"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="102" yCoord="132"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="A1 to T3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="Authenticated_msg" 
target="Split" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="131" yCoord="132"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="186" yCoord="132"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T3 to MACValue" inscription="1" source="Split" 
target="Recieved_MAC_Value" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="197" yCoord="127"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="298" yCoord="78"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T3 to Cipher" inscription="1" source="Split" 
target="Cipher" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="196" yCoord="137"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="237" yCoord="133"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Cipher to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="Cipher" 
target="Compute" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="266" yCoord="132"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="306" yCoord="132"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="Macscrt to T4" inscription="[0,inf)" source="MAC_Key" 
target="Compute" type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="312" yCoord="192"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="312" yCoord="147"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T4 to MacValue2" inscription="1" source="Compute" 
target="Computed_MAC_Value" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="316" yCoord="132"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="372" yCoord="132"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MACValue to T5" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="Recieved_MAC_Value" target="Compare" type="timed" 
weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="326" yCoord="77"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="457" yCoord="127"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="MacValue2 to T5" inscription="[0,inf)" 
source="Computed_MAC_Value" target="Compare" type="timed" 
weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="401" yCoord="133"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="456" yCoord="137"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T5 to P11" inscription="1" source="Compare" target="Result" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="466" yCoord="132"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="492" yCoord="132"/> 
</arc> 
</net> 
<net active="true" id="Integrity2" type="P/T net"> 
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<place id="P19" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P19" 
nameOffsetX="22.0" nameOffsetY="-2.0" positionX="105.0" 
positionY="75.0"/> 
<place id="P20" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P20" 
nameOffsetX="38.0" nameOffsetY="7.0" positionX="180.0" 
positionY="75.0"/> 
<place id="P21" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P21" 
nameOffsetX="4.0" nameOffsetY="10.0" positionX="255.0" 
positionY="15.0"/> 
<place id="P22" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P22" 
nameOffsetX="12.0" nameOffsetY="3.0" positionX="300.0" 
positionY="75.0"/> 
<place id="P23" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P23" 
nameOffsetX="29.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="435.0" 
positionY="75.0"/> 
<place id="P24" initialMarking="1" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P24" nameOffsetX="-
5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="240.0" positionY="165.0"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T26" infiniteServer="false" name="T26" 
nameOffsetX="-5.0" nameOffsetY="35.0" positionX="60.0" 
positionY="75.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T1" infiniteServer="false" name="T1" 
nameOffsetX="21.0" nameOffsetY="47.0" positionX="135.0" 
positionY="75.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T2" infiniteServer="false" name="T2" 
nameOffsetX="8.0" nameOffsetY="40.0" positionX="240.0" 
positionY="75.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T3" infiniteServer="false" name="T3" 
nameOffsetX="35.0" nameOffsetY="43.0" positionX="360.0" 
positionY="75.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<arc id="Integrity_C to P19" inscription="1" source="T26" 
target="P19" type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="76" yCoord="87"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="102" yCoord="87"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P19 to T1" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P19" target="T1" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="131" yCoord="87"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="141" yCoord="87"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T1 to P20" inscription="1" source="T1" target="P20" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="151" yCoord="92"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="177" yCoord="88"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T1 to P21" inscription="1" source="T1" target="P21" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="152" yCoord="82"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="253" yCoord="33"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P21 to T3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P21" target="T3" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="277" yCoord="37"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="268" yCoord="28"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="2" xCoord="367" yCoord="82"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P20 to T2" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P20" target="T2" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="206" yCoord="87"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="246" yCoord="87"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P24 to T2" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P24" target="T2" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="252" yCoord="162"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="252" yCoord="102"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T2 to P22" inscription="1" source="T2" target="P22" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="256" yCoord="87"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="297" yCoord="87"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P22 to T3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P22" target="T3" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="326" yCoord="88"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="366" yCoord="92"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T3 to P23" inscription="1" source="T3" target="P23" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="376" yCoord="87"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="432" yCoord="87"/> 
</arc> 
</net> 
<net active="true" id="Integrity3" type="P/T net"> 
<place id="P19" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P19" 
nameOffsetX="26.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="150.0" 
positionY="60.0"/> 
<place id="P20" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P20" nameOffsetX="-
3.0" nameOffsetY="20.0" positionX="285.0" positionY="5.0"/> 
<place id="P21" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P21" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="-4.0" positionX="255.0" 
positionY="60.0"/> 
<place id="P22" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P22" 
nameOffsetX="32.0" nameOffsetY="43.0" positionX="300.0" 
positionY="135.0"/> 
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<place id="P23" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P23" 
nameOffsetX="8.0" nameOffsetY="-1.0" positionX="360.0" 
positionY="60.0"/> 
<place id="P24" initialMarking="0" invariant="&lt; inf" 
markingOffsetX="0.0" markingOffsetY="0.0" name="P24" 
nameOffsetX="25.0" nameOffsetY="3.0" positionX="450.0" 
positionY="60.0"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T41" infiniteServer="false" name="T41" 
nameOffsetX="52.0" nameOffsetY="50.0" positionX="90.0" 
positionY="60.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T1" infiniteServer="false" name="T1" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="51.0" positionX="195.0" 
positionY="60.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T2" infiniteServer="false" name="T2" 
nameOffsetX="20.0" nameOffsetY="42.0" positionX="300.0" 
positionY="60.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<transition angle="0" id="T3" infiniteServer="false" name="T3" 
nameOffsetX="23.0" nameOffsetY="42.0" positionX="405.0" 
positionY="60.0" priority="0" urgent="false"/> 
<arc id="T41 to P19" inscription="1" source="T41" target="P19" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="106" yCoord="72"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="147" yCoord="72"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P19 to T1" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P19" target="T1" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="176" yCoord="72"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="201" yCoord="72"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T1 to P21" inscription="1" source="T1" target="P21" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="211" yCoord="77"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="252" yCoord="73"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T1 to P20" inscription="1" source="T1" target="P20" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="212" yCoord="67"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="284" yCoord="24"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P21 to T2" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P21" target="T2" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="281" yCoord="72"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="306" yCoord="72"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P22 to T2" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P22" target="T2" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="312" yCoord="132"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="312" yCoord="87"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T2 to P23" inscription="1" source="T2" target="P23" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
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<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="316" yCoord="72"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="357" yCoord="72"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P23 to T3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P23" target="T3" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="386" yCoord="74"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="411" yCoord="77"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="P20 to T3" inscription="[0,inf)" source="P20" target="T3" 
type="timed" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="310" yCoord="23"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="412" yCoord="67"/> 
</arc> 
<arc id="T3 to P24" inscription="1" source="T3" target="P24" 
type="normal" weight="1"> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="0" xCoord="421" yCoord="72"/> 
<arcpath arcPointType="false" id="1" xCoord="447" yCoord="72"/> 
</arc> 
</net> 
<k-bound bound="3"/> 
</pnml> 
 
 
